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exeCuTive summary
Canada is drawing an ever-greater proportion of its 
new immigrants from countries in the Global South, 
including Africa. There is little evidence that Canadian 
policy makers have seriously considered the possible 
negative consequences of this trend for the development 
prospects of these countries. In part, this is because of a 
lack of coherence between Canadian immigration and 
development policy. As a result, Canada has traditionally 
been extremely defensive about charges that it, along 
with other industrialized countries, is responsible for a 
crippling “brain drain” of skills from the South. The idea 
that migration to the North inevitably leads to economic 
and social stagnation and decline in the South was 
extremely common a decade ago. Since then, however, a 
new and more positive prognosis has emerged about the 
nexus between migration and development. In the words 
of one commentator, there has been a “pendulum swing” 
from deep pessimism to unbridled optimism (de Haas, 
2012).
The migration and development nexus has risen rapidly 
to the top of the international policy agenda over the last 
decade. Evidence for this includes the UN High Level 
Dialogue on Migration and Development (convened 
in 2006 with a second scheduled for late 2013), the 
annual meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development, the formation of the multilateral Global 
Migration Group and the growing number of migration 
and mobility partnerships between blocs of states (Crush, 
2013). Central to the new consensus that migration is, or 
can be, good for development is the empirical reality that 
migrants from the South to the North rarely cut their ties 
when they emigrate. There is growing evidence that these 
ties are responsible for massive, though uneven, transfers 
of remittances, direct investment, philanthropic capital, 
knowledge, skills, technology and personnel from North 
to South. Some have even argued that this process has 
been essential to the unprecedented growth of emerging 
economies in the South.
States in the North and South are increasingly concerned 
with how to tap the potential of migrant diasporas to 
facilitate social and economic development in the South. 
Various “diaspora engagement” initiatives are currently 
emerging in countries such as Canada and in many of 
the countries from which people immigrate to Canada. In 
order to better understand the potential for government 
support of diaspora engagement and to identify which 
kinds of activities are likely to bring the greatest return, it is 
extremely important to build knowledge on the links that 
diasporas currently maintain with their countries of origin. 
This report is presented as a contribution to that project by 
constructing a systematic knowledge base about Southern 
African diasporas in Canada. In addition to providing 
insights about the actual and potential development 
impacts of these diasporas, this report presents a new 
methodology for accessing information about diasporas 
which could be used for other national groups in Canada, 
and more broadly.
At present, the Southern African diaspora in Canada 
exceeds 120,000 people and continues to grow. Migration 
from the 15 countries of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) to Canada is certainly not a new 
phenomenon although it has accelerated rapidly in recent 
years. In the 1980s, for example, between 1,000 and 2,000 
people emigrated each year from this region to Canada, a 
figure that increased to around 3,000 per year in the 1990s 
and rose again to over 4,000 per year after 2000. Since 
1990, every SADC country has experienced a growth in 
emigration to Canada. The greatest increases came from 
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mauritius. By 2006, the Southern 
African immigrant population of Canada constituted 
27 percent of the total number of African immigrants in 
Canada. Three countries dominate the flow, making up 72 
percent of the total: South Africa (40,570), Tanzania (20,115) 
and the DRC (15,795).
Over the past three decades, more than half (55 percent) 
of SADC immigrants to Canada entered in the economic 
class. An additional 22 percent entered in the refugee class 
and 20 percent in the family class. Temporary migration 
from SADC to Canada has also increased considerably 
since the late 1990s. SADC migrants (including temporary 
workers and students) make up less than three percent 
of all temporary migrants in Canada but 31 percent of all 
African temporary residents in the country. Over 95 percent 
of SADC immigrants in Canada live in just four provinces: 
Ontario (48 percent), British Columbia (19 percent), 
Quebec (17 percent) and Alberta (12 percent). Francophone 
immigrants mainly settle in Quebec. Immigrants from 
South Africa and Zimbabwe are dispersed throughout the 
country. Over 90 percent of South Africans, Zimbabweans 
and Tanzanians live in Ontario, British Columbia and 
Alberta. Two-thirds of all Southern African immigrants to 
Canada settle in three main metropolitan areas: Toronto, 
Montreal and Vancouver.
In 2010 and 2011, the Southern African Migration 
Programme (SAMP) conducted an innovative online and 
face-to-face survey of Southern Africans in Canada. The 
survey made extensive use of social media to identify 
members of the diaspora for interview. The questionnaire 
was completed by a total of 2,439 respondents. The 
information collected focussed on the demographic, 
social, economic, employment and educational profile 
of individuals and households; their reasons for leaving 
Africa and coming to Canada; their experiences in Canada 
and comparisons between Canada and countries in Africa; 
the linkages maintained with countries of origin, including 
remittances and other economic links, family ties, and 
frequency and reasons for return visits; involvement in 
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development-related activities in countries of origin; 
and the likelihood of returning to Africa temporarily or 
permanently.
The survey revealed significant differences between South 
Africans and non-South Africans. The immigrants from 
outside South Africa fit the profile of a diaspora that is 
engaged with countries of origin.  Among the key findings 
for the respondents from SADC countries outside South 
Africa are the following:
• While Canada has been accused of precipitating 
a brain drain from Africa, only 19 percent of the 
sample actually entered Canada in the economic 
class (20 percent). The bulk of the remainder entered 
as asylum seekers/refugees (34 percent), students (18 
percent) and family-class immigrants (15 percent). 
Irrespective of the category of entry, 53 percent had 
acquired Canadian citizenship and another 35 percent 
were permanent residents.
• The immigrants had attained high levels of education 
before coming to Canada, and are more educated 
than the Canadian-born population. For example, 30 
percent had at least a university degree upon entry to 
Canada, compared with 19 percent of the Canadian 
population. As many as a third had to re-certify or re-
train in Canada in order to work in a field for which 
they were already trained. Furthermore, 30 percent 
were working in occupations that did not make full 
use of their qualifications.
• Only seven percent were unemployed, while an 
additional 21 percent were students. The most 
common occupations included sales and service, 
health and finance, business and banking. Almost a 
third of the respondents earn less than CDN$25,000 
a year. An additional 34 percent earn between 
CDN$26,000–50,000 a year and less than five percent 
earn more than CDN$200,000 a year. The income 
profile is consistent with the African immigrant 
population in Canada more generally.
• Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the respondents 
said that they have an important role to play in 
developing their countries of origin. Only 15 percent 
thought that they had no role to play.
• Nearly 70 percent of the respondents remit money 
to their country of origin. One-quarter remit at least 
once a month, another third at least once a year and 
the rest occasionally. The average amount remitted is 
CDN$1,000 per year. A smaller number (55 percent) 
also remit goods with an average annual value of 
CDN$500. Remitting consists almost exclusively 
of private funds sent to immediate and extended 
family. Nearly all remitters (95 percent) send money 
to immediate family members, while 50 percent 
also remit to extended family. Only 10 percent send 
remittances to community groups and organizations. 
Households receiving remittances from relatives in 
Canada spend the funds on their immediate needs: 
61 percent of remitters send money for food purchase 
and 44 percent to meet other day-to-day household 
expenses. A significant proportion also remit to 
meet medical expenses (59 percent) and to pay for 
education and school fees (58 percent). A much 
smaller proportion send money for direct productive 
investment: for example, 12 percent send remittances 
for purchase of agricultural inputs, 10 percent for 
starting or running a business and six percent for 
buying property.
• In terms of diaspora engagement activities, nearly 50 
percent of the respondents have participated in some 
kind of economic activity in their country of origin: 
25 percent have exported Canadian goods for sale, 
11 percent had invested in business, 11 percent have 
generated employment, 10 percent have engaged 
in research partnerships and nine percent have 
purchased local goods for resale in Canada.
• In terms of willingness to be engaged in the future, 
only nine percent said they had no interest. The 
favoured avenues of engagement included skills 
transfer (mentioned by 58 percent), investing 
in businesses (55 percent), participation in 
developmental projects (52 percent), educational 
exchanges (52 percent), volunteer work (48 percent), 
fundraising for development projects (46 percent), 
philanthropy (42 percent), export and import of 
goods to and from the country of origin (38 percent), 
investing in infrastructural development (39 percent) 
and providing distance learning (37 percent). Others 
specifically mentioned their desire to be involved in 
activities that would lead to greater empowerment 
for women and children.
• Despite high levels of citizenship and permanent 
residence in Canada, and the fact that Canada was 
rated more favourably on a wide range of economic, 
social and political indicators, 55 percent of the 
respondents had given return migration some or a 
great deal of consideration. However, only 15 percent 
thought it was likely within two years, a figure that 
rose to 27 percent within five years and to 57 percent 
at some time in the future (usually upon retirement).
In sharp contrast to immigrants from other Southern 
African countries, South Africans in Canada display a 
very different attitudinal and behavioural profile. The 
differences are so marked that they are referred to in this 
report as a “disengaged diaspora.” The key characteristics 
of the South African diaspora in Canada are as follows:
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• The dominant mode of entry into Canada by 
South Africans is as economic-class immigrants 
(56 percent of respondents). Most of the remainder 
were accompanying family members. Less than 10 
percent of respondents said their primary reason 
for coming to Canada was economic; rather, the two 
main reasons that were given were concerns about 
safety and security in South Africa (34 percent) and 
the future of their children (26 percent).
• The South African diaspora in Canada is highly 
educated and dominated by skilled professionals. 
Before leaving South Africa, 54 percent of the 
respondents had obtained a university degree. After 
leaving South Africa, 47 percent continued with their 
formal education, primarily in Canada. Yet, as many 
as 25 percent of the respondents noted that they were 
working in a job that did not make full use of their 
professional qualifications and experience. Nearly 
a third of the respondents are health professionals, 
eight percent are employed in the education field, 
seven percent occupy management posts, six percent 
are employed in the sales and service industry, five 
percent occupy administrative or clerical positions 
and five percent are employed in the finance, business 
and banking industry.
• In comparison to immigrants from other Southern 
African countries, those from South Africa are high 
earners by Canadian standards. As many as 44 
percent of the respondents said they earn more than 
CDN$100,000 a year. Over a quarter earn more than 
CDN$200,000 a year, yet they remit far less and far 
less frequently. Nearly 45 percent of the respondents 
have never remitted funds to South Africa and only 
12 percent could be considered regular remitters, 
sending money to South Africa at least once a 
month. The rest remit only sporadically. Those who 
remit send the funds to immediate family members. 
Over a third (38 percent) of the remitters identified 
household expenses in South Africa as the major use 
of the remittances. Levels of savings and investment 
of remittances are extremely low and there is little 
evidence of collective remitting for development 
projects.
• Most South African immigrants in Canada maintain 
strong contact with their family members in the 
country and travel relatively frequently to South 
Africa. As many as 92 percent had visited South 
Africa at least once since immigrating to Canada and 
59 percent had done so in the previous three years. 
More than 80 percent of the visits were for family-
related issues and events. Although most regard 
themselves as South African and display high levels 
of nostalgia, they hold very negative views about 
most aspects of life in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Some even portrayed themselves as persecuted 
victims of post-apartheid policies.
• About 40 percent still maintain bank accounts in 
South Africa, while 22 percent have investments, 
14 percent own a house and nine percent own land 
in South Africa; however, half of the respondents 
indicated that they do not own any of these assets in 
South Africa. The survey also showed that the longer 
immigrants have lived in Canada, the less likely they 
are to hold assets in South Africa. In other words, 
over time they progressively disinvest and cut these 
links.
• Over 80 percent of the South Africans said that they 
had no interest in any role in the development of South 
Africa. The survey revealed very low levels of interest 
in activities such as educational exchanges, volunteer 
work, philanthropy, skills transfer, import and export 
of goods, fundraising for projects in South Africa, 
remitting for development projects and investment in 
South African businesses. Interest in return migration 
to South Africa is also very low. Only six percent said 
they were likely to return within the next two years, 
10 percent within the next five years and 20 percent at 
some time in the future.
While the vast majority of South Africans in Canada do 
not participate in activities typical of an engaged diaspora 
and do not see themselves playing any role in the future of 
South Africa, a small minority (around 20 percent) does. 
What differentiates these engaged South Africans from 
their peers? There were no significant differences between 
the two groups on a range of indicators, including where 
they lived in Canada (city and province), gender, race, 
education and training (both inside and outside South 
Africa) and whether or not they had family members in 
South Africa. Other variables did seem to differentiate 
the two groups. First, more of the engaged group were 
in lower income brackets. Second, there is a marked 
difference between the two groups in terms of their main 
reason for coming to Canada. Disengaged South Africans 
were far more likely to cite concerns about safety and 
security and their children’s future than engaged South 
Africans. Third, engaged South Africans in Canada tend to 
visit South Africa more frequently than their disengaged 
counterparts. Finally, they have a much stronger South 
African identity and hold more positive views about the 
country and its future. What kinds of links do engaged 
South Africans maintain with their country of origin?
• While engaged South Africans tend to be lower wage 
earners than disengaged South Africans, they remit 
more and do so more regularly. The average annual 
remittance of the engaged group is more than twice 
as much as the disengaged group.
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• Engaged South Africans are more likely to participate 
in diaspora organizations and associations than the 
disengaged. There is a consistent pattern of greater 
involvement in South Africa on every measure 
used, ranging from buying property, to investment, 
importing South African goods for sale and, 
especially, philanthropy. The intention to engage in 
the future was also significantly higher among the 
engaged group. For example, 28 percent said it was 
likely they would work in South Africa in the next 
two years (compared to only three percent of the 
disengaged group). Forty percent said they would 
fundraise for projects in South Africa, compared 
to only six percent of the disengaged. Other major 
differences included sending funds for development 
projects in South Africa (39 percent versus four 
percent) and making charitable donations that 
benefit South Africa (55 percent versus 16 percent).
• Skills transfer was rated as the most important area 
of interest for future engagement through training 
programs in South Africa (55 percent of respondents) 
or working there (53 percent). Forty-four percent of 
the engaged group were interested in undertaking 
educational exchanges. Another area of preferred 
activity is philanthropy, with 54 percent willing to 
fundraise in Canada for projects in South Africa, 
49 percent volunteering in South Africa, 42 percent 
participating in development projects in South Africa 
and 34 percent making charitable donations to South 
Africa. Other activities of interest included investing 
in South African businesses (34 percent), importing 
goods from South Africa (27 percent) and investing in 
infrastructural development (18 percent).
• Given that the engaged group is more favourably 
disposed towards South Africa on most measures, it 
is interesting to see if this translates into an intention 
to return. The engaged and disengaged groups think 
about this question very differently. Only four percent 
of the disengaged group have given it a great deal 
of consideration, compared with a third (34 percent) 
of the engaged group. Nearly 20 percent of the 
engaged group said it was likely they would return 
within two years, compared to only two percent of 
the disengaged group. At the five-year mark, the 
figures were 30 percent and three percent. As many 
as 65 percent of the engaged group thought it likely 
that they would return at some point (compared to 
only seven percent of the disengaged group). In other 
words, the likelihood of engaged South Africans 
returning to South Africa increases over time, while 
the likelihood of disengaged South Africans returning 
is low and static.
Diasporas are well known globally for forming diaspora 
associations and organizations with those who come 
from the same country. These associations allow for a 
range of social, cultural and economic interactions within 
the diaspora. Besides demonstrating an affinity with the 
country of origin, diaspora associations can provide an 
avenue for the diaspora to make meaningful development 
contributions to those countries. The final section of this 
report examines the development-related activities of 
Southern African diaspora organizations in Canada. The 
study focussed on those associations actively engaging 
in development initiatives or those with the potential 
for engaging in such development work. A number of 
diaspora associations or networks limit their activities to 
Canada and are given less attention.
The activities discussed here include initiatives by 
individuals who rely on their diaspora networks, as well 
as initiatives by groups that, as a collective, raise funds 
and material resources in Canada to support projects 
or institutions in their countries or communities of 
origin. Southern African diaspora organizations engage 
in a wide variety of collective formal and informal 
development initiatives in Africa. Most tend to be 
directed at the grassroots level and generally avoid 
any form of engagement with national governments. 
Despite their strong developmental focus and impact, 
very few associations and projects receive financial or 
material support from either the Canadian federal or 
provincial governments. Their main source of support 
and fundraising is the diaspora itself. These groups could 
have an even bigger impact if such support was available 
through, for example, fund-matching programs.
All of the 70 or so groups identified during the research 
play a role in building, maintaining or strengthening 
development activities in countries of origin. Given their 
diversity and function, their contributions to development-
related activities are wide-ranging and varied. A number of 
groups have been directly involved in community projects, 
from inception to completion, especially those established 
by diaspora-led charitable or non-profit organizations 
in Canada. Some diaspora organizations have played a 
supporting role to organizations or projects already set up 
in Africa, while others have provided support to Canadian 
organizations with development projects in SADC 
countries. In some cases, a collective of diaspora and non-
diaspora actors have worked jointly to build up existing 
systems in SADC countries, such as education and health.
Diaspora-led charitable organizations have contributed 
to a variety of sectors, including education (school and 
college/university level), humanitarian assistance, gender 
and development, poverty reduction, environment and 
development, food security, basic amenities development 
and health. The number and strength of diaspora-led 
charitable/non-profit organizations is not necessarily 
related to the size of a country’s diaspora in Canada. 
Smaller communities, such as the Zambian diaspora in 
Canada, have established similar or larger numbers of 
development-centred organizations compared with larger 
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groups such as the South African and Tanzanian diaspora 
communities.
The report draws a number of conclusions about the nature 
and future of engagement in development by Southern 
African diasporas in Canada. First, redefining immigrants 
from developing countries in Canada as “diasporas” 
raises the interesting possibility that there might be real 
development benefits for those countries from emigration 
to Canada. This study set out to test this proposition with 
a subset of African immigrants in Canada. The primary 
reason for separating out the South Africans in this analysis 
is that it quickly became clear that there were considerable 
attitudinal and behavioural differences between this 
group and other immigrants from Southern Africa. When 
it comes to the maintenance of links with countries of 
origin, attitudes towards those countries and engagement 
in development, the differences are so stark that the term 
“divided diasporas” was coined.
Second, the South African diaspora in Canada — for all its 
wealth, privilege and skills — displays an attitudinal and 
behavioural profile which leads us to the conclusion that 
it is largely disengaged and unlikely to play a significant 
role in South Africa’s development. The majority used 
their skills and training acquired in South Africa to 
immigrate to Canada. However, they do not feel that 
they owe their country anything in return. Their intention 
was to leave South Africa, not to look back. The majority 
of South Africans in Canada hold negative views about 
their country of origin, are divesting themselves of their 
resources there and show little inclination to be involved 
in its development. Our conclusion is that the majority of 
South Africans in Canada are lost to South Africa and that 
there is little point in trying to foster diaspora engagement 
for development among this group as a whole.
Third, the South African diaspora in Canada is itself 
divided with a minority showing a very different 
attitudinal profile. This minority, around 20 percent of those 
interviewed, are far more typical of an engaged diaspora 
with a genuine desire to be involved in the development 
of their South Africa. Their efforts and activities need to 
be profiled, encouraged and supported. Their views and 
activities are far more similar to those of immigrants from 
other Southern African countries in Canada than they are 
to other South African immigrants.
Fourth, immigrants from the Southern African region 
outside South Africa are characterized in this report as 
an engaged diaspora. Like many immigrants from Africa, 
they have a very strong affinity for their countries of origin 
(Baffoe, 2009-2010). The majority are comparatively recent 
immigrants to Canada and maintain close personal cultural 
and economic ties with their countries of origin. Most of 
these ties are focussed on family living in those countries. 
The clearest indication of this is their remitting behaviour. 
Individually, they do not remit large sums but, by the same 
token, they are not particularly high earners in Canada. 
They remit cash (and goods) extremely regularly and tend 
to use formal channels to do so. While most remit to meet 
the living expenses of relatives, remittances clearly have 
positive development implications at the household and 
community level, including contributing to improved food 
security and nutrition, medical expenses and education.
Fifth, only a small minority use their remittances 
in a broader development-related manner through 
investments in community projects, productive 
activity, entrepreneurship and so on. A significant 
minority, however, engage in other activities that 
have development-related implications. For example, 
a quarter have exported goods from Canada for sale 
in their countries of origin and one in every ten have 
imported goods for sale in Canada. The same proportion 
have invested in business, generated employment and 
engaged in research partnerships. These numbers could 
grow rapidly with the return of political and economic 
stability and opportunity in countries such as Angola, the 
DRC and Zimbabwe.
How can the considerable potential for engagement be 
better tapped in the future? Disaporas, as individuals or 
groups, are unlikely to put words into action if it means 
supporting a government or political system that they 
consider unacceptable or unrepresentative; however, 
this does not mean that they will do nothing until the 
political situation is more to their liking. Highly motivated 
individuals and groups in Canada have already established 
a significant and impressive array of community-oriented 
projects throughout Southern Africa, particularly in 
education and health, with their own resources and 
through fundraising within and outside the diaspora. 
An evaluation of many of these initiatives would help to 
identify best practices and new ideas that could be scaled 
up, with appropriate financial backing, for broader impact.
Another challenge is that there is only so much that 
individuals can do unless they are independently wealthy 
or have major financial backing. Here, there is a critical 
enabling role for various types of diaspora organizations, 
which potentially provide the structure, ideas and 
resources to harness individual energy and enthusiasm. 
Diaspora organizations rely heavily on volunteer and pro 
bono work, and private donations, which affects their 
ability to develop systematic long-term projects. The 
Canadian government, in particular, needs to reframe the 
diaspora as development partners in new ways and to 
support their work and projects creatively, with dedicated 
funding and support. By identifying the kinds of activities 
that members of the diaspora are, or would like to be, 
engaged in, we hope that this report makes a contribution 
to this process.
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ChapTer 1: diasporas and 
developmenT
BRAin DRAin oR DiASPoRA EngAgEMEnt?
Although Canada is one of the world’s most proactive 
countries regarding immigration, it does not appear to 
be overly concerned about the possible negative impact 
of its policies on the countries its immigrants come from 
(Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998; Green and Green, 2004). This 
is a legacy from the period when almost all immigrants 
came from Europe and the impacts of migration to 
Canada on European countries were fairly modest. This 
kind of thinking persists but is no longer tenable with 
more and more Canadian immigrants drawn from poorer 
developing countries (Biles, Bursten and Frideres, 2008). 
Canada needs to address the question of the impacts its 
own immigration policies have on those countries and, 
where these are negative, to consider how to mitigate 
them. Canada gives millions of dollars each year in 
international aid to developing countries. If, at the same 
time, it is pursuing an immigration policy that deprives 
those same countries of scarce skills, then its immigration 
and international development policies are seriously at 
odds with one another.
The term most often used to describe the emigration of 
skilled people from Africa to countries like Canada is 
“brain drain” (Maharaj, 2010; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011; 
Kalipeni, Semu and Mbilizi, 2012). It was coined in the 
1950s and 1960s to describe the emigration of scientists 
from Britain to North America, but is now widely applied 
to any form of skilled migration deemed to have damaging 
consequences for the countries of origin and benefits 
for the  countries of destination — usually advanced 
industrial nations, including Canada (Johnson, 1965; 
Gish and Godfrey, 1979; Wright, Flis and Gupta, 2008). 
The term has also been used in Canada itself to describe 
the movement of Canadian professionals to the United 
States (Devoretz, 1999; Finnie, 2001). The sense of moral 
outrage that brain drain elicits in Africa can be seen in a 
public outburst by anti-apartheid icon Nelson Mandela 
in the late 1990s. Lashing out at people who were leaving 
South Africa, Mandela called them unpatriotic cowards 
and intimated that the country was better off without them 
(“Good Riddance,” 1998).
African politicians are not the only ones to rail against brain 
drain; so do the media and many researchers (Reynolds, 
2005; York, 2011; McAllester, 2012). A contributor to the 
British Medical Journal, for example, suggested that brain 
“suction” rather than “drainage” would be a more apt 
metaphor (Richards, 2002). Others feel that Africa’s skills 
are being “poached” or “looted” by the West in a “great 
brain robbery” (Patel, 2003; Singh et al., 2003; Snyder 
2009). Health recruiters are labelled “global raiders” and 
“merchants of medical care” (Crush, 2002; Connell and 
Stilwell, 2006). Incentives to emigrate are called “grab 
factors” and the medical brain drain, in particular, is seen as 
a “fatal flow” for source countries (Muula, 2005; Chen and 
Boufford, 2005). Others argue that the brain drain produces 
“intolerable inequities” in health-care access between 
Africa and the West, and represents a “catastrophe” for 
African development (Mensah, Mackintosh and Henry, 
2005; Bach, 2008). Some have suggested that the brain 
drain of scarce human resources from Africa should be 
viewed as an “international crime” (Mills et al., 2008). It 
has even been called a “sugar-coated” version of the old 
slave trade, a plundering of Africa’s human resources for 
the benefit of the West (Benedict and Ukpere, 2012).
Beyond the rhetoric, critics have noted negative impacts, 
including the loss of Africa’s “best and brightest,” skill 
shortages in the public and private sectors, loss of public 
investment in training and skills development, and 
economic decline (Kapur and McHale, 2005). According to 
the World Bank:
High-skilled emigration can also impair 
development by reducing the supply of critical 
services; limiting productivity spillovers to both 
high- and low-skilled workers; reducing the 
potential for innovative and creative activities that 
are at the core of long-term growth; and limiting 
contributions to the health of social, political, 
and economic institutions. The loss of workers 
educated at public expense can represent a 
substantial fiscal drain, and the many university-
educated African emigrants who fail to obtain 
skilled jobs in high-income destination countries 
represent a lost investment in human capital. 
(Ratha et al., 2011: 7)
In the health sector, documented damages include reduced 
access to basic and advanced health care, a growing 
disease burden and under-qualified personnel performing 
tasks for which they were not trained (Awases et al., 2004; 
Schrecker and Labonte, 2004; Chikanda, 2006; Dovlo, 
2006; Gerein, Green and Pearson, 2006; Kirigia et al., 2006; 
Chikanda, 2007; Connell et al., 2007; Khaliq, Broyles and 
Mwachofi, 2009; Naicker et al., 2009):
Understaffing results in stress and increased 
workloads. Many of the remaining health 
professionals are ill-motivated, not only because 
of their workload, but also because they are poorly 
paid, poorly equipped and have limited career 
opportunities. These, in turn, lead to a downward 
spiral where workers migrate, crippling the 
system, placing a greater strain on the remaining 
workers who themselves seek to migrate out of the 
poor working conditions. (Labonte et al., 2006: 6)
Several researchers argue that the deepening crisis 
of health-care delivery in Africa is exacerbated by a 
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combination of the increased demands of the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic and the medical brain drain (Bhargava 
and Docquier, 2008; Dambisya et al., 2009). The negative 
economic impacts of brain drain on developing countries 
have also been examined in some depth. The general 
conclusion seems to be that although the loss of a single 
skilled professional by a developing country is one too 
many, the economic impacts do vary from country to 
country. If South Africa loses 100 doctors, engineers and 
accountants, the overall impact is likely to be much less 
significant than if Lesotho or Swaziland loses the same 
number.
A group of European and American neo-liberal economists 
has challenged critics of high-skilled emigration, arguing 
that the way that brain drain is conceptualized and 
discussed is inaccurate and misleading. Michael Clemens, 
a researcher at the Center for Global Development in 
Washington, DC, for example, suggests that it is time to 
bury the “unpleasant and judgemental” term in favour of a 
more “brief, accurate and neutral” term such as “skill flow” 
(Clemens, 2009: 34). In the context of a highly polarized 
debate, this alternative is neither neutral nor accurate, 
since it suggests that brain drain is a “natural” process 
without causation or direction. While the suggestion is 
unlikely to find much traction in Africa, it is certainly true 
that the term is not, and was never meant to be, value-free. 
Since its inception, the term has embodied a critique of the 
causes of skills migration and the impact on countries of 
origin.
Critics of the brain drain idea argue that there is little 
evidence to suggest it is responsible for the parlous state 
of African economies and health-care systems and counter, 
in fact, that the migration of professionals can have 
significant positive benefits for countries of origin (Stark, 
2004; Skeldon, 2008). A Brookings Institute working paper, 
for example, maintains that “contrary to a lot of the worries 
expressed in the media and in aid agencies, the brain drain 
is probably a net benefit to the source countries” (Easterly 
and Nyarko, 2008). How can this be? First, the Brookings 
paper argues that the African brain drain “is not large 
enough to have much effect on Africa’s skills gap relative 
to the rest of the world” (ibid.). Second, it suggests that the 
gains to the migrants themselves, and to their families who 
receive indirect benefits and remittances, more than offset 
the losses of the brain drain. Third, it argues that the value 
of remittances more than covers the cost of educating a 
“brain drainer” in the source country (ibid.). Finally, it 
asserts that the brain drain “has a positive effect on skill 
accumulation that appears to offset one for one the loss 
of skills” (ibid.). This means that a brain drain becomes 
an incentive for more people to acquire the education and 
skills that will allow them to leave. The pool of local skills 
expands, but since not everyone can or will leave, the 
result is a net expansion in a country’s skill base (Fan and 
Stark, 2007; Schiff, 2006).
All of these arguments (with the possible exception of 
the second) are highly contentious and the subject of 
ongoing debate. African researchers and policy makers 
might argue that it is hardly surprising that economists 
in Europe and North America have attacked the whole 
idea of brain drain, given that these are the regions that 
benefit most from skills migration from Africa. Sometimes 
the debate is not between Africans and those in the North 
at all, but between researchers with differing ideological 
positions within the North. In late 2011, for example, a 
research team at the University of Ottawa attempted to 
calculate the magnitude of the financial savings (in terms 
of training costs avoided) provided by the brain drain 
from nine African countries to the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Canada and Australia (Mills et al., 2011). 
Based on the number of doctors working from these source 
countries and the average cost of medical education in the 
destination countries, the University of Ottawa researchers 
calculated a savings of at least US$2.7 billion for the United 
Kingdom, US$846 million for the United States, US$621 
million for Australia and US$384 million for Canada, for a 
combined total of US$4.55 billion (ibid.).
In a strongly worded rejoinder, Clemens noted that “it 
[made him] sad to see such unscientific analysis in a 
respected scientific forum like the British Medical Journal” 
(Clemens, 2011a). Clemens accused the University of 
Ottawa research group of making “back-of-the-envelope” 
calculations, asserting that aspects of their argument were 
“indefensible,” “incoherent” and seriously mistaken: “If 
all this public investment were ‘lost’ to Africa, to say that 
‘migration’ causes that loss is like saying that tires cause 
a car’s movement” (ibid.). He concluded that “policy 
must not be based on simplistic arithmetic and unjustified 
economic assumptions, but on a fuller economic 
consideration of the subject” (ibid.). One of his substantive 
arguments was that the Ottawa study did not discount the 
substantial amounts of money that physicians are known 
to remit to their countries of origin — supposedly double 
what it cost to train them (Clemens, 2011b).
This dispute highlights a basic question about brain drain 
impacts: when individuals emigrate from Africa, are 
they an absolute loss to their families, communities and 
countries? The simple answer to this question is usually 
not, although the more general impact of their departure 
depends on who and how many people leave, what kinds of 
links they maintain with their home countries and whether 
they develop new links once they are settled abroad. This 
reality has led to the idea that the very real costs of the 
brain drain must be set against the compensating benefits 
in a kind of “balance sheet” approach. In Africa and Asia, 
there is growing interest in government and business 
circles in proactively forging mutually beneficial linkages 
with citizens or former citizens living in other countries.
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DEfining DiASPoRAS
A decade after Mandela’s renunciation of South African 
emigrants, a very different attitude is developing in 
Africa towards those who have departed. Throughout the 
continent, those who have left are increasingly viewed 
in a positive light for a number of reasons. The personal 
blame and finger pointing embedded in the idea of brain 
drain is being replaced by an acknowledgement that, in an 
increasingly mobile and globalized world, people with the 
means, desire and incentive to move will do so, and trying 
to stop them infringes on their freedom of movement. 
Skilled emigration has become a reality whose negative 
impacts need to be addressed urgently.
Individuals and groups who have left Africa clearly 
become significant contributors to the massive global 
flow of remittances to the continent (Maimbo and Ratha, 
2005; Mohapatra and Ratha, 2011; Ratha et al., 2011). Many 
are independently and informally engaged in activities 
relating to their countries of origin that have positive 
development aims and outcomes. As a result, governments 
and international organizations are increasingly viewing 
these expatriates as important resources and agents of 
change and development, and are actively seeking them 
out. There is also evidence that brain drains can be partially 
reversed, as has happened in India and China, with 
returning migrants often bringing invaluable knowledge, 
skills, technology, capital and networks acquired abroad 
(Saxenien, 2005).
To break conventional ideas of immigration as a one-
time, permanent move from one country to another, and 
immigrants as people who largely abandon their countries 
of origin for a new life in another country, a new language 
is needed to acknowledge that many immigrants maintain 
active links and interests with their countries of origin. The 
term diaspora has been increasingly used by migration 
researchers and policy makers to try to capture this 
reality. Central to the notion of immigrants as a diaspora 
is a continued identification with the country of origin: 
an attachment that facilitates the transfer of resources 
and ideas from the country of destination to the country 
of origin. Robin Cohen, an eminent international scholar 
on the subject of diasporas and a member of the South 
African diaspora in the United Kingdom, has suggested 
that diasporas have the following generic characteristics:
• dispersal from an original homeland, often 
traumatically, to two or more foreign nations;
• the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in 
pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambition;
• a collective memory and myth about the homeland, 
including its location, history and achievements;
• an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a 
collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, 
safety, prosperity, even to its creation;
• the development of a return movement that gains 
collective support;
• a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained 
over a long period of time and based on a sense of 
distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a 
common fate;
• a possibly troubled relationship with host societies, 
suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that 
another calamity might befall this group;
• a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic 
members in other countries of settlement; and
• the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching 
life in host countries with a tolerance of pluralism. 
(Cohen, 1997)
More recent definitions have focussed less on the common 
cultural characteristics identified by Cohen, and more on 
the material links that members of a diaspora maintain 
with one another and with their countries of origin. One 
definition consistent with this emphasis sees diasporas as 
“populations of migrant origin, who are scattered among 
two or more destinations, between which there develop 
multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people 
and resources; between the homeland and destination 
countries, and among destination countries” (Van Hear et 
al., 2004: 3).
The African Union (AU) has designated the African 
diaspora as the “sixth region” of Africa (along with 
Southern, Eastern, Central, West and North Africa). In 
practice, the African diaspora is scattered around the 
world. Recently, it has been suggested that there are also 
significant African diasporas within Africa itself (Crush, 
2011). Whether located inside or outside the continent, 
many now feel that the African diaspora is an untapped 
resource for African economic, social and human 
development (Kaplan, 1997; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Newland 
and Patrick, 2004; Kuznetsov, 2006a; Brinkerhoff, 2009; 
Plaza and Ratha, 2011). This, in turn, has led to the idea of 
“diaspora engagement,” which occurs when individuals 
or groups in a destination country participate in activities 
in, or relating to, their countries of origin that have positive 
development impacts and implications for those countries:
Diasporas may act as “bridges” between the 
destination and the source countries, and they 
can stimulate trade, investments and the transfer 
of technology. The hypothesis that migration 
may generate positive externalities on the source 
country may be true not only with regard to trade, 
investments and technology diffusion but also for 
DiviDeD DiASpoRAS: SoutheRn AfRiCAnS in CAnADA
10 • the CentRe foR inteRnAtionAl GoveRnAnCe innovAtion
other areas as well. In particular, migrants to more 
democratic societies may have a positive impact 
on the social, economic, and political institutions 
in their home countries...Although much work 
has investigated whether expatriate networks 
can induce trade, other issues remain almost 
entirely unexplored. Nevertheless, the literature 
does show that the diaspora may be important 
for the development of migrants’ origin countries. 
(Lodigiani, 2009: 36)
There is now a growing emphasis on identifying 
and developing policies to encourage these forms of 
engagement as a way of contributing to the development 
of their countries of origin (Agunias, 2009; Newland 
and Tanaka, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2011a; 2012; Agunias and 
Newland, 2012). Kuznetsov (2006a) notes that members of 
diaspora communities have three resources that position 
them to make potential contributions to the development 
of their countries of origin: an unusually high motivation 
to have a significant influence on the course of events in 
those countries; new knowledge and expertise that can 
be transferred in various ways; and financial resources to 
act on new opportunities and perceived needs. A useful 
starting point is to group diaspora home-country-focussed 
activities into economic, political, social and cultural 
dimensions (Table 1.1).
The AU (2005: 7) specifically defines the African diaspora 
as “people of African origin…who are willing to contribute 
to the development of the continent and the building of 
the [AU].” This seems a rather narrow definition since 
it precludes any consideration of those who choose, for 
whatever reason, not to contribute to development in 
Africa. A workable definition of diasporas, therefore, 
needs to include those who do and do not contribute 
to the development of the continent. One of the aims of 
this study is to find out why some members of a diaspora 
engage and others do not. The presence of a large immigrant 
community in a destination country, however, does not 
automatically translate into development impacts in their 
country of origin. It is therefore important to understand 
whether and under what conditions individuals, 
households and communities choose to maintain an active 
interest in the development of their country of origin. 
There is no easy or automatic answer to this question. 
Only by systematic research with those concerned can we 
begin to understand why some turn their backs on where 
they came from, why others take an active interest in the 
country left behind and how greater engagement might be 
encouraged and supported by policy makers.
DiASPoRA REMittAnCES
Global remittance flows were estimated to exceed US$440 
billion in 2010, with developing countries receiving 
US$325.5 billion (World Bank, 2011). This is three times as 
large as official development aid and almost as large as 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. 
Remittance flows are much more stable than private 
capital flows and tend to be less volatile to changing 
economic cycles (Ratha, 2003). Remittances have been 
shown to reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty: 
a 10 percent increase in per capita official international 
remittances will lead, on average, to a 3.5 percent decline 
in the share of people living in poverty (Adams and 
Page, 2005). One study of the socio-economic impact of 
remittances on poverty reduction suggests that the two 
primary motivations for remitting are risk sharing and 
altruism, and the two main uses of remittances received 
are consumption and productive investment (Table 1.2) 
(Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005). As Table 1.3 shows, 
potential impacts can be felt at different scales (household, 
community, national and international) and can be divided 
into poverty-reducing impacts and various other impacts 
(ibid.).
tABlE 1.1: DiASPoRA EngAgEMEnt ACtivitiES in CountRiES of oRigin
Economic Political Social Cultural
• financial remittances
• other remittances (for example, 
medicine or clothes)
• investments
• charitable donations
• taxes
• purchase of government bonds
• purchase of entry to government 
programs
• participation in elections
• membership of political parties
• visits to friends and family
• social contacts
• social remittances
• contributions to newspapers 
circulated in home country
• cultural events, including 
visiting performers from 
the home country
Source: Van Hear et al., 2004.
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tABlE 1.2: REMittAnCE MotivAtion AnD uSE
Motivation Consumption Productive Investment
Risk sharing • remittances help households cope with risks
• cash receipts are used to purchase daily food and 
luxury consumables or to purchase locally available 
essential services (health, education)
• remittances help households manage idiosyncratic risks
• investment in liquid assets such as livestock, agricultural 
implements and new technologies help households to cope 
better in future
• ensures the household functions day to day
Altruism • goods and gifts are sent to the household to fulfill 
altruistic obligations to the family
• remittances are used to expand available capital assets
• indirect benefit to the household, but long-term benefit to the 
wider community
Source: Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005: 90.
tABlE 1.3: KEy iMPACtS of REMittAnCES on PovERty At DiffEREnt lEvElS
Recipient Poverty-reducing Impact
Household • income and consumption smoothing
• increased savings and asset accumulation (liquid and non-liquid assets), collateral for loans, liquidity in times of crisis
• improved access to health services and better nutrition (potential for improved productivity)
• access to better education for longer, reducing child labour
• increased social capital and ability to participate in social groups and activities, savings clubs, money rounds, reciprocal 
labour pools
• improved access to information
Community • improved local physical infrastructure
• growth of local commodity markets
• development of local capital markets and availability of new services: banking, retail and trade, travel, construction
• development of new development institutions
• changes to cultural practices, especially attitudes toward girl children
• generation of local employment opportunities
• reduction of inequality between households, particularly for poor households
National • improved foreign currency inflows, in some countries up to nine percent of GDP
• employment creation as remittances are invested in the productive sectors
• increased human capital as migrants learn new skills and work practices
International • reduction in inequality among countries as remittances exceed official aid transfers in some regions
Source: Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005: 95-96.
There is a growing amount of research into the variety 
of remittance patterns and remitting behaviours of 
immigrants in Canada, including from countries such 
as Haiti, Jamaica, Brazil, Vietnam, Ghana and Somalia 
(Hernández-Coss, 2005; Hamza, 2006; Wong, 2006; 
Simmons, Plaza and Piché, 2009; Todoroki, Vaccani 
and Noor, 2009; Goza and Ryabov, 2012). A recent 
Statistics Canada survey of the remitting behaviour of 
immigrants in their first four years in Canada confirms this 
observation (Houle and Schellenberg, 2008). The survey 
tracked the remitting patterns of migrants who entered 
Canada between 2000 and 2001. On average, 26 percent 
of Canadian immigrants remitted funds to their country 
of origin in their first four years in Canada; however, the 
incidence of remitting varied markedly from source region 
to region (Table 1.4). Immigrants from Southeast Asia (54 
percent) and the Caribbean (50 percent) were the heaviest 
remitters, while those from East Asia, North Africa and 
the Middle East were the lowest (16 percent). Immigrants 
from Sub-Saharan Africa were well above the overall 
average, at 39 percent. The average amounts remitted 
also differed considerably, from CDN$1,500 per year in 
the case of Caribbean immigrants, to CDN$3,600 per year 
in the case of South Asian immigrants. Statistics Canada 
also provides information on a selection of countries to 
illustrate the range of remitting behaviour. Immigrants 
from the Philippines and Haiti were most likely to remit 
(around 60 percent) and those from South Korea the least 
(less than 10 percent) (Figure 1.1). The only African country 
shown was Nigeria (at around 48 percent). Countries 
ranked very differently with regard to average amounts 
remitted: the United States, South Korea and India were 
top (at over CDN$4,000 per year), followed by Mexico, 
Lebanon, Nigeria and China (all between CDN$3,000 
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and CDN$4,000 per year) (Figure 1.2). Another recent 
study on the characteristics of African remittance senders 
in nine Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries found that the average 
annual remittance sent by diaspora households was 
US$1,263. Africans tend to remit more often than migrants 
from other areas and African migrants from poorer 
countries are more likely to remit than those from richer 
countries (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2010).
tABlE 1.4: REMitting PAttERnS fRoM CAnADA
Region
Proportion of Immigrants Who 
Remitted (%)
Average Amount Remitted 
per Year (CDN$)
Southeast Asia 54 2,200
Caribbean 50 1,500
Sub-Saharan Africa 39 2,500
Eastern Europe 37 1,900
South Asia 25 3,600
Central and South America 24 2,000
East Asia 16 3,500
North Africa and Middle East 16 2,300
Total all regions combined 26 2,700
Data source: Houle and Schellenberg, 2008.
figuRE 1.1: PRoPoRtion of iMMigRAntS in CAnADA WHo REMit to CountRy of oRigin
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figuRE 1.2: AvERAgE AMount REMittED By iMMigRAntS in CAnADA
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The probability of remitting from Canada did not vary 
significantly with the immigrant’s class of entry. Family-
class immigrants were just as likely to remit as economic 
immigrants (29 percent) and both were marginally less 
likely to remit than refugees (31 percent); however, the 
amounts remitted did differ significantly. Economic 
migrants had the highest average remittance (CDN$3,000 
per year) and the greatest proportion of those remitting 
over CDN$5,000 per year (12 percent, compared with five 
percent of refugees). In contrast, refugees had the lowest 
average remittance (CDN$1,900 per year) and the greatest 
proportion of those remitting less than CDN$500 per 
year (45 percent, compared with 21 percent of economic 
immigrants). Another study used a subset of the Statistics 
Canada data and identified several other variables that 
affect remitting behaviour:
Remittances rise with income, jobs and age, 
though at a decreasing rate — and, in the latter 
two cases, they eventually decline. Higher 
housing costs and more family responsibilities 
in Canada reduce remittances. Higher levels of 
educational attainment are also associated with 
lower remittances. Those identifying stronger 
intentions to support their family at home or who 
invest in their home country remit more, while 
those with seemingly stronger financial ties to 
Canada remit less. A migrant’s region of origin 
is also important, although religion and attitudes 
towards integration seem to matter much less. 
(Unheim and Rowlands, 2010: 133)
“Collective” remittances by groups of immigrants to 
groups or communities in their countries of origin are 
thought to offer considerable development potential, 
although they tend to bear more resemblance to charitable 
and philanthropic donations than productive investments 
(Goldring, 2004). Remittances for collective projects 
generally fall into four categories: basic infrastructure and 
communications projects; public service infrastructure 
related to education, health and social security; 
recreational; and other community or urbanization 
projects. Most of the projects carried out to date with 
collective remittances thus focus on public goods. The 
best-documented case of collective remitting is from 
migrants to rural home communities in Mexico (Aparicio 
and Meseguer, 2012).
Migrants generally remit goods as well as cash. These 
remittances in-kind need to be seen as part of the overall 
remittance package for two reasons: first, most goods 
have a definite cost to the purchaser and cash value. In 
many cases, goods are purchased and sent because they 
are much more expensive or do not exist locally; however, 
most studies of remittances focus only on cash remitting. 
This is especially true of studies using International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank data, including those by 
the Bank itself. Second, the nature of the goods remitted is 
an important indication of the reasons they are sent and 
the needs of households in countries of origin. While some 
goods are unsolicited gifts, the vast majority of goods 
are sent in response to an actual or perceived need of the 
household itself. It is therefore important to know not only 
the cash value of goods remitted, but the character of the 
goods themselves.
DiASPoRA EntREPREnEuRS
Members of the diaspora who have been particularly 
successful economically in other countries are in a 
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position to do much more than send remittances to family 
members in their countries of origin. Many developing 
countries are anxious to increase FDI and diasporas are 
viewed as potential “pioneer investors,” especially when 
major capital markets regard these economies as too risky 
(Kuznetsov, 2006b). Other entrepreneurial activities of 
note include “nostalgia trade” (which meets the demand 
of diasporas for products from their country of origin) and 
“diaspora-led import/export businesses,” which have a 
more diverse product base and clientele (Wong and Ng, 
2002). The extent of global diaspora entrepreneurship and 
investment is not known with any certainty, although the 
cases of China and India are well-documented (Guha and 
Ray, 2000; Bajpai and Dasgupta, 2004; Smart and Hsu, 2004; 
Roy and Banerjee, 2007; Zhu, 2007; Tsai, 2010). A study in 
2001, for example, showed that the diaspora provided an 
estimated 70 percent of FDI in China in the 1990s (Devan 
and Tewari, 2001). The Indian diaspora is estimated to 
have invested US$2.6 billion out of US$10 billion of FDI 
between 1991 and 2001 (Yingqi and Balasubramanyam, 
2006). More recently, a global study of diasporas in the 
OECD found that a one percent increase in migration from 
a particular country leads to a 0.1 to 0.25 percent increase 
in FDI in that country (Gormsen and Pytlikova, 2012). 
While there have been some studies of African diaspora 
entrepreneurship, few have focussed on the Southern 
African region (Sheikh and Tanaka, 2009; Chaco and Price, 
2009; Belai, 2007; Negash, 2009).
The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) has proposed five 
different levels of diaspora entrepreneurial engagement 
with countries of origin: networking, mentoring, training, 
investment and partnerships (Figure 1.3). These different 
levels describe “ascending levels of commitment” to the 
entrepreneurial project (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 18). 
More passive forms of support towards the bottom of the 
pyramid “proliferate and dissipate” more quickly than the 
active forms of engagement at higher levels (ibid.).
Diaspora entrepreneurship and investment have the 
following potential development impacts on the countries 
of origin:
• sustainable local business development, job creation 
and innovation;
• integration of developing countries into global 
economic, trade and knowledge networks;
• transfer of new technologies and skills from North 
to South (Kapur, 2001; Gueron and Spevacek, 2008; 
Nanda and Khanna, 2010);
• identification of new economic opportunities 
through their local knowledge, contacts and cultural 
familiarity (Leblang, 2001);
• diaspora members act as early innovators into a 
country, which may act as a catalyst for further 
investment by diaspora and non-diaspora members;
• contributions to the development of capital markets 
in countries of origin (Terrazas, 2010);
• encouraging FDI by providing market and 
operational information about the homeland to 
potential investors and brokering relationships with 
buyers, suppliers, partners, government officials and 
lending institutions in the homeland; and
• acting as sources of local knowledge about investment 
opportunities, information about regulations and 
procedures, or familiarity with language and 
customs decrease the transaction costs associated 
with investment (Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Debass 
and Ardovino, 2009).
figuRE 1.3: lEvElS of CoMMitMEnt to DiASPoRA EntREPREnEuRSHiP
Investment
Training
Mentoring
Networking
Venture Capital 
and Partnerships
Source: Newland and Tanaka, 2010.
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Not much is known about what motivates diaspora 
individuals and groups to invest in their countries of 
origin and why levels of investment and entrepreneurial 
engagement differ considerably from country to country 
(Galetto, 2011). Two models have recently been proposed 
to try and understand the factors that influence the 
level and type of engagement by diaspora investors 
and entrepreneurs (Table 1.5). The first focusses almost 
exclusively on the availability (or absence) of investment 
opportunities in countries of origin and argues that it is 
the interaction among factors (or “nodes”), rather than 
the factors per se that create the conditions for investment 
(Galetto, 2011: 301). This model identifies four basic nodes: 
the earning capacity of the migrant and the amount of 
money remitted; a minimum level of local development; 
suitable investment opportunities; and intra-household 
arrangements that facilitate the adoption of new investment 
opportunities. Each node is, in turn, influenced by a set 
of sub-factors in countries of origin and destination. A 
second psycho-social model focusses more on the decision 
making of the potential entrepreneur investor, arguing 
that there are three specific categories of return likely to 
impact on the motivation to engage: financial, social and 
emotional (Nielsen and Riddle, 2007). The model also tries 
to take into account cultural and structural variables that 
might affect motivations to invest.
Both models help to identify factors that interact and 
impact on diaspora entrepreneurial engagement. Other 
important variables that need to be taken into account 
include: the reasons for leaving the country of origin; 
the opportunities for creating wealth and raising capital 
in the country of destination; the facilitating role of 
diaspora organizations; the degree of personal and 
community identification with, or alienation from, the 
political system of the country of origin; and  financial 
and other incentives for investment put in place by 
origin governments (Riddle, Brinkerhoff and Nielsen, 
2007; Nielsen and Riddle, 2008). Several studies have 
explored the motivations of diasporas to invest in the 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies (Mohamoud, 
2007; Nielsen and Riddle, 2008; Hammond et al., 2011; 
Brinkerhoff, 2011b; Antwi-Boateng, 2012). Others have 
suggested that attitudes towards government and the 
political system more generally play an important 
role. Diaspora investors tend to be wary, for example, 
of countries with a “disabling environment” — high 
levels of bureaucratic red tape, corruption and political 
instability, even while they may be sizable remitters to 
their own family members still living there (Brinkerhoff, 
2012). Not all countries are equally amenable to 
diaspora entrepreneurship and those that are “tend 
to have promising prospects for economic growth, as 
well as proactive diaspora engagement policies, good 
governance, positive socio-cultural perceptions of 
entrepreneurship, a critical mass of human and social 
capital, and accessible financial institutions and pools of 
capital” (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 1).
DiASPoRA PHilAntHRoPiStS
The growth of diaspora communities has generated 
a growing interest in the developmental potential of 
diaspora philanthropy (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diaspora 
philanthropy refers to “the private donations of diaspora 
populations to a wide range of causes in their countries 
of origin” (Agunias and Newland, 2012: 187). There is no 
consensus on whether remittances should be included 
in the calculation of total diaspora philanthropy. The 
primary argument against viewing remittances as a 
form of philanthropy is that they are really private 
transfers to family members and are not meant for public 
benefit (Mehta and Johnson, 2011). Yet, totally excluding 
remittances from diaspora philanthropy could lead to an 
underestimation of the full extent of diaspora giving. A 
number of studies therefore see remittances as an integral 
part of diaspora philanthropy (Copeland-Carson, 2007; 
Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010).
The basic premise of diaspora philanthropy is that 
it converts private wealth into philanthropic capital 
(Johnson, 2007). Among its constituent elements are 
charitable giving from individuals who reside outside 
their homeland, who maintain a sense of solidarity with 
their home country, give to causes or organizations in 
that country, and give for public benefit (ibid.: 5). One 
study of diaspora philanthropic giving in the Philippines 
observed that it was motivated by the following factors: 
a desire to give back to the country of birth, motivated 
by a sense of gratitude for the life lived in the country 
of origin; compassion for the poor and underprivileged, 
especially in their hometowns; a desire to “pay back,” 
especially among those who were themselves poor or 
underprivileged before they left for abroad; a wish to 
maintain their ties with their country of birth; a desire 
to prove that they have succeeded in their adopted 
country and are now in a position to be generous; an 
expression of their faith, which encourages sharing and 
giving to the less privileged; and a desire to provide 
humanitarian assistance to help victims of a natural 
disaster (Garchitorena, 2007). Amongst the Kenyan 
diaspora in the United States, the principle of ubuntu, 
which emphasizes common humanity, interdependence 
and mutual responsibility for others, is another driving 
force behind diaspora philanthropy (Copeland-Carson, 
2007).
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tABlE 1.5: DiASPoRA invEStMEnt MoDElS
Diaspora Investment Model One
Node 1: Investment is contingent on the earning capacity and amount of money remitted.
• level of integration into labour market in destination country
• access to employment through social networks
• legal status
• time since immigration
• level of social capital
• level of human capital
• economic situation of country of destination
• economic sector in which migrant is employed
Node 2: Investment is contingent on a minimum level of local development.
• provision of basic services
• availability of physical infrastructure
• minimum level of commercialization
• market demand and accessibility of markets
• availability of natural resources
• public-private partnership opportunities
Node 3: Investment is contingent on suitable investment opportunities.
• entry-level requirements that can be met by local population
• prior local experience minimizes risks and uncertainties
Node 4: Investment is contingent on household arrangements.
• pooling of income and capital
• split households with complementary roles in origin and destination countries
• social norms about gender roles
• place of business activity within (where those who remain manage the business)
Diaspora Investment Model Two
Financial motivations
• the potential for financial returns on investment in country of origin
• diaspora members’ perception of “ethnic advantage” in business (knowledge of and social capital in the country of origin)
Social motivations
• the potential for social returns (e.g., social recognition, stronger social relations, “homeland duty”)
• the density and strength of a diaspora member’s social network ties within their diaspora community (or social embeddedness)
• the density and strength of a diaspora member’s social network ties in the country of origin
Emotional motivations
• the potential for emotional returns (altruism, feelings of personal satisfaction, psychological rewards)
• the degree to which diaspora members are emotionally invested in their diaspora community
• the degree to which diaspora members are emotionally invested in their country of origin
Data sources: Galetto, 2011; Nielsen and Riddle, 2007.
Both individual and institutional actors are involved in 
diaspora philanthropy (Table 1.6). Prominent individual 
diaspora members, for instance, are known to raise cash 
to support various causes in the home country (Singh and 
Singh, 2007). Other diaspora members choose to channel 
their resources to intermediary agencies that support 
various initiatives and projects in the country of origin 
(Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010). Examples of such 
initiatives include the African Women’s Development 
Fund, which raises funds from US-based diasporas 
and directs them to projects in Africa, and the African 
Federation Inc., a multi-ethnic, national intermediary 
designed to build the capacity of emerging US-African 
non-profits (Copeland-Carson, 2007).
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Three main donor actors have gained special prominence 
in recent years (Johnson, 2007). First, diaspora associations 
have emerged as powerful philanthropic players. They 
include hometown associations (HTAs), which are small 
voluntary associations organized by migrants from the 
same country of origin who reside in close proximity to 
each other and professionals’ associations, whose main 
role is to support and protect the interests of its members. 
These diaspora associations may eventually develop 
strong philanthropic programs (Aikins, Sands and White, 
2009). Second, diaspora foundations and philanthropic 
intermediaries have been established to encourage and 
facilitate philanthropic giving to a specific country or 
region. These organizations essentially connect diaspora 
donors with causes and organizations in the country 
of origin (Bakshi and Baron, 2011). Third, new actors 
and models are taking advantage of opportunities that 
have arisen in the diaspora philanthropic sphere. They 
include community foundations, whose main role is to 
support issues and organizations in a local or regional 
geographical area. The Kenyan Community Development 
Fund (KCDF), for example, was founded in 2001 by a 
coalition of Kenyan leaders interested in fostering and 
giving support to local development. KCDF established 
a US arm in 2006, called Friends of KCDF, which raises 
funds to support initiatives in Kenya (Copeland-Carson, 
2007). New technologies, such as mobile phones, the 
Internet and other information technologies are likely 
to revolutionize diaspora philanthropy, as it has become 
easier for potential donors to identify causes to support. 
For instance, the website GiveIndia.org posts a list of 
approximately 100 certified non-profit organizations that 
donors can contribute to (Johnson, 2007).
A study of philanthropy by diasporas in the United States 
found several common features of diaspora giving (Najam, 
2007). First, there is a strong desire among diasporas to 
give to individuals in need, rather than to institutional 
causes, despite the fact that they do not benefit from the 
economies of scale that come with pooling resources. Part 
of the reason is that most donors want to be more “hands 
on” and involved, while beneficiary institutions view 
them simply as donors, regardless of the fact that diaspora 
knowledge and experience may sometimes make a bigger 
contribution than their financial resources (Kapur, Mehta 
and Dutt, 2004). Second, many diasporas are distrustful 
of institutions in their countries of origin. The Pakistan 
diaspora, for instance, has responded by setting up its 
own non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
country, that not only channel the funds they raise, but 
also provide a role model of institutional governance 
(Najam, 2006). Third, philanthropic giving serves as a 
crucial psychological and cultural need for diaspora 
communities, whether in terms of national, regional/
community or religious identity. While this can potentially 
widen social, political or religious rifts in the country of 
origin, in some cases, such identity can be used to promote 
greater community good (Sidel, 2004). The Egyptian 
Coptic community in the United States, for example, 
raises funds to support Coptic orphanages in Egypt. By 
2005, it had served over 10,500 children in Egypt with 
annual donations of over US$1 million from the Coptic 
diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Fourth, constrained giving 
instruments are a key hurdle to greater diaspora giving. 
This is especially true in the aftermath of 9/11, which has 
made it more difficult to send money internationally. Thus, 
without cheap and easily available means of transferring 
funds, a large amount of philanthropic potential remains 
untapped (Najam, 2007).
The literature on diaspora philanthropy in Canada is 
much smaller, although Mehta and Johnson (2011: 4) 
argue that the phenomenon is growing as a result of “the 
pervasiveness of globalization, the changing composition 
of the Canadian population, evolving allegiances, and 
a growing global consciousness of diasporic buying 
power.” A 2007 survey of Canadian gift-giving found 
that immigrants contribute 20 percent of all charitable 
donations in Canada and the probability and size of gift-
giving increases the longer a person has been in Canada. 
This survey, however, did not distinguish between 
donations to local or overseas organizations. Indeed, 
“there are very few comprehensive statistics available 
about how Canada’s diaspora is giving back to their 
countries of origin” (ibid.).
tABlE 1.6: DiASPoRA PHilAntHRoPy MAtRix
Individual Donor
Donor Aggregation
Individual Donor Multiple Donors
Donation Size Small Some remittances, individual donations HTAs, online platforms, small 
foundations
Large Direct donations from magnates, celebrities, 
sports stars; large foundations established by 
such individuals
Professional associations, 
family foundations, venture 
philanthropy funds
Source: Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010.
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DiASPoRA KnoWlEDgE nEtWoRKS
One of the defining features of diasporas is that they are 
usually spread between two or more destination countries. 
This presents opportunities for diaspora members to 
network both within and across countries, furthering 
their economic and social interests. Among emigrant 
skilled professionals, knowledge networks can help 
diasporas build new establishments in their countries 
of origin. Diaspora knowledge networks (DKNs) have 
played a critical and highly visible role in accelerating 
technology exchange and FDI in China, India, Israel and 
the United States (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006). Advocates 
have promoted their broader potential for converting the 
“brain drain” into a “brain gain” (Meyer, 2001; Meyer and 
Wattiaux, 2006; Biao, 2005). DKNs also allow migrant-
sending countries to access the social capital accumulated 
by its expatriates (Meyer, 2007). These networks have also 
received support from international organizations such as 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Development 
Program’s (UNDP’s) Transfer of Knowledge Through 
Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program (Rizvi, 2007). 
The five most common DKNs are summarized in Table 1.7 
(Meyer and Brown, 1999).
DKNs can make a number of important contributions 
to the development of the home country: the exchange 
of scientific, technical, administrative or political 
information; specialist knowledge transfer; “scientific or 
technological diplomacy,” or promoting the home country 
in the research and development and business community 
of the host country; joint projects, partly on a virtual basis 
(distant working, simulations); training: attending home-
country sessions and meeting/mentoring students abroad 
(a feature shared by most networks of this type); enterprise 
creation (including multinational subsidiaries) to assist the 
possible return of expatriates on a part-time or permanent 
basis; and ad hoc consultations, for example on research/
development projects (peer review, job recruitment and 
technology assessment) (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 8).
The success of DKNs depend on a number of factors, 
including the nature and extent of the intellectual 
capital of the networks; the level of organization of the 
networks; the home country governments’ commitments 
to “genuinely engage” their intellectual diasporas; 
the perceptions and attitudes of home communities 
toward their intellectual exiles; the existence of policy 
frameworks, resources, infrastructure and so on to 
involve networks in national development efforts; the 
technical and logistical issues involved in engaging the 
diaspora network; and the compatibility of the home 
and diaspora environments in supporting partnership 
and interaction (Teferra, 2004).
In 2007, at least 50 countries had developed, or tried to 
develop, networks for and with their diasporas (Leclerc 
and Meyer, 2007). They include the well-known Caldas 
network of scientists and engineers abroad that was set 
up in 1991 with the aim of mobilizing, gathering and 
reconnecting expatriates with Colombia. At its peak, 
the network had over 800 members from 25 different 
countries (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006). In South Africa, 
the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) 
once seemed to be a promising initiative (Meyer and 
Brown, 1999). However, the effort to link diaspora 
South Africans with each other and with employers and 
potential partners in South Africa petered out when 
SANSA left the University of Cape Town (UCT) and 
moved to the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006; Seguin et al., 
2006). Another example with a short lifespan was the 
South African Diaspora Network (Marks 2004; 2006). 
More recently, a network called Global South Africans 
has emerged to promote South Africa abroad and to link 
high-profile South Africans in the diaspora to pursue 
initiatives jointly that would benefit that country (Global 
South Africans, 2013).
It is difficult to establish exact trends in the formation of 
DKNs at the global level. Attempts to enumerate these 
networks at various times illustrate this complexity, as 
Figure 1.4 shows (Meyer, 2006). In 2006, the number of 
DKNs in Latin America, Asia and Africa was said to be 
158 by one study, while another found 191 operational 
networks the same year. Africa seems to be doing 
well, relative to other continents, when it comes to the 
establishment of DKNs. In the first study, Africa had 51 
of the 158 networks identified (Table 1.8) (Meyer and 
Wattiaux, 2006).
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tABlE 1.7: tyPology of DKns
DKN Description and Characteristics
Student/scholarly networks Offer assistance to students studying abroad and encourage the sharing of information 
and dialogue between scholars. They often facilitate studies abroad and reintegration 
into the highly qualified labour market afterwards. They have a limited scope in terms of 
activities and contributions to the country of origin.
Local associations of skilled expatriates Groups of highly skilled professionals who meet regularly on both a professional and 
social level. The aim is to promote the professional interests of members as well as to 
socialize on a more personal level.
TOKTEN program A UNDP program that uses the expertise of highly skilled expatriates by assisting 
them to return to their home country for short visits. These visits usually last between 
three weeks and three months, during which time the expatriates engage in various 
development projects or undertake teaching assignments at local universities.
Developing intellectual/scientific 
diaspora networks
They share certain characteristics with intellectual/scientific diaspora networks, but due 
to certain constraints have not fully developed into this type of network. Their aim is 
to make use of the highly skilled expatriate pool of their countries to contribute to the 
development process of the home country.
Intellectual/scientific diaspora networks In order to be classified as such, networks must fulfill the following criteria:
• members must be mostly nationals of a particular country living and working or 
studying abroad;
• members must be highly skilled, active in a number of professional fields, specifically 
conducting scientific research;
• the networks must have, as their main purpose, the economic and social development 
of the country of origin; and
• there must be a degree of connection or linkage between different network members 
and between network members and their counterparts in their country of origin.
Data source: Meyer and Brown, 1999.
figuRE 1.4: nuMBER of DiASPoRA KnoWlEDgE nEtWoRKS
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tABlE 1.8: BREAKDoWn of DiASPoRA KnoWlEDgE nEtWoRKS By REgion
Regions Identified Networks Networks Active in 2005 Number in Home Countries
Latin America 25 15 9
Africa 51 27 11
Asia 82 56 18
Total 158 98 38
Source: Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006.
Even though DKNs hold much promise for a “brain 
gain,” some researchers have observed that they have 
been more successful in emerging economies, mostly in 
Asia (Meyer and Brown, 1999; Barré et al., 2003; Tobin 
and Sallee, 2006). The success of the DKN programs in 
India, for instance, is often attributed to the crucial input 
provided by associations of Indians working in Silicon 
Valley, but does not take into consideration other factors 
such as the presence of cheap, highly skilled local labour 
(ibid.). Nonetheless, the growth of DKNs could increase 
the potential contribution of diasporas in many regions of 
the developing world, including Africa.
DiASPoRA ASSoCiAtionS
Diaspora associations are playing an increasingly 
significant role in the affairs of diaspora communities, 
as well as shaping development activities in countries of 
origin. Diaspora organizations are extremely diverse but 
encompass associations of migrants originating from the 
same locality, ethnic affinity groups, alumni associations, 
religious organizations, professional associations, 
charitable organizations, development NGOs, investment 
groups, affiliates of political parties, humanitarian relief 
organizations, schools and clubs for the preservation of 
culture, virtual networks and federations of associations 
(Table 1.8) (Newland and Patrick, 2004).
HTAs of various kinds consist of groups of migrants from 
the same local community or country who, through their 
activities, maintain formal links to their village, urban area 
or nation (Sorensen, 2004). The HTAs of Mexicans in the 
United States are well-known, but they have also been 
reported amongst West Africans in both Europe and the 
United States (Owusu, 2000; Henry and Mohan, 2003; Van 
Hear et al., 2004; Mohan, 2006; Lampert, 2009; Reynolds, 
2009). A large number of Ghanaian diaspora associations 
in the United Kingdom and United States, for example, 
comprise migrants from the same part of Ghana (Orozco, 
2005). In some instances, associations in cities are branches 
of national associations, such as multi-ethnic or multi-
country diaspora associations (Ellis, 2003; Biao, 2005; 
Sökefeld, 2006; McGregor, 2009). Another study has shown 
that hometown and ethnic associations are common among 
newer African diasporas, but absent among older African 
diasporas in the United Kingdom (African Foundation 
for Development [AFFORD], 2000). Activities pursued by 
diaspora associations vary according to the nature of ties 
that they enjoy with the country of origin. General factors 
that influence the participation of individuals in HTAs 
include the emotional satisfaction of helping their country 
of origin, receiving recognition in that country for their 
contribution and making personal financial gains (Ghosh, 
2006). Some associations also take on more overt, and often 
oppositional, political roles in relation to the country of 
origin (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001; Guarnizo, Portes 
and Haller, 2003).
Diaspora business associations are another relatively 
common, though specialized, form of organization with 
development potential. A report by FOCAL in 2007 
identified a range of activities common to many business 
associations including, most significantly, networking, 
trade promotion, business partnerships, lobbying and 
knowledge sharing (Figure 1.5). The members of these 
associations also tended to be involved in shared social 
and cultural activities and functions. A smaller number 
engaged in philanthropic and policy consultancies. Most 
work on associational formation among the African 
diaspora has focussed on diasporas from either East or West 
Africa and little is known about the possible associational 
linkages within the Southern Africa diaspora outside the 
continent (Bloch, 2008; Mercer, Page and Evans, 2009).
DiASPoRA REtuRn MigRAtion
Return migration is an increasingly viable option for those 
who have spent considerable periods of time in other 
countries (Diatta and Mbow, 1999; Thomas-Hope, 1999; 
Olesen, 2002; Iredale, Guo and Rozario, 2003; McCormick 
and Wahba, 2003; Potter, Conway and Phillips, 2005; Mayr 
and Peri, 2008; Dustmann, Fadlon and Weiss, 2011). In 
some cases, return is prompted by the end of a period of 
crisis or instability that forced people out in the first place 
(Basta, 2011). In others, return is prompted by the prospect 
of new economic opportunities. Empirical evidence shows 
that countries such as India and China have benefitted 
from the return of their citizens from abroad who have 
brought with them much-needed technical expertise, as 
well as the capital that is crucial for economic development 
(Kuznetsov, 2006b).
Professionals seem most likely to return permanently 
after reaching retirement age and therefore make limited 
contribution to resolving a country’s human resource 
problems (Tettey and Puplampu, 2005). There have also
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figuRE 1.5: ACtivitiES of DiASPoRA BuSinESS ASSoCiAtionS
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been reports of “brain waste” in some regions. Studies in 
the South Pacific, for example, have shown that between 
10 and 20 percent of migrant health workers return to 
their countries of origin, but only a few return to the 
health sector (Ray, Lowell and Spencer, 2006). The rest are 
absorbed into non-medical fields. Furthermore, studies in 
India have shown that some of the returnees who rejoin 
the medical field are absorbed into the medical tourism 
industry, which serves the foreign, rather than the local 
population (Khadria, 2004).
Return is more likely to be beneficial when it occurs after 
a moderately long time away, between five and 10 years, 
a period of time that allows the migrant to save sufficient 
resources to ease reinsertion (UN, 2006). The return of 
professionals from abroad offers potentially numerous 
benefits to migrant-sending countries, especially those 
that have lost a substantial proportion of their skilled 
professionals to brain drain (Skeldon, 2008). The United 
Nations (2006) claims that return migration is more 
common than is widely believed; however, evidence from 
Africa seems to contradict this claim (Ammassari, 2005; 
Kirigia et al., 2006; Connell et al., 2007).
Programs that encourage the short-term return of 
professionals to their country of origin have received 
widespread institutional support. The UNDP ran the 
TOKTEN program, which supported the return of experts 
and technicians from the diaspora to their countries of 
origin for brief stays, ranging from one week to three 
months to engage their fields of expertise (Macalou, 2009). 
The UNDP covered travel costs and stipends and the 
diaspora consultants received great personal satisfaction 
from contributing to the development of their country of 
origin. Since 1998, about 150 Malian diaspora members 
have completed 381 teaching missions through TOKTEN 
(ibid.). Conflicting views have been expressed on the 
effectiveness of the program in facilitating development 
in migrant-origin countries. An evaluation report for 
the period 1998–2004 for Sri Lanka showed abuse of the 
program, with expatriates who planned to visit the home 
country using it as a way of defraying travel expenses 
(Wanigaratne, 2006). Another evaluation report painted 
a more positive picture. Between 2005 and 2007, 47 
highly educated recruits from seven countries served as 
volunteers in Rwanda under the TOKTEN program and 
nine ended up resettling in that country (Touray, 2008).
Similarly, the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) operates the Migration for Development in Africa 
(MIDA) program, which supports the short-term return 
of African professionals from abroad. Capacity-building 
and training of local staff through skills transfer are 
important elements of the MIDA program. Under MIDA, 
for example, Ghanaian health professionals have been 
supported to return to work temporarily in hospitals and 
medical training institutions under the Ghanaian Health 
Project (Ndiaye, Melde and Ndiaye-Coic, 2011). In Ghana, 
more than 8,264 medical staff, consisting of doctors, nurses, 
medical assistants and students, have so far benefitted 
from the MIDA program.1
1 For details about the MIDA program, visit www.
migration4development.org/content/mida-migration-development-
africa.
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ChapTer 2: ouT of afriCa
MigRAtion fRoM SoutHERn AfRiCA
The SADC is an economic grouping of 15 African countries 
with a total population of 258 million. As a region, SADC 
is characterized by large-scale movements of people 
within countries and across borders (Crush and Frayne, 
2010; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Segatti and Landau, 2011). 
In 2007, an estimated 2.5 million SADC country citizens 
were living in another SADC country. Short-term, cross-
border movements between countries number in the 
millions each year. With the collapse of apartheid and 
greater integration into the global economy, the region 
has also become a destination for migrants from the rest 
of Africa and other parts of the globe, including Asia and 
Latin America.
One of the greatest challenges facing the SADC region, 
however, is not migration within or to the region from 
other parts of the world, but the emigration of citizens 
seeking their fortunes elsewhere. In 2000, around 1.5 
million people born in Southern Africa were scattered 
around the globe, the vast majority in only a handful 
of countries (Table 2.1); by now, this number probably 
exceeds two million. These emigrants are often among 
the most skilled and educated members of society and 
their departure has prompted considerable concern. 
There is also significant evidence that the departure of 
skilled professionals from Southern African countries will 
continue (Oberoi and Lin, 2006; Oosthuizen, 2006; Record 
and Mohiddin, 2006; Chikanda, 2007; Bezuidenhout et 
al., 2009; Crush and Pendleton, 2011).
Previous SAMP surveys have shown that the emigration 
potential of professionals and students in all SADC 
countries is very high (Table 2.2). In a 2000 survey 
of working professionals, for example, 67 percent of 
Zimbabweans, 20 percent of Batswana and 13 percent of 
South Africans said they would be likely to leave their 
countries within five years (McDonald and Crush, 2002). 
In another study, around half of final-year university and 
college students in six different SADC countries said they 
would likely leave within five years (Crush, Pendleton 
and Tevera, 2006). The proportion varied from 48 percent 
in South Africa to 60 percent in Zimbabwe. Medical 
students displayed marginally higher emigration 
potential than non-medical students (Crush and 
Pendleton, 2012). Finally, a survey of practising South 
African health professionals in 2007 showed extremely 
high emigration potential, a prospect labelled “brain 
flight” rather than “brain drain” by the authors of the 
study (Crush and Pendleton, 2011). The major reasons 
for continued emigration include: dissatisfaction with 
remuneration and job opportunities; better employment 
prospects overseas; high levels of local taxation; safety 
and security concerns; and the desire to provide children 
with better opportunities. Social networks — in which 
those who have emigrated facilitate and encourage 
relatives, friends and colleagues to follow them — have 
an increasingly strong influence.
tABlE 2.1: toP 10 DEStinAtion CountRiES foR SADC EMigRAntS, CiRCA 2000
Destination Number of Emigrants % of Total Top Three Origin Countries
United Kingdom 314,921 21 South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania
Portugal 265,210 18 Angola, Mozambique, South Africa
Germany 146,420 10 Angola, South Africa, DRC
United States 126,669 8 South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Australia 118,414 8 South Africa, Mauritius, Zimbabwe
Canada 86,870 6 South Africa, Tanzania, DRC
France 75,068 5 Mauritius, DRC, Angola
Belgium 58,928 4 DRC, South Africa, Mauritius
Pakistan 38,985 3 South Africa, Angola, Mozambique
New Zealand 31,060 2 South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia
Subtotal 1,262,545 85
Other 247,847 15
Global Total 1,510,392 100
Data source: Migration Development Research Centre, 2007.
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tABlE 2.2: EMigRAtion PotEntiAl of PRofESSionAlS AnD StuDEntS in SoutHERn AfRiCA
Within Two Years Within Five Years
Skilled professionals by country (2000)
Zimbabwe 55 67
South Africa 5 13
Botswana 13 20
Final-year students by country (2003)
Zimbabwe 70 60
Lesotho 55 50
South Africa 48 48
Swaziland 55 59
Namibia 48 58
Botswana 40 50
Final-year students by intended profession (2003)
Medical students 65 65
Non-medical students 58 62
South African health professionals (2007)
Physicians 24 50
Dentists 41 85
Pharmacists 41 72
Nurses 31 50
Data source: SAMP Migration Database.
figuRE 2.1: totAl MigRAtion fRoM SoutHERn AfRiCA to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (see footnote 1 for details).
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SADC iMMigRAtion to CAnADA
Migration from Southern Africa to Canada is certainly not 
a recent phenomenon, although the numbers have steadily 
increased over time.1 In the 1980s, for example, between 
1,000 and 2,000 people from the SADC region emigrated 
each year to Canada, a figure that increased to around 
3,000 per year in the 1990s and rose again to over 4,000 per 
1  This profile of Southern African immigration to Canada draws on 
data from two main sources: Statistics Canada census data and CIC 
landing data. The Statistics Canada census data is used to derive the 
SADC immigrant population in Canada and the settlement patterns of 
the SADC immigrant population across the country’s provinces. Statistics 
Canada has conducted the census every five years since 1871, and this 
report uses data up to the 2006 census, as the 2011 findings were not 
available at the time of the study. Landing data collected by the CIC 
was used to illustrate migrant flows into the country. The CIC provides 
a broad range of statistical information on migration admissions to 
Canada. Statistics are available on the admission of permanent residents 
to Canada for the three main categories of immigration: economic 
immigrants, family-class immigrants and refugees, as well as a fourth 
category for “other” immigrants. The CIC also provides landing data 
for temporary residents who enter as foreign workers, students and 
humanitarian (including refugee) claimants. Data was made available to 
SAMP by CIC for the years 1980 to 2009.
year after 2000 (Figure 2.1). Between 1991 and 2006, the 
number of Southern African migrants in Canada more than 
doubled, from 47,410 to 106,325, representing a 124 percent 
increase. Between 1991 and 1996, the overall number rose 
by 12,340; between 1996 and 2001 by 14,890; and by 24,445 
between 2001 and 2006. At present, the number probably 
exceeds 120,000 and continues to grow.
Every SADC country also experienced a growth in 
emigration to Canada between 1991 and 2006. The greatest 
absolute increase over this period came from South 
Africa (21,345 emigrants), the DRC (14,155), Zimbabwe 
(6,100), Tanzania (5,685) and Mauritius (4,941) (Table 2.3). 
In proportional terms, the greatest increases were from 
the DRC, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Angola, the DRC 
and Zimbabwe show particularly rapid increases over 
time, while several countries, including South Africa 
and Tanzania, had a relatively consistent increase over 
the period. By 2006, the Southern African immigrant 
population of Canada constituted 27 percent of the total 
number of African migrants in Canada. Three countries 
dominated the flow, making up 72 percent of the total: 
South Africa (40,570), Tanzania (20,115) and the DRC 
(15,795) (Table 2.4).
tABlE 2.3: CHAngES in tHE nuMBER of SoutHERn AfRiCAn iMMigRAntS in CAnADA, 1991–2006
Immigrant Population
Non-
permanent 
Residents
Total
Numerical 
Increase 
between 
1991 and 
2006
Percentage 
Increase 
between 1991 
and 2006
Place of Birth
Before 
1991
1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2006
Total 
Immigrants
Total Canada 3,408,415 823,930 844,625 1,109,980 6,186,950 265,355 6,452,305 3,043,891 89
Total Africa 136,235 54,800 66,310 117,215 374,565 23,535 398,100 261,864 192
Angola 1,405 160 300 1,175 3,045 225 3,270 1,865 133
Botswana 65 45 30 80 215 170 390 324 498
DRC 1,640 1,745 3,830 6,910 14,125 1,665 15,795 14,155 863
Lesotho 35 25 0 30 90 10 100 74 211
Madagascar 1,060 405 205 360 2,025 190 2,220 1,160 109
Malawi 215 75 50 90 425 80 500 285 132
Mauritius 4,995 1,060 740 2,860 9,660 280 9,935 4,941 100
Mozambique 825 55 85 85 1,050 35 1,090 285 35
Namibia 120 35 60 110 330 125 455 335 279
Seychelles 420 280 120 65 885 10 900 480 114
South Africa 19,225 5,445 7,105 6,525 38,305 2,260 40,570 21,345 111
Swaziland 50 25 15 50 140 25 165 110 220
Tanzania 14,430 2,050 1,345 1,935 19,770 350 20,115 5,685 39
Zambia 1,045 405 385 680 2,515 265 2,780 1,735 166
Zimbabwe 1,880 530 620 3,490 6,520 1,515 8,040 6,100 324
Total SADC 47,410 12,340 14,890 24,445 99,100 7,205 106,325 58,915 124
Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009 (see footnote 1 for details).
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tABlE 2.4: SoutHERn AfRiCAn MigRAnt PoPulAtion of CAnADA, 2006
Place of Birth Immigrants
Non-permanent 
Residents
Total Migrant Stock % of SADC Migrant Stock
Angola 3,045 225 3,270 3.1
Botswana 215 170 390 0.4
DRC 14,125 1,665 15,795 14.9
Lesotho 90 10 100 0.1
Madagascar 2,025 190 2,220 2.1
Malawi 425 80 500 0.1
Mauritius 9,660 280 9,935 9.3
Mozambique 1,050 35 1,090 1.0
Namibia 330 125 455 0.4
Seychelles 885 10 900 0.8
South Africa 38,305 2,260 40,570 38.1
Swaziland 140 25 165 0.1
Tanzania 19,770 350 20,115 18.9
Zambia 2,515 265 2,780 2.6
Zimbabwe 6,520 1,515 8,040 7.6
Total SADC 99,100 7,205 106,325 100.0
Total Africa 374,565 23,535 398,100
Total Canada 6,186,950 265,355 6,452,305
Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.  
Note: Totals may vary due to rounding.
tyPES of iMMigRAntS
In 2002, Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA) replaced the Immigration Act of 1976. Since then, 
Canada’s immigration program has been governed by the 
IRPA, which shifts away from an occupation-based model 
in favour of a points-based model that takes into account 
education, knowledge of official Canadian language(s) 
and the transferability of skills sets. The IRPA defines four 
basic categories of entry for the purposes of permanent 
residence:
• economic class, defined as those individuals who 
are selected for their skills and ability to contribute 
to Canada’s economy, including skilled workers, 
business immigrants, provincial and territorial 
nominees and live-in caregivers;
• family class, designed to reunite families and 
comprises foreign nationals sponsored by close 
relatives or family members in Canada, including 
sponsors and partners, dependant children, parents 
and grandparents;
• refugee class, designed to protect refugees, including 
government-assisted refugees, privately sponsored 
refugees, refugees landed in Canada and dependants 
of refugees landed in Canada who live abroad; and
• other class, where, on an exceptional basis, the IRPA 
gives CIC the authority to grant permanent resident 
status to individuals and families who would not 
otherwise qualify in any category, for example, 
in cases where there are strong humanitarian and 
compassionate considerations, or for public policy 
reasons. These discretionary provisions provide the 
flexibility to approve deserving cases not anticipated 
in the legislation.
In 2010, Canada accepted 280,681 immigrants, of whom 
186,913 (67 percent) were economic class; 60,220 (22 
percent) family class, 24,696 (nine percent) refugees; and 
8,845 (two percent) other class.
Of the 106,325 SADC migrants to Canada in 2006, 93 
percent were permanent residents or citizens and 7,205 
were non-permanent residents (Table 2.4).2 Migrants from 
SADC have entered Canada for permanent residence in 
each of the four categories, although the annual numbers 
in each category and the relative importance of each has 
2  Immigrants are legally defined as persons who are landed immigrants 
or permanent residents in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who 
has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration 
authorities. Non-permanent residents are persons from another country 
who, at the time of the census, held a work or study permit, or who were 
refugee claimants, as well as those family members living with them in 
Canada.
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varied over time (Figure 2.2). It is clear, for example, that 
since 1980, economic-class migrants have consistently been 
the largest category of entry every single year. Family-
class migrants have probably varied the least over time, 
though their absolute numbers are much lower. Although 
refugee-class migrants have been admitted since the mid-
1980s, the numbers have dramatically increased since the 
late 1990s. Migrants entering in the special dispensation 
category are a more recent phenomenon.
figuRE 2.2: tyPE of MigRAtion fRoM SoutHERn AfRiCA to CAnADA, 1980–2009
0!
1,000!
2,000!
3,000!
4,000!
5,000!
6,000!
7,000!
19
80
!
19
81
!
19
82
!
19
83
!
19
84
!
19
85
!
19
86
!
19
87
!
19
88
!
19
89
!
19
90
!
19
91
!
19
92
!
19
93
!
19
94
!
19
95
!
19
96
!
19
97
!
19
98
!
19
99
!
20
00
!
20
01
!
20
02
!
20
03
!
20
04
!
20
05
!
20
06
!
20
07
!
20
08
!
20
09
!
Family class! Economic immigrants! Refugees! Other immigrants!
Data source: CIC.
figuRE 2.3: totAl EConoMiC-ClASS iMMigRAntS to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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Economic-class Migrants
Between 1980 and 2009, more than half (55 percent) of 
SADC immigrants to Canada entered in the economic 
class, compared to 36 percent for Africa as a whole. Since 
the early 1990s, the number of economic immigrants has 
remained relatively consistent, or even declined slightly 
(Figure 2.3).3 The peak year for economic immigrants 
was 1994, with nearly 3,000. The number has remained at 
around 2,000 per year for most of the past decade. Prior to 
2000, South Africans made up the majority of economic-
class immigrants and these fluctuations were closely tied 
to general emigration flows from South Africa. South 
Africa has consistently made up the largest proportion 
of SADC economic-class immigrants (45 percent in total), 
although its numbers have fallen steadily since 2000 
3  Economic-class immigrants enter Canada in one of four subcategories 
and are selected on the basis of demand for particular occupational skills 
in the Canadian economy. These categories currently include: skilled 
workers and professionals, selected as permanent residents based 
on their education, work experience, knowledge of English and/or 
French, and other criteria; investors, entrepreneurs and self-employed 
persons; provincial nominees, persons who immigrate to Canada 
under provincial nominee programs; and Quebec-selected skilled 
workers: under the Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and 
Temporary Admission of Aliens, Quebec establishes its own immigration 
requirements and selects its own immigrants. New regulations were due 
to come into effect in January 2013.
(Figure 2.4). The number and relative proportion from 
other SADC countries has risen. The reason for the South 
African decline is not any overall slowdown in emigration 
from South Africa, but rather the growing popularity of 
Australia and New Zealand as alternate destinations. The 
idea that there is an escalating brain drain from Southern 
Africa to Canada (as there is to Australia and New 
Zealand, for example) is therefore not really supported 
by the statistics. The flow is not insignificant, but it is not 
growing rapidly either.
family-class immigrants
A primary objective of Canada’s immigration program 
has been family reunification. Individual family-class 
immigrants either accompany economic-class migrants, or 
are family members or close relatives who reunite with their 
families later. Under the family class designation, partners, 
dependant children, parents and grandparents can also 
be sponsored by a close relative or family member who 
is already in Canada. Entry to Canada from SADC under 
the family class peaked in the early 1990s, fell considerably 
towards the end of that decade, then recovered and has 
been relatively constant since 2000, between 500 and 700 
immigrants per year (Figure 2.5).
figuRE 2.4: EConoMiC-ClASS iMMigRAtion to CAnADA By oRigin, 1980–2009
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figuRE 2.5: SADC fAMily ClASS iMMigRAtion to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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Asylum Seekers and Refugees
Once a refugee claim has been accepted, those individuals 
may make an application for permanent resident status 
in Canada. This application may include family members 
in the country or abroad. Acceptance or refusal of refugee 
claims is determined by the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB), an independent administrative tribunal that 
oversees claims for refugee protection made in Canada. 
While individuals in the humanitarian population are 
primarily refugee claimants, applicants under this class 
of entry also include foreign nationals allowed to remain 
in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate grounds 
under special considerations. Any person can apply 
to stay in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate 
grounds, including refugee claimants whose claims are 
not approved by the IRB.
Between 1980 and 2009, a total of 72,706 humanitarian 
claims were filed in Canada by people from SADC 
countries (Figure 2.6). Since 2000, refugees have made 
up the second-largest class of entry for SADC migration 
to Canada. In 1980, the number of SADC refugees did 
not even constitute one percent of total SADC migration 
to Canada. By 1991, refugees accounted for 18 percent of 
migrants, and by the turn of the century, 28 percent of 
migrants. In 2009, refugees made up one-third of all SADC 
migrants to Canada. While the number of SADC migrants 
entering as refugees may seem high, the proportion of 
SADC refugees is much lower than for Africa as a whole.
Of the more than 70,000 refugees to Canada between 1980 
and 2009, 39,795 (55 percent) were from the DRC; 16,445 
(23 percent) from Zimbabwe; 8,693 (12 percent) from 
Angola; 4,509 (six percent) from Tanzania; and 2,662 (four 
percent) from South Africa (Figure 2.6). Between 1980 and 
1989, only 1,489 claims were filed by SADC citizens, mostly 
from South Africa (36 percent), Tanzania (27 percent) and 
the DRC (24 percent). Between 1990 and 1999, the number 
of claims rose to 18,078. Of these, 79 percent were filed 
by people from the DRC fleeing the war in their country. 
Between 2000 and 2009, the humanitarian population has 
come from more countries and increased significantly to 
53,139 people. The share of the DRC fell to 47 percent, 
while Zimbabwe’s share grew to 31 percent and Angola’s 
to 14 percent.
The two countries that have generated the most refugees 
to Canada from SADC are the DRC and Zimbabwe. 
According to CIC, these countries continue to make the 
overall list of top source countries for refugee entries 
to Canada. The DRC and Zimbabwe also generate 
considerable numbers of refugees to other countries 
within SADC, notably to South Africa (Kadima, 2001; 
Amisi, 2006; Steinberg, 2006; Simpson, 2008; Idemudia, 
Williams and Wyatt, 2010; Bandeira et al., 2010; 
Rugunanan and Smit, 2011). The influx of refugees from 
the DRC to Canada started in the early 1990s, accelerated 
in the late 1990s and has remained relatively consistent 
for the past 10 years (Figure 2.7). Between 1991 and 2009, 
refugees comprised three-quarters (13,212 in total) of all 
migrants from the DRC.
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figuRE 2.6: REfugEES fRoM SADC in CAnADA, 1980–2009
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figuRE 2.7: DRC REfugEES to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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Data source: CIC.
Canada has seen a significant increase in the number of 
refugee claims filed by Zimbabweans (Figure 2.8). After 
2000, increasing levels of political violence and persecution 
coincided with an unprecedented economic meltdown 
in Zimbabwe, forcing many migrants to flee to other 
countries (Crush and Tevera, 2010). Even though the vast 
majority of victims of political persecution sought refuge in 
neighbouring countries, such as South Africa, a significant 
proportion have moved to more distant countries such 
as Canada. Zimbabweans currently make up the second-
largest group of refugee claimants in Canada and comprise 
just over 50 percent of all Zimbabwean immigrants to 
the country. The numbers of refugee claimants peaked 
in 2004 and then declined after the imposition of a visa 
requirement that made it very difficult for Zimbabweans 
to get to Canada.
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figuRE 2.8: ZiMBABWEAn REfugEES to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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CitiZEnSHiP
Canada recognizes multiple citizenship, but requires 
immigrants to meet several requirements before they 
can claim Canadian citizenship, including at least three 
years of residence in Canada and knowledge of an 
official language. The 2006 census showed that 870,255 
individuals, or 2.8 percent of the Canadian population, 
held citizenship with Canada and at least one other 
citizenship. In SADC, only two countries, Mauritius and 
South Africa, recognize dual or multiple citizenship. In 
theory, citizens of all other SADC countries therefore lose 
the citizenship of their country of origin upon acquiring 
Canadian citizenship. In practice, 17 percent of the SADC-
born population in Canada reported holding multiple 
citizenships. Most originate from Mauritius and South 
Africa, but not all (Table 2.5).
tEMPoRARy MigRAtion to CAnADA
temporary Workers
One of the major changes in migration to Canada over 
the past decade has been the rapid growth of temporary 
migration to the country (Thomas, 2010). In 2006, the 
census enumerated approximately 265,000 temporary 
residents in the country, compared to 143,000 in 1996. Of 
these, 112,000 were working (94,000 full time). In 2010, 
Canada admitted 183,322 foreign temporary workers 
and 96,147 students. Many temporary workers enter the 
country through various officially sanctioned programs, 
such as the Temporary Foreign Worker Program, the 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program and the Live-
in Caregiver Program. These kinds of temporary work 
programs are hailed by the Canadian government as “win-
win-win”: good for Canada, good for home countries and 
good for migrants and their families. Anyone familiar 
with Southern African history will know, however, that 
temporary work programs have existed in that region 
for many decades and are especially associated with 
gold mining and commercial agriculture. They have been 
severely criticized for being highly exploitative and failing 
to protect the basic work and human rights of migrants 
(Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1992). While it would be 
misleading to directly compare the South African migrant 
labour system with Canada’s temporary work programs, 
it is important to note that the latter have attracted censure 
from researchers and human rights groups (Basok, 2001; 
2004; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Goldring, Berinstein and 
Berhard, 2009; Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010; Prebisch and 
Hennebry, 2010; Hennebry, 2012).
Temporary migration from SADC to Canada has increased 
considerably since the late 1990s (Figure 2.9). While SADC 
migrants constitute a relatively small percentage of all 
temporary migrants in Canada (less than three percent), 
they do make up 31 percent of all African temporary 
residents in the country. Since 2001, the overall number of 
SADC temporary residents has increased by 10 percent. 
Findings from the 2006 census suggest that temporary 
migration has increased significantly from many SADC 
countries (Table 2.6), with some — Angola, the DRC, 
Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania — experiencing a 
slight fall in numbers.
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tABlE 2.5: CitiZEnSHiP StAtuS of SADC-BoRn PERSonS in CAnADA, 2006
Country of Birth Single Citizenship Multiple Citizenship Total
Multiple Citizenship 
as % of Total
Angola 1,360 125 1,490 8.4
Botswana 205 10 220 4.5
DRC 8,710 845 9,555 8.8
Lesotho 15 0 15 0.0
Madagascar 415 235 650 36.2
Malawi 130 15 140 10.7
Mauritius 3,210 1,335 4,545 29.4
Mozambique 65 20 90 22.2
Namibia 220 15 235 6.4
Seychelles 210 90 300 30.0
South Africa 9,370 3,195 12,565 25.4
Swaziland 45 10 60 16.7
Tanzania 1,825 320 2,150 14.9
Zambia 455 105 565 18.6
Zimbabwe 4,345 110 4,455 2.5
Total SADC 30,580 6,430 36,765 17.5
Total Canada 30,370,770 870,255 31,241,030 2.8
Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.
figuRE 2.9: SADC tEMPoRARy WoRKERS to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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tABlE 2.6: tEMPoRARy MigRAtion fRoM SADC to CAnADA, 2001–2006
Place of Birth
Number of Temporary Residents Change
2001 2006 %
Angola 680 225 -67
Botswana 70 170 +143
DRC 1,715 1,665 -3
Lesotho 15 10 -33
Madagascar 75 190 +153
Malawi 20 80 +400
Mauritius 135 280 +107
Mozambique 25 35 +43
Namibia 50 125 +150
Seychelles 10 10 0
South Africa 2,310 2,260 -2
Swaziland 15 25 +66
Tanzania 555 350 -37
Zambia 120 265 +121
Zimbabwe 675 1,515 +124
Total SADC 6,470 7,205 +11
Total Africa 22,085 23,535 +7
Total Canada 198,640 265,355 +34
Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.
international Students
There has also been a consistent and significant increase 
in the number of post-secondary SADC students coming 
to Canada since the late 1990s (Figure 2.10). Throughout 
the 1980s, the number coming to study in Canada rarely 
exceeded 1,000 annually. This number rose in the early 
1990s, falling again by mid-decade. Since 1998, however, 
the number has increased almost annually, and reached 
over 2,500 for the first time in 2009. While these students 
are classified as temporary residents in official immigration 
statistics, recent changes in Canadian immigration policy 
encourage international students to remain in Canada 
after graduation (Arthur and Flynn, 2011).
SPAtiAl loCAtion of iMMigRAntS in 
CAnADA
Canada’s 2006 census showed that 96 percent of the SADC-
born population resided in just four provinces: Ontario, 
with 47,425, or 48 percent of the total enumerated; British 
Columbia, with 18,515, or 19 percent; Quebec, with 16,820, 
or 17 percent; and Alberta, with 12,010, or 12 percent (Table 
2.7). The SADC francophone diaspora was settled mainly 
in Quebec (83 percent of immigrants from Madagascar, 63 
percent from Seychelles, 57 percent from the DRC and 36 
percent from Mauritius). Immigrants from South Africa 
and Zimbabwe were dispersed throughout the country. 
South Africans were found in largest concentrations in 
Ontario (18,155), British Columbia (12,090) and Alberta 
(4,950). Eighty-nine percent of migrants from Zimbabwe 
and 94 percent of those from Tanzania also lived in these 
three provinces.
Data on the place of first residence of all immigrants to 
Canada between 1980 and 2009 provides a complementary 
picture of patterns of settlement at the intra-provincial 
scale (Table 2.8). This is not necessarily an accurate 
representation of the actual numbers living in particular 
provinces and cities at present, due to later in-migration:
• Southern African migrants to Canada tend to move 
to three main metropolitan areas: Toronto (35,719), 
Montreal (16,255) and Vancouver (12,145). These 
three cities alone were the destination for two-thirds 
of all migrants to Canada.
• Toronto is a major gateway for migrants in Canada. In 
2006, the city was home to eight percent of Canada’s 
population and 20 percent of all immigrants. Three-
quarters of all SADC migrants arriving in Ontario 
went to Toronto. South Africans make up the largest 
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proportion, at 43 percent (15,469), followed by 
Tanzanians (5,993), Mauritians (5,754), Zimbabweans 
(2,917) and Congolese (2,656). Together, these five 
countries made up 92 percent of all SADC migrants 
arriving in Toronto.
• Vancouver has become a top destination for migrants. 
In 2006, the foreign-born population of the city was 
831,300 — 40 percent of its total population. A total of 
12,145 SADC-born migrants first settled in Vancouver, 
with three-quarters from South Africa (9,287, or 
76 percent). Other smaller clusters of migrants 
in Vancouver include those from Tanzania (734), 
Zimbabwe (649), Mauritius (626) and the DRC (411).
• Montreal is the preferred destination for francophone 
migrants from African countries. African migrants 
make up 26 percent of Montreal’s newcomers and 
12 percent of the total immigrant population in the 
city. Migrants moving to Montreal came largely from 
four countries: the DRC (8,163), Madagascar (1,359), 
Mauritius (3,246) and Seychelles (953). Together, they 
make up 84 percent of all SADC migrants in the city.
• A total of 17,426, or 18 percent of SADC migrants first 
settled in other Canadian cities, a list that includes 
several provincial capitals and the national capital, 
Ottawa. In other words, 83 percent of all SADC 
migrants settle in Canada’s urban centres on arrival 
in the country.
• There are variations in this pattern from country to 
country, but the major exception is South African 
immigrants. The majority went to Toronto (15,469), 
followed by Vancouver (9,287), Calgary (2,141) and 
Edmonton (1,188). Nearly one-quarter of South 
Africans (23 percent) did not go to any major urban 
centre. This is a reflection of the fact that many South 
African health professionals obtain their first jobs 
in Canada in underserviced smaller towns. This is 
particularly evident in Newfoundland, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, where nearly half (47 
percent) of all South Africans did not go to major cities.
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figuRE 2.10: SADC StuDEntS in CAnADA, 1980–2009
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Data source: CIC.
tABlE 2.7: loCAtion of SADC iMMigRAnt PoPulAtion in CAnADA, 2006 CEnSuS
Province
Country of Birth NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC YT NT NU Total
Angola 10 0 10 0 735 1,955 45 0 170 125 0 0 0 3,050
Botswana 0 0 10 0 10 115 0 10 40 20 0 0 0 205
DRC 0 0 30 195 7,980 4,325 300 75 785 430 0 0 0 14,120
Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 10 15 0 0 0 85
Madagascar 0 0 10 0 1,680 195 0 0 50 95 0 0 0 2,030
Malawi 15 0 0 15 30 225 10 15 70 50 0 0 0 430
Mauritius 0 15 30 0 3,475 4,740 140 100 420 740 0 0 0 9,660
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 115 680 40 0 70 155 0 0 0 1,060
Namibia 0 0 10 10 10 110 20 10 85 85 0 0 0 340
Seychelles 10 0 0 0 560 240 25 0 15 45 0 0 0 895
South Africa 125 25 320 125 625 18,155 1,095 720 4,950 12,090 35 40 10 38,315
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 10 65 10 15 30 10 0 0 0 140
Tanzania 10 0 75 10 905 11,600 60 55 4,035 3,010 0 10 0 19,770
Zambia 0 0 25 20 215 1,370 50 90 270 470 0 0 0 2,510
Zimbabwe 0 35 25 10 470 3,590 110 65 1,010 1,175 10 10 0 6,510
Total 170 75 545 385 16,820 47,425 1,905 1,155 12,010 18,515 45 60 10 99,120
Source: Statistics Canada, 2009.
Table acronyms: 
AB Alberta NS Nova Scotia SK Saskatchewan
BC British Columbia NT Northwest Territories QC Quebec
MB Manitoba NU Nunavut YT Yukon
NB New Brunswick ON Ontario
NL Newfoundland PE Prince Edward Island
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tABlE 2.8: PERMAnEnt RESiDEntS fRoM SADC CountRiES By PRovinCE AnD MAJoR uRBAn AREAS, 1980–2009
ANG BOT DRC LES MAD MAL MAU MOZ NAM SA SEY SWZ TAN ZAM ZIM TOTAL
Newfoundland
St. John’s 0 0 11 -- -- -- 5 39 -- 7 0 0 62
Other 5 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 7 359 0 0 7 0 12 397
Total 5 0 12 -- -- 6 -- 12 398 -- 7 7 0 12 459
PEI
Charlottetown -- -- 14 -- -- 0 0 0 -- 11 0 -- 0 0 0 25
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 6 0 0 17
Total -- -- 14 -- -- 0 0 -- 22 0 -- 6 0 0 42
Nova Scotia
Halifax 0 0 58 0 0 0 0 14 0 131 0 0 22 5 36 251
Other 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 113 0 0 0 5 8 153
Total 0 0 65 0 0 0 5 14 0 244 0 0 22 10 44 404
New Brunswick
Moncton 0 0 183 0 0 0 0 -- 0 16 -- -- 0 7 5 211
Fredericton 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 -- 0 15 -- -- 5 5 14 72
Other 0 0 39 0 0 0 5 -- 0 84 -- -- 10 14 16 168
Total 0 0 255 0 0 0 5 7 0 115 -- -- 15 26 35 458
Quebec
Montreal 554 0 8,163 0 1,359 0 3,246 40 0 735 953 5 414 101 685 16,255
Quebec City 17 0 910 0 87 0 48 5 0 11 0 6 5 0 0 1,089
Hull (Gatineau) 6 0 474 0 14 5 11 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 521
Other 30 8 1,063 0 206 27 160 11 11 107 60 0 59 73 43 1,858
Total 607 8 10,610 0 1,666 32 3,465 56 11 864 1,013 11 478 174 728 19,723
Ontario
Toronto 956 503 2,656 15 5 155 4,754 141 47 15,469 103 27 5,993 1,798 2,917 35,719
Ottawa 93 5 1,511 0 6 46 348 41 15 606 0 0 220 169 210 3,270
Hamilton 78 0 275 5 0 0 0 8 14 733 0 0 64 25 487 1,689
Other 190 132 648 56 51 132 315 29 80 2,996 19 58 0 0 0 6,362
Total 1,317 640 5,090 71 62 333 5,417 219 156 19,984 122 75 6,841 2,288 4,425 47,040
Manitoba
Winnipeg 0 11 673 0 0 13 104 50 0 593 0 0 59 97 110 1,710
Other 0 0 16 0 0 0 21 0 0 851 0 0 4 11 23 926
Total 0 11 689 0 0 13 125 50 0 1,444 0 0 63 108 133 2,636
Saskatchewan
Regina 0 5 31 0 -- 0 11 -- 0 401 0 0 32 52 14 546
Saskatoon 0 0 110 0 -- 0 6 -- 0 332 0 0 0 25 0
Other 0 2 48 0 0 5 22 -- 8 1,356 0 0 32 26 35
Total 0 7 189 0 -- 5 39 -- 8 2,089 0 0 64 103 49 2,553
Alberta
Edmonton 16 8 322 0 0 10 186 18 15 1,188 0 0 781 72 357 2,973
Calgary 37 18 230 0 6 12 191 -- 0 2,141 11 0 1,267 61 418 4,392
Other 15 55 79 0 0 23 75 -- 47 1,621 0 6 109 61 172 2,263
Total 68 81 631 0 6 45 452 31 62 4,950 11 6 2,157 194 947 9,641
British Columbia
Vancouver 26 39 411 0 0 27 636 25 0 9,287 16 30 734 265 649 12,145
Victoria 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 27 0 593 0 6 0 0 25 663
Other 0 39 59 0 0 10 47 - 24 2,203 0 12 79 75 193 2,741
Total 26 78 470 0 0 37 695 55 24 12,083 16 48 813 340 867 15,552
NT 0 0 0 -- -- -- 32 -- 0 13 -- -- 0 6 16 67
YT -- -- 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 20 -- 0 0 0 5 25
Source: CIC.  
Note: In this table, cells marked (--) represent areas containing fewer than five individuals. In the judgment of CIC, this data could allow for the  
identification of specific individuals; in such cases, therefore, CIC does not provide the actual number. As a result, the table contains minor arithmetic errors.
Table acronyms:
ANG Angola LES Lesotho MAU Mauritius SA South Africa TAN Tanzania
BOT Botswana MAD Madagascar MOZ Mozambique SEY Seychelles ZAM Zambia
DRC Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
MAL Malawi NAM Namibia SWZ Swaziland ZIM Zimbabwe
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ChapTer 3: diasporas on The 
Web: sTudy meThodology
loCAting DiASPoRAS
Census and immigration data provide a valuable overall 
picture of diaspora flows and distributions. Privacy issues, 
however, preclude these sources from being used to 
provide disaggregated information on individual migrants 
or migrant households. Census data tells us the size of the 
population to survey, but not who the individuals are, 
where they live or how to contact them. Without a sampling 
frame, researchers tend to rely instead on techniques such 
as “snowball” sampling, moving from one respondent to 
another by following their social networks (Simich and 
Hamilton, 2004; Pasura, 2006; 2010; Faye, 2007; Mosaic 
Institute, 2009; Zohry and Debnath, 2010). This usually 
leads to a focus on geographically concentrated diaspora 
groups (Orozco, 2005; Schüttler, 2007; Schmelz, 2007; 
Makina, 2010; Warnecke, 2010). The diaspora research 
literature also tends to rely on small sample sizes, which 
raises questions about the generalizability of the findings 
(Arthur, 2000; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Belai, 2007; Schlenzka, 
2009).
The mail-out survey is the most common method of 
reaching members of a geographically dispersed diaspora 
(Bloch, 2005; Nworah, 2005). To contact members of the 
diaspora, mailing lists are compiled from groups such as 
diaspora organizations, embassies, alumni associations, 
immigrant service agencies and religious organizations 
that keep, and are willing to share, membership lists. This 
method of “accessing the diaspora through the diaspora” 
is unlikely to provide much information on “hidden” 
members of a diaspora who do not participate in or interact 
with any of these agencies (Bloch, 2007). Researchers have 
noted that members of vulnerable populations, such as 
asylum seekers and refugees, may be especially reluctant 
to participate in such surveys due to mistrust (Atkinson 
and Flint, 2001).
The potential of the Internet for diaspora research is 
considerable (Crush et al., 2012). More than one billion 
people are connected to the Web, creating seemingly 
limitless opportunities for communication and exchange 
(Wright, 2005; Weaver and Morrison, 2008). The past 
decade has also seen a major increase in the use of the 
Internet by diaspora individuals and groups, enhancing 
communication among diaspora members and 
influencing the formation of diaspora identities (Ackah 
and Newman, 2003; Bernal, 2004; 2006; Hiller and Franz, 
2004; Parham, 2004; Ignacio, 2005; Georgiou, 2006; Kissau 
and Hunger, 2008; Mano and Willems, 2010; Peel, 2010). 
Online communication has become particularly valuable 
to diaspora communities, as it creates a meeting place 
of the private and the public, the interpersonal and the 
communal; through the Internet, diasporas have developed 
“virtual communities” within and across national borders 
(Karim, 2003; Georgiou, 2006). One study of Eritreans 
abroad shows how they use the Internet as a “public 
sphere” to produce and debate narratives of history, 
culture, democracy and identity (Bernal, 2006). Another 
analysis of the use of websites, chat rooms and discussion 
forums by the Zimbabwean diaspora shows how the 
Internet has connected the diaspora to the homeland in 
multiple and imaginative ways (Mano and Willems, 2010). 
Zimbabwean online communities also use these forums 
to interrogate their own identities, citizenship, sense of 
belonging, politics and aspirations (Peel, 2010).
The Internet opens up new opportunities for researchers 
to study geographically dispersed diasporas with a strong 
online presence (Schmidt, 1997; Berrens et al., 2003; Wright, 
2005). The online survey allows researchers to reach much 
larger numbers of widely dispersed individuals with 
common characteristics in a short period of time and at 
greatly reduced fieldwork cost. Other advantages of online 
surveying include the ability to post advertisements and 
invitations on websites, and to send invitations to listserv 
members. By automatically collecting and writing data 
to an online database file, the costs of data entry and 
cleaning are also eliminated (Wright, 2005). Low-cost, 
or even free, online survey companies provide technical 
and administrative support in research design, data 
collection and analysis. With the rapid advance in online 
survey technology over the past 10 years, collecting and 
storing data online is now more secure. Through the 
use of encryption, survey data can be stored without 
the possibility of sensitive and confidential data being 
accessed by the public. The advanced nature of some 
providers allows researchers to export data to a variety of 
data analysis programs. Some even allow researchers to 
conduct preliminary analyses on data while the survey is 
in progress.
This chapter describes the development of the SAMP 
survey methodology and the decision to adopt a mixed-
methods approach combining traditional face-to-face 
interviewing, mail-out surveys and an Internet-based 
survey. The chapter first discusses the strategies used to 
locate and interview Southern African diaspora members 
in Canada. Particular attention is paid to the use of the 
Internet and social networking sites (SNSs), since this 
constitutes the most original part of the study (Crush et 
al., 2012).
DEvEloPing tHE inStRuMEnt
The survey instrument used to collect the data for this 
study was collaboratively developed by the SAMP 
research team in Canada and Africa. The instrument and 
study methodology were submitted to, and approved by, 
the General Research Ethics Board at Queen’s University 
in Canada. The questionnaire was pilot tested and refined 
prior to implementation. The survey consisted of a series 
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of closed questions designed to gather information on the 
following:
• the demographic, social, economic, employment and 
educational profiles of individuals and households;
• reasons for leaving Africa and coming to Canada, 
including categories of entry to Canada;
• experiences in Canada and comparisons between 
Canada and African countries of origin;
• linkages maintained with countries of origin, 
including remittances and other economic 
transactions, family ties and the frequency and 
reasons for return visits;
• involvement in development-related activities in 
countries of origin; and
• the likelihood of returning to Africa, either 
temporarily or permanently.1
An open-ended question was included at the end of the 
survey to allow respondents to write at greater length 
about their experiences, perceptions and aspirations.
As shown in Chapter 2, the Southern African diaspora 
in Canada is scattered across the country. Cost and 
time constraints prohibited a nationwide face-to-face 
interviewing strategy and an online survey instrument 
was designed instead (Evans and Mathur, 2005). The 
survey was hosted by StudentVoice© Canada and was 
accessible through a link on the SAMP website.2 Data 
collected by the program was encrypted and stored on 
a Canadian server. The StudentVoice© Canada team 
assisted with questionnaire design, putting the survey 
online and troubleshooting technical difficulties that 
arose. In total, the project required the design and hosting 
of 14 country-specific questionnaires in both official 
languages, English and French (i.e., 28 questionnaires 
in total). When a survey was completed, the data set 
was easily downloaded and manipulated using SPSS, a 
statistical analysis software package.
inviting DiASPoRAS
With the survey online, a multi-pronged strategy was 
developed to contact members of the Southern African 
diaspora and invite them to complete the survey. These 
methods had varying degrees of success.
1 Copies of the survey are available from Jonathan Crush via email to 
jcrush@balsillieschool.ca.
2 Access the SAMP website at www.queensu.ca/samp.
Degrees of Separation
The first strategy was based on the “six degrees of 
separation” concept, starting with the contact lists of the 
members of the research team itself (Watts, 2004). The 
research team included one member of the South African 
diaspora (Mary Caesar) and one from the Zimbabwean 
diaspora in Canada (Abel Chikanda). A third member was 
born in the United Kingdom, but raised in South Africa, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Jonathan Crush). A fourth 
is a member of the Indian diaspora, whose partner is a 
member of the South African diaspora in Canada (Sujata 
Ramachandran). A fifth is Canadian and Australian, and 
has conducted research on migration to South Africa 
(Ashley Hill). A sixth (Wade Pendleton) is a member of 
the US diaspora living in South Africa (and prior to that, 
Namibia). The final member of the team is from the German 
diaspora in Canada and has conducted research on Latin 
American immigration to Canada (Cassandra Eberhardt). 
The team was therefore extremely heterogeneous, but has 
the diaspora experience in common.
Each member of the research team has friends, relatives, 
colleagues and acquaintances from Southern Africa in 
Canada. Using the six-degrees logic, an invitation list was 
drawn up of personal contacts. These contacts were then 
invited to complete the survey and to pass the invitation 
on to their own circle of personal contacts. The logic of 
the degrees of separation is that within a maximum of six 
steps of contact, every member of the SADC diaspora in 
Canada should have become aware of the survey. This 
method was not a great success, however, yielding only 
80 respondents in the first six weeks of the survey. This 
number was not significantly greater than the original list 
of personal contacts of the research team (around 60). This 
suggests that while many of these contacts completed the 
survey themselves, very few passed on the invitation.
SnSs
Social media, especially SNSs such as Facebook, have 
profoundly reshaped Internet usage in the past decade 
(Brickman-Bhutta, 2009; Wink, 2010; Redmond, 2010). 
SNSs have become a way for users to connect and interact 
with family, friends and colleagues globally. They have 
also opened up opportunities to make contact with new 
individuals, both personal and professional, and with 
other diaspora members. In one recent study, Facebook 
data was used to define user subgroups by gender, race/
ethnicity and socio-economic status with distinct network 
behaviours and cultural preferences (Lewis et al., 2008). 
Facebook users themselves have the ability to form and join 
groups based on shared interests and activities, providing 
members with the ability to network with other members 
and to share information relevant to the group description.
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tABlE 3.1: fACEBooK PRESEnCE of SADC DiASPoRA in CAnADA
SADC Country of Origin Number of Facebook Groups Number of Facebook Group Members Number of Individuals Messaged
Angola 3 34 22
Botswana 3 54 51
DRC 5 130 59
Lesotho 0 0 0
Madagascar 7 663 505
Malawi 1 26 26
Mauritius 15 1,639 911
Mozambique 1 27 4
Namibia 3 68 14
Seychelles 0 0 0
South Africa 36 5,371 2,581
Swaziland 2 506 7
Tanzania 4 201 132
Zambia 6 366 263
Zimbabwe 11 477 1,046
Total 97 9,562 5,621
Note: The number of individuals messaged may not correspond with the total number of individuals in a Facebook group for one or a combination of 
the following reasons: a person’s Facebook profile prohibited sending them a message, the individual member was not living in Canada, the existence 
of duplicate profiles and individuals being under the age of 18. As some groups were more “global” in nature, only individuals who appeared to be 
living in Canada were sent a message.
Diaspora groups on Facebook have grown rapidly in 
number and size since 2004. In total, 97 SADC-related 
Canadian Facebook groups were located and contacted, 
most relating to South Africa (36), Mauritius (15) and 
Zimbabwe (11) (Table 3.1). Information about the survey 
and invitations to participate were posted on the message 
boards of the diaspora groups. Each member of a given 
group was then sent a personal message explaining the 
purpose of the survey and inviting their participation. 
Many people belonged to more than one group, but each 
individual was only messaged once. The overall response 
was extremely positive. A total of 5,621 people were 
messaged via Facebook with an overall response rate 
(in terms of completing the survey) of over 40 percent; 
however, the country coverage achieved via Facebook 
messaging varied considerably. In total, around six 
percent of the SADC diaspora was sent an individual 
message. Most countries were in the five to 15 percent 
range, although over 20 percent of migrants in Canada 
from Botswana, Madagascar and Zimbabwe were located 
and messaged.
Other SNSs target particular subgroups. LinkedIn and 
Academia.edu, for example, are directed at professionals 
and academics, respectively. LinkedIn, which also has 
diaspora groups, proved a useful tool for identifying and 
messaging professionals, primarily from the business, 
banking, legal and Internet technology sectors. The 
Academia.edu site proved less useful for recruiting 
diaspora academics, necessitating a time-consuming 
search of Canadian university websites using various 
keywords to try to identify faculty who had trained in 
Southern Africa.
Public Websites
Two diaspora websites, South Africans in Ontario and 
the South African Jewish Association of Canada (SAJAC), 
containing the names and mailing addresses (but not 
email addresses) of members were found. Hard copies of 
the survey were mailed to 554 addresses with a response 
rate of over 40 percent. Another subgroup that the study 
was interested in was health professionals, given the 
considerable amount of attention and controversy that 
surrounds the migration of health professionals from 
South Africa to Canada. Some health professionals were 
recruited during the Facebook campaign, but the numbers 
were insufficient to undertake any general analysis of the 
medical diaspora in Canada. Together, the websites of each 
province’s College of Physicians and Surgeons provide the 
names and addresses of all physicians in the country. Using 
“languages spoken” and “degree-granting institutions” as 
search terms, it was possible to construct a large database 
of diaspora physicians. In the case of South Africans, for 
example, a total of 791 physicians were identified. The 
questionnaire was mailed to all physicians identified and 
554 responded, an exceptional response rate of 70 percent, 
far exceeding the 32 percent response rate reported for the 
National Physician Survey conducted by the College of 
Family Physicians of Canada in 2007 (Grava-Gubins and 
Scott, 2008).
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figuRE 3.1: onlinE RECRuitMEnt of SoutHERn AfRiCAnS in CAnADA
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The relative importance of the different online methods 
of recruiting diaspora respondents is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Without the innovative use of the Internet to identify and 
contact potential respondents, the study would certainly 
have been far less effective in accessing the SADC 
diaspora in Canada. At the same time, online recruiting 
was far more effective with some country diasporas than 
others.
face-to-face interviews
Although the online methods used to identify respondents 
reached a sizable proportion of the SADC diaspora in 
Canada, certain groups were not adequately represented in 
the sample. Thus, a decision was made to hire researchers 
from the diaspora to conduct face-to-face interviews. Given 
financial constraints, all the interviews were conducted in 
Toronto. The first “scattergun” approach was to target the 
annual Afrofest in Toronto, as one of the research team 
members was on the festival’s organizing committee. While 
the project had a booth at the festival with researchers ready 
to interview anyone willing to complete the survey, only 
a handful of questionnaires were completed. Community 
researchers were then hired and, under supervision, 
administered the questionnaire to individuals from countries 
that were poorly represented in the sample, such as Angola, 
the DRC, Tanzania and Zambia. Respondents were identified 
using social networks and snowball sampling. Data from 
the completed hard-copy questionnaires was then entered 
online on the StudentVoice© Canada server. This research 
method yielded an additional 345 respondents, bringing the 
study total to 2,439 (Table 3.2).
intERviEWing oRgAniZAtionS
The study also set out to collect information on diaspora 
organizations and their development initiatives. The 
specific objectives of this component were to compile 
a database on the size and origins of the diaspora 
organizations, to establish the general development 
potential of diaspora associations, to consider the role 
of diasporas in furthering the Millennium Development 
Goals, to examine the ways in which governments 
and regional organizations can engage with diaspora 
associations and to determine the potential for future 
diaspora engagement in development activities.
With no database of diaspora groups and organizations 
in Canada, SADC diaspora organizations were identified 
initially through intensive Web-based searches using a 
variety of keywords. Additional groups were located 
through Facebook and community-based contacts. In 
some cases, community identity is cohesive and several 
diaspora members are actively involved in more than 
one organization. Community-based contacts proved 
useful in these situations in drawing attention to diaspora-
led development-oriented initiatives. Conversely, in 
other SADC diaspora communities, where ethnic or 
racial identities play a strong role in the formation 
of group participation in activities, members are less
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tABlE 3.2: totAl SuRvEy RESPonDEntS
Country of Birth Internet Respondents Personal Interview 
Respondents
Total Respondents
Angola 10 47 57
Botswana 7 6 13
DRC 12 116 128
Lesotho 2 1 3
Madagascar 25 0 25
Malawi 9 0 9
Mauritius 52 0 52
Mozambique 8 0 8
Namibia 26 0 26
Seychelles 2 0 2
South Africa 1,635 0 1,635
Swaziland 9 1 10
Tanzania 37 89 126
Zambia 40 25 65
Zimbabwe 220 60 280
Total 2,094 345 2,439
familiar with or able to identify groups/organizations other 
than their own. Another challenge was the identification 
of diaspora-led organizations that focus on development 
projects in SADC countries and are largely independent of 
“ethno-national” community diaspora groups.
Some groups exist only informally and are not registered 
entities. Others do not have websites, or do not provide 
contact information about their executive members, raising 
problems of access in order to study them in depth, identify 
their activities or assess their development potential. One of 
the consequences of not having a comprehensive database 
was that it was not possible to determine the number of 
interviews that would provide us with a representative 
sample. However, the broader goal in this part of the study 
was not to make generalizations, but rather to collect and 
disseminate information on the range and diversity of 
organizations and initiatives. The results were therefore 
compiled into a database that included the organization’s 
name, mission statement, contact details, office bearers and 
management, and fundraising objectives and programs, 
including international development initiatives.
As soon as a set of organizations had been identified and 
their activities assessed through material in the public 
domain, a selection was contacted in order to conduct 
in-depth interviews with a representative familiar with 
their work, structure, history and activities. In a few cases, 
despite expressing strong interest in the SAMP project 
and its outcomes, representatives were reluctant to be 
interviewed. Instead, they directed our attention to other 
material, such as website information, books and other 
information about the organization and its activities in 
their countries of origin. Some organizations did both, 
consenting to an interview and providing supplementary 
material.
In many cases, founding members of organizations were 
interviewed. In others, like ethno-national and ethnic-
cultural diaspora groups, the interviewees had played an 
active role in these groups for several years and possessed 
a strong familiarity with the group’s goals and practices. 
Respondents were typically members of the executive 
committee or the board of these organizations. Interviews 
were conducted in person or by telephone using a semi-
structured interview guide. Depending on the nature of 
the organization and its activities, interviews varied in 
length from 40 minutes to a few hours. Where respondents 
agreed, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Where 
they did not, the interviewer took notes.
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ChapTer 4: engaged diaspora: 
souThern afriCans in Canada
DiviDing tHE DiASPoRAS
When interpreting the results of the survey, it quickly 
became evident that there were considerable differences in 
the responses received from South Africans and migrants 
from other Southern African countries now living in 
Canada. Rather than treating the SADC diaspora as an 
undifferentiated whole, therefore, we have separated these 
two groups and present the survey results separately. 
Ideally, we would have liked to present a separate 
analysis for each SADC country; however, the number of 
responses from some countries was too small to allow for 
country-specific conclusions. Only the South African and 
Zimbabwean samples were large enough to permit single 
country analysis, thus, for this report, the Zimbabwean 
data has been combined with that from other countries 
outside South Africa. A separate report has been published 
elsewhere on the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada 
(Chikanda, Crush and Maswikwa, 2012).
There are five major differences between the South African 
group of respondents and those from other Southern 
African countries now living in Canada (referred to here 
as “other Southern Africans”): immigration timelines, 
channels, reasons for coming to Canada, current 
employment profiles and earnings, and the type and 
intensity of connections that they maintain with their 
countries of origin.
immigration timelines
The two groups’ timelines for immigration to Canada 
vary considerably (Table 4.1). Just over 43 percent of 
South African respondents immigrated before 1998, 
compared with one-quarter of the other Southern African 
respondents. This is consistent with Canadian census and 
CIC immigration figures that show that South Africans 
have a much longer history of migration to Canada and a 
major increase from other Southern African countries over 
the last decade (see Chapter 2).
immigration Channels
There are significant differences in the immigration 
channels through which the two groups entered Canada 
(Table 4.2). For example, only 0.1 percent of South Africans 
entered as asylum seekers or refugees, compared with 
one-third of the other Southern Africans. The dominant 
category of South African migrants was the economic 
class (56 percent), compared to just under 20 percent of 
the other group. Other smaller differences were noted 
in the student class (18 percent versus four percent) and 
the temporary worker class (two percent versus seven 
percent).
Primary Reasons for Coming to Canada
The survey found major differences in the main reasons 
the two groups gave for coming to Canada, some of them 
counterintuitive (Table 4.3). For example, although over 
half of South Africans entered Canada as economic-class 
migrants, less than 10 percent of them said that their 
primary reason for coming was economic. In the other 
Southern Africa group, the proportion who entered as 
economic-class migrants (19 percent) was reflected in the 
proportion who said that they entered for economic reasons 
(18 percent). Conversely, while less than one percent of 
South Africans entered as refugees or asylum seekers, 40 
percent said that their main reasons for emigrating related 
to personal safety and security, as well as political reasons. 
Among the other Southern Africans, the discrepancy 
was in the opposite direction, with one-third entering as 
asylum seekers or refugees, but only 23 percent of them 
citing politics or personal safety and security as primary 
reasons for entry.
Employment Profiles and Earnings
There are major differences in the employment profile 
and earnings between the two groups (Figure 4.1). Almost 
one-third of the other Southern African respondents earn 
less than CDN$25,000 a year. An additional 34 percent 
reported earning between CDN$26,000 and $50,000 a year, 
and less than five percent earn more than CDN$200,000 
a year. A Statistics Canada report shows that the income 
profile of SADC-country respondents is consistent with 
its profile of the general African immigrant population 
in Canada (Lindsay, 2001). This report found that the 
average income for African immigrants was CDN$24,000, 
almost CDN$6,000 less than the average income for the 
Canadian-born population. Moreover, the report shows 
that 39 percent of African immigrants have incomes below 
Statistics Canada’s low-income cut-off, compared to only 
16 percent of the Canadian-born (ibid.).1 South Africans in 
Canada, on the other hand, are relatively high earners. As 
many as 44 percent earn more than CDN$100,000 per year, 
a figure that dwarfs both the five percent for Canadian-
born people and the 10 percent for other Southern African 
survey respondents (Golombek, 2011). Over one-quarter 
of South Africans earn more than CDN$200,000 per year, 
compared with less than five percent of the non-South 
African respondents.
1 According to Statistics Canada, the 2011 low-income cut-off for an 
individual living in a metropolitan area of 500,000 or more is CDN$23,298. 
See: www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/75f0002m2012002-eng.pdf for 
details.
DiviDeD DiASpoRAS: SoutheRn AfRiCAnS in CAnADA
44 • the CentRe foR inteRnAtionAl GoveRnAnCe innovAtion
tABlE 4.1: yEAR of MigRAtion to CAnADA
 Other Southern Africans 
%
South Africa 
%
 Before 1991 13.2 21.8
 1991–1998 13.1 21.5
 1999–2002 34.4 22.5
 2003–2006 20.9 16.5
 2007–2010 18.4 17.7
 Number of Respondents 733 1,577
tABlE 4.2: offiCiAl CAtEgoRy of EntRy of RESPonDEntS
 Other Southern African 
%
South African 
%
Asylum seeker/Refugee 34.3 0.7
Economic class (skilled worker or professional) 19.5 56.1
Student 18.2 4.3
Family sponsorship/Assisted relative class 15.5 12.4
Temporary worker 1.9 5.6
Canadian experience class 0.5 2.0
Government sponsored 0.5 1.5
Provincial nominee 0.3 3.1
Other 5.9 8.8
Unknown 3.4 5.6
 Number of Respondents 735 1,585
tABlE 4.3: MAin REASonS foR Moving to CAnADA
 Other Southern African 
%
South African 
%
Total Southern African 
%
 Children’s future 18.1 26.2 23.6
 Economic 17.8 9.7 12.3
 Educational 22.5 3.3 9.5
 Political 8.2 5.4 6.3
 Professional 6.2 7.6 7.1
 Religious 0 0.4 0.3
 Safety/Security 14.4 34.5 28.1
 Unite with relatives 6.7 3.7 4.7
 Other 6.1 9.0 8.1
 Number of Migrants 742 1,584 2,326
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figuRE 4.1: inCoME PRofilE of RESPonDEntS
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Maintaining Connections with Countries of origin
Finally, there are significant differences between the two 
groups in terms of the type and intensity of connections 
that they maintain with their countries of origin. These 
differences are so significant that we have labelled the two 
groups accordingly: “disengaged” (South Africans) and 
“engaged” (other Southern Africans).
PRofilE of An EngAgED DiASPoRA
This section rounds out the immigration history and 
patterns discussed in the previous section by providing 
additional information on other Southern African 
migrants. South African migrants are considered 
separately, in Chapter 5 of this report.
As noted, these migrants entered Canada through a variety 
of legal channels. Compared with migration flows to 
Canada as a whole, Southern African asylum seekers and 
refugees are overrepresented (at 34 percent) and family-
class entrants are significantly underrepresented (at only 
15 percent). Irrespective of the category of entry, however, 
the vast majority of respondents (81 percent) have made 
the transition to citizenship or permanent residence (Table 
4.4). Only three percent of the respondents from these 
states were still in the asylum-seeker or refugee class 
at the time of the survey. This is a similar pattern to the 
sample as a whole, which includes South Africans. This 
suggests that most SADC migrants, wherever they come 
from, share the common goal of establishing permanent 
residence in Canada. In the context of the aims of this 
study, this is an important finding. Previous studies have 
found an inverse relationship between legal status in the 
destination country and commitments in the country of 
origin: immigrants with secure legal status are more likely 
to be socially integrated in the host country and to send 
less in remittances, and they are less likely to return home 
(Chetsanga, 2003; Bloch, 2005; Chikanda, 2010).
Demographically, the sample is split almost evenly 
between males and females (Table 4.5). Racially, the 
majority are black (63 percent), while 17 percent are 
white and 12 percent are mixed race. The age profile of 
the respondents shows that they are generally young, 
with nearly two-thirds below the age of 40. Slightly more 
than half are married, while 39 percent have never been 
married. A further eight percent are divorced or separated 
and two percent are widowed.
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tABlE 4.4: CuRREnt iMMigRAtion StAtuS
Immigration Status % of Other Southern Africans All Respondents %
 Citizen 53.2 58.8
 Permanent resident 27.5 26.4
 Work permit 7.0 9.0
 Student 7.1 3.0
 Asylum seeker/Refugee 3.1 1.1
 Other 2.0 1.7
 Number of Respondents 742 2,331
tABlE 4.5: DEMogRAPHiC PRofilE of otHER SoutHERn AfRiCAn MigRAntS
Number %
Gender
Female 394 50.3
Male 389 49.7
Total 783 100.0
Race
Black 498 63.2
White 138 17.5
Indian/Asian 98 12.4
Other 43 5.5
Coloured 11 1.4
Total 788 100.0
Age
17–30 298 39.0
31–39 194 25.4
40–46 122 15.9
47–52 78 10.2
53–90 73 9.5
Total 765 100.0
Marital Status
Married/Common law 406 51.4
Never married 311 39.4
Divorced/Separated 60 7.6
Widowed 13 1.6
Total 790 100.0
tABlE 4.6: lEvEl of EDuCAtionAl AttAinMEnt
Other Southern Africans 
%
Recent Immigrants to 
Canada 
%
Canadian-born Population 
%
 Less than high school 11 11 15
 High school 33 22 26
 College or trade diploma 26 31 39
 University degree or more 30 35 19
 Number 743 1,460,900 15,306,300
Data sources: SAMP survey data and Fleury, 2007.
ChApteR 4: enGAGeD DiASpoRA: SoutheRn AfRiCAnS in CAnADA
SoutheRn AfRiCAn MiGRAtion pRoGRAMMe • 47
The migrants had attained high levels of education 
before coming to Canada (Table 4.6), comparable to most 
recent immigrants to the country and exceeding the 
Canadian-born population. For example, 30 percent of 
the migrants had at least a university degree upon entry 
to Canada, compared with 19 percent of the Canadian 
population.
Three-quarters of the respondents indicated that they 
had continued their formal education outside Africa. The 
most common qualifications earned included bachelor’s 
degrees (30 percent), technical or vocational diplomas and 
certificates (29 percent) and master’s degrees (11 percent). 
For many, this was a matter of necessity rather than choice. 
As many as 33 percent of respondents said they have been 
asked to recertify or retrain in Canada in order to work in 
a field for which they were already trained. Furthermore, 
30 percent reported that they work in occupations that do 
not make full use of their professional qualifications. One 
survey respondent observed that moving to Canada set 
them back a few years and that it took a long time to get to 
the point they were at before leaving Africa:
From a job point of view, my husband and I 
took a moment, on our 12-year anniversary of 
immigrating to Canada, to evaluate and compare 
where we were in our careers 12 years ago when 
we left South Africa (after leaving Zambia) and 
where we are now, 12 years later in Canada and 
we have still not caught up to where we were. 
Immigrating to Canada sets you back about 10 or 
more years in your career, unless you are a doctor. 
I think immigrating to Canada is most beneficial 
to doctors, in my opinion, because they seem to 
be the most successful here. (Respondent No. 61, 
Zambia)
The respondents face four main barriers in accessing 
the Canadian labour market: a lack of Canadian work 
experience, language problems, a lack of foreign 
credential recognition and a lack of job contacts in 
Canada. Access to the labour market has an influence 
on the level of integration in Canada, as well as on the 
migrants’ capacity to send remittances. Only seven 
percent of the respondents were not employed, while an 
additional 21 percent were students. The most common 
occupations include sales and service (10.7 percent), 
health (8.4 percent), and finance, business and banking 
(7.1 percent) (Table 4.7).
tABlE 4.7: CuRREnt JoB/oCCuPAtion
Occupation %
Management 8.1
Business owners 1.8
Finance, business, banking 7.1
Engineering and construction 3.0
Health 8.4
Legal 0.6
Sales and service 10.7
Information technology 2.3
Advertising, media, communications 0.9
Arts, sports and culture 0.6
Social services 4.7
Civil service 0.4
Technical and trades 6.3
Education 3.0
Student 21.4
Self-employed 2.8
Administrative and clerical 4.7
Other 6.4
Not employed 7.0
Number of Respondents 704
tiES tHAt BinD
Emotional ties are central to the idea of diaspora-led 
development, as they prompt migrants to maintain 
social links with family and friends in their country of 
origin. Just over half of survey respondents (55 percent) 
said they have immediate family members living there 
(defined as a spouse, child, sibling, parent, grandparent 
or grandchild) (Figure 4.2). The majority of the immediate 
family members are siblings (19 percent), parents (19 
percent) and grandparents (13.6 percent). Only a few 
respondents reported having their children (2 percent) or 
spouses (0.5 percent) living there.
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figuRE 4.2: fAMily tiES to CountRy of oRigin
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tABlE 4.8: iDEntifiCAtion WitH CountRy of oRigin
%
Strongly 
Agree
Agree Disagree
Strongly 
Disagree
To what extent do 
you agree with 
the following 
statements?
Being from that country is an important part of 
how I view myself.
58.7 24.7 3.9 2.2
Number of Respondents: 602
I feel strong ties with people from that country.
50.1 30.1 4.3 2.7
Number of Respondents: 585
tABlE 4.9: intERESt in CultuRE AnD PolitiCS of CountRy of oRigin
Do you: % Yes
Want your children to know about the culture of your country of origin? 83.7
Listen to music from your country of origin? 82.1
Make or buy traditional foods from your country of origin? 74.6
Consult websites from your country of origin? 72.1
Want your children to learn the language(s) of your country of origin? 70.8
Read newspapers from your country of origin? 60.1
Closely follow political events in your country of origin? 59.2
Find that most of your best friends in Canada are from your country of origin? 48.1
Go to a cultural event or show in Canada with performers from your country of origin? 39.8
Read online newspaper(s) from your country of origin? 12.2
Participate in a social networking site associated with your country of origin? 12.0
Note: Multiple responses permitted.
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Continued links with family and friends in the country of 
origin may be transformed into obligations, commitments 
and concrete actions for the diaspora, particularly if 
migration was used as a household livelihood strategy to 
diversify, secure and potentially improve livelihoods (de 
Haas, 2010). There may therefore be networks of mutual 
obligation and implicit contracts within families that 
ensure that migrants continue to send money home until 
family members emigrate, join them in the host country or 
pass away (Bloch, 2006; Crush and Frayne, 2007).
In the survey, respondents were asked a set of questions to 
measure the strength of their attachment and identification 
with their country of origin. Over 80 percent said they felt 
strong connections: 83 percent agreed with the statement 
that being from their country of origin is an important part 
of how they view themselves and 80 percent said they felt 
strong ties to other people from that country (Table 4.8). 
Over three-quarters of the respondents said they eat foods 
from their home country, listen to music from that country 
and want their children to know about the culture of the 
country (Table 4.9).
REMitting BEHAviouR
Remittances are one of the most significant indicators of 
the strength of the ties that migrants maintain with their 
countries of origin. The critical role that remittances have 
played in the survival of households in Southern Africa is 
well documented (Chikanda, 2010). The weight of academic 
evidence, however, suggests that these remittances have had 
little developmental impact in countries of migrant origin. 
This study sought to measure the frequency, value, and the 
use of the money and goods that migrants remit. Nearly 
70 percent of the respondents send money to their country 
of origin. The frequency of remitting is distributed fairly 
evenly: 25 percent remit once a month or more, 29 percent 
once a year or more and 10 percent remit occasionally (once 
every few years) (Table 4.10).
tABlE 4.10: fREquEnCy of REMitting
Money 
% of Remitters
Goods 
% of Remitters
More than once a month 7.5 1.8
Once a month 18.0 2.7
A few times a year 26.0 18.1
Once a year 3.1 9
Occasionally 10.5 19.9
Never 32.2 44.6
Don’t know 2.8 3.9
Number of Respondents 678 659
Median Value (CDN$) 1,000 500
The average (median) amount sent is CDN$1,000 per 
year. These amounts are low compared with West African 
migrants (Ghanaians, Nigerians and Senegalese) in 
OECD countries who remit an average of US$2,500 per 
year (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2009). More than 
66 percent of the remitters send less than CDN$2,000 in 
cash remittances annually, while only 21 percent of the 
remitters sent more than CDN$3,000 annually (Table 4.11).
tABlE 4.11: CASH REMittAnCES SEnt AnnuAlly
Amount (CDN$) % of Remitters
1–999 42.0
1,000–1,999 23.9
2,000–2,999 13.1
3,000–3,999 5.5
4,000–4,999 4.0
Over 5,000 11.6
Number of Respondents: 398
The study results show that a smaller, but still significant, 
proportion of the diaspora remit goods (55 percent), though 
they do so less frequently than with cash remittances. The 
reported average value of goods remitted was CDN$500. 
Only 30 percent of the remitters sent goods with a value of 
more than CDN$1,000 annually (Table 4.12). On average, 
therefore, the respondents remit about CDN$1,500-worth 
of goods and cash each year, from an average annual 
income of CDN$37,500, or four percent of their earnings.
tABlE 4.12: vAluE of gooDS REMittED AnnuAlly
Amount (CDN$) % of Remitters
1–499 40.7
500–999 28.5
1,000–1,999 17.4
2,000–2,999 5.6
3,000–3,999 2.2
Over 4,000 5.6
Number of Respondents: 270
The proportion of remitters who send money to immediate 
family members is 95 percent (Table 4.13). Significantly, 
nearly 50 percent also remit to extended family, which 
indicates that responsibilities for financial support extend 
to a broader circle of relatives. Only 10 percent send 
remittances to community groups and organizations, 
and six percent remit to their own bank accounts in 
their country of origin. In other words, remitting by this 
diaspora consists almost exclusively of private funds sent 
to immediate and extended family. Unlike other engaged 
diasporas, they do not remit for community projects or to 
build personal capital in their home country.
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tABlE 4.13: REMittAnCE RECiPiEntS
% of Remitters
Immediate family members 95.0
Extended family 47.2
A personal bank account for future use 6.0
Community group or organization 10.0
Other people 8.5
Total 100.0
Note: Multiple responses permitted.
Households receiving remittances from relatives in 
Canada tend to spend the funds on their immediate needs 
(Table 4.14). Sixty-one percent of remitters sent money for 
food purchases and 44 percent to meet other day-to-day 
household expenses. A significant proportion also sent 
money to meet medical expenses (59 percent) and to pay 
for education and school fees (58 percent). A much smaller 
proportion sent money for direct productive investment: 
for example, 12 percent sent remittances for the purchase 
of agricultural inputs, 10 percent for starting or running 
a business and six percent for buying property. In other 
words, not only are remittances essentially intra-family 
transfers, they are used primarily to help meet the basic 
needs of relatives in the country of origin.
tABlE 4.14: uSE of REMittAnCES
% of Remitters
Buy food 61.5
Pay medical expenses 59.4
Pay educational/school fees 58.2
Meet other day-to-day household expenses 44.1
Buy clothes 34.6
For special events 33.4
Pay transportation costs 32.5
Build, maintain or renovate their dwelling 21.3
For agricultural inputs/equipment 11.6
Start or run a business 10.2
Buy property 6.3
For savings 5.3
Purchase livestock 4.6
Other 6.7
Number of Respondents 431
Note: Multiple responses permitted.
Remittances are a primary means by which diasporas 
engage economically with countries of origin. Remittances 
from Canada, however, are overwhelmingly private, 
small-scale transfers rather than activity motivated by a 
desire to further national or community development 
per se. Clearly, these funds contribute to the human 
development of the recipients (through ensuring greater 
food security and health and educational opportunities), 
but the investment of remittances in productive enterprises 
is not significant at present.
DiASPoRAS in DEvEloPMEnt
Diaspora engagement is increasingly advanced as a way to 
enhance the positive impacts of migration and to minimize 
its negative impacts on developing countries (Chapter 1). 
Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the respondents agreed 
that they have an important role to play in developing their 
countries of origin (Figure 4.3). Only 15 percent thought 
that they had no role to play.
In terms of actual activities, nearly half of the respondents 
said that they already participated in some kind of 
economic activity in their country of origin: 25 percent 
had exported goods there for sale, 11 percent had invested 
in business, 11 percent had generated employment, 10 
percent had engaged in research partnerships and nine 
percent had purchased local goods for resale in Canada 
(Table 4.15).
tABlE 4.15: lEvEl of PARtiCiPAtion in EConoMiC 
ACtivitiES in CountRy of oRigin
% of 
Remitters
Exported goods for sale 25
Invested in a business in country of origin 11
Provided employment in country of origin 11
Carried out research with people based in 
country of origin 10
Purchased goods at home for resale in Canada 9
Note: Multiple responses permitted.
The respondents were then asked to identify 
developmental activities in which they were willing 
to participate (Table 4.16). Only nine percent said they 
had no interest in any of the activities. Among the most 
popular activities were skills transfer (mentioned by 58 
percent), investing in businesses (55 percent), participation 
in developmental projects (52 percent) and educational 
exchanges (52 percent). Interestingly, 36 percent stated that 
they would like to contribute to development by sending 
remittances, suggesting that there is a willingness to see 
the development potential of remittances reaching beyond 
the migrant’s own family.
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figuRE 4.3: lEvEl of intERESt in DEvEloPMEnt in CountRy of oRigin
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tABlE 4.16: intERESt in PARtiCiPAting in SPECifiC DEvEloPMEnt ACtivitiES
% of Respondents
Transfer skills through training people in country of origin 58
Invest in a business in country of origin 55
Transfer skills through working in country of origin 52
Participating in developmental projects in country of origin 52
Educational exchanges 52
Volunteer work 48
Fundraising for projects 46
Making charitable donations 43
Exporting goods 39
Invest in infrastructure 39
Importing goods 38
Provide distance teaching (via Internet) 37
Sending remittances 36
Note: Multiple responses permitted.
Others specifically mentioned their desire to be involved 
in activities that would lead to greater empowerment for 
women and children:
I would play an important role, such as being able 
to help women and children and educate them 
about their rights because these are things that 
[the] Tanzania government is still failing to do 
and especially women and children who live in 
villages are still ignorant of their own rights and 
continue to face oppression. (Respondent No. 19, 
Tanzania)
I will play a big role in African development, 
especially in education for women and children to 
help them reach their goals and more than that if I 
have an opportunity. My main goal is to improve 
women’s ability to access their rights and equal 
opportunity and respect from men. (Respondent 
No. 20, Tanzania)
REtuRn MigRAtion
Return migration has been proposed as a means by which 
developing countries can benefit from the professional 
expertise and material resources of their diasporas. The 
probability of return migration is related to a number 
of factors, including immigration status, number of 
dependants in the country of origin, age, income, gender 
and the original reasons for migrating (Bloch, 2007). The 
respondents in this survey have certainly given thought to 
returning: 55 percent said they had given it some or a great 
deal of consideration; only a third had given it little or no 
thought. Because thinking about return is no guarantee 
that someone will actually do so, the respondents were 
asked to specify a time frame within which they thought 
their return was likely. Only 15 percent thought it was 
likely within two years, a figure that rose to 27 percent for 
a return within five years and to 57 percent at some time 
in the future.
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The qualitative responses suggest that many of those who 
contemplated return at some point were mainly thinking 
about retirement:
I do not think I would go back to work but I most 
certainly would go back to retire...the beach, sun 
and sand. Family relationships are completely 
different...we were more family-oriented in 
Mauritius than here. If I have kids I would rather 
have them educated and instructed in Mauritius 
than here. (Respondent No. 33, Mauritius)
I maintain links with home because I will always 
be an African and home is home. I don’t see myself 
in those retirement homes. I would rather have 
family not workers to take care of me at an old 
age. (Respondent No. 9, Tanzania)
I would go back once I feel I can retire comfortably 
as cost of living is not as high as Canada as well 
as social life is the best in Zambia. More time 
with friends and family being spent as well as the 
weather is excellent all year round. (Respondent 
No. 58, Zambia)
I have family at home, as well as property and 
business interests, and I am likely to inherit 
my parents’ property. I will return to Malawi 
permanently on retirement, so in around 10 to 12 
years. (Respondent No. 76, Malawi)
The general evidence suggests that promoting large-scale 
return migration is problematic, particularly in countries 
that have been through protracted conflicts or crises, 
such as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe in the Southern 
African context (Missika et al, 2010). This is because the 
social, political, economic and legal environment is often 
so dysfunctional that there is a serious mismatch between 
the demands and needs of the diaspora and the country’s 
capacity to meet those needs.
A comparison between perceptions of living conditions 
in the country of origin and destination can also 
provide insights into return potential. An unhappy and 
marginalized diaspora is more apt to consider return 
than one that is not. When presented with 15 comparative 
quality-of-life indicators, the respondents indicated that 
their lives were better in Canada in all but two: social life 
and level of taxation (Table 4.17). A large majority felt 
that Canada offered better medical services, personal and 
family safety, a better future for their children, prospects 
for professional and job advancement, income and 
suitable jobs.
Despite the fact that economic and social conditions were 
viewed as far better in Canada, the respondents said they 
might consider returning to their country of origin if 
economic conditions improved (75 percent), with improved 
safety and security (74 percent), job opportunities (71 
percent) and a change in the political system (66 percent). 
A small number related return to a feeling that they could 
be of more value in their countries of origin:
I am strongly thinking of returning to Africa 
to live, particularly for work-related purposes, 
especially as it relates to my field of international 
development. I believe I have the necessary 
skills and strong passion to contribute to a more 
developed Africa. I hope to return within the next 
five to 10 years. (Respondent No. 69, Zambia)
I think that I owe a lot to my home country, 
Madagascar. I believe that at some stage(s) of my 
life I will go back to Madagascar to help my fellow 
citizens. My ultimate goal is to practice my new 
skills in Madagascar, even if it would mean going 
back and forth between Canada and Madagascar. 
I feel strongly about being a Canadian as well. 
Canadians have values that are very similar to 
mine. I think that I have grown a lot and became 
stronger here in Canada. If I ever move back to 
Madagascar, I believe that I will never forget 
that I am also a Canadian. (Respondent No. 81, 
Madagascar)
In general, however, return migration does not seem very 
likely in the short or even the medium term.
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tABlE 4.17: PERCEPtionS of lifE in CAnADA vERSuS CountRy of oRigin
Better in Canada 
%
Better in origin 
country 
%
No difference 
%
Don’t know 
%
Medical services/treatment 92 3 2 3
Upkeep of public amenities 88 4 2 6
My personal/my family’s safety 87 3 8 3
Future of my children 86 3 3 8
Environmental protection 80 9 4 7
Honesty/integrity of politicians 76 1 13 9
Prospects for professional/job advancement 73 15 6 6
My level of income 71 12 7 9
Availability of a suitable job/job security 69 14 9 8
Attitudes to foreigners/immigration/refugees 60 18 12 11
Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance 54 24 15 7
Cost of living 52 36 5 7
Affordable housing 49 33 7 11
Social life 44 46 7 3
Level of taxation 33 42 7 17
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ChapTer 5: disengaged 
diaspora: souTh afriCans in 
Canada
WitHDRAWing fRoM SoutH AfRiCA
The end of apartheid in 1994 marked the dawn of a new 
era in South Africa’s political landscape. While the country 
celebrated the positive changes, emigration to countries 
like Canada began to accelerate (Weiner, Mitchell and 
Price, 1998; Brown, Kaplan and Meyer, 2001; Crush, 2002). 
The global South African diaspora has grown at a rapid 
pace post-apartheid, and Canada has emerged as one of 
the most important destinations for professionals leaving 
South Africa. This chapter provides a profile of South 
African immigrants in Canada and assesses their attitudes 
towards, and level of engagement with, their country of 
origin. As we have suggested, the South African diaspora 
in Canada is very different from the diaspora from other 
countries in the Southern African region.
In sharp contrast to their other Southern African 
counterparts, South Africans in Canada bear many of the 
hallmarks of a classic “disengaged diaspora,” but more a 
result of their own choices than forced exile. To characterize 
all South Africans in Canada as “disengaged,” however, 
would do an injustice to the minority who see themselves 
playing a significant role in the future of South Africa. This 
chapter first presents a profile of the South Africans who 
answered the research survey, then examines the nature of 
the linkages that South Africans in Canada maintain with 
South Africa. As we show, these tend to be personal. The 
majority of South Africans do not see themselves playing 
any role in the future of the country and some are actively 
hostile to the idea. The final part of this chapter shows that 
there is a minority of South Africans who do constitute an 
engaged diaspora and whose attitudes are similar to those 
of the other Southern Africans discussed in Chapter 4.
PRofilE of A DiSEngAgED DiASPoRA
As noted, South Africans have a long history of migration 
to Canada (Figure 5.1). Data from 1980 onwards shows 
considerable fluctuation in annual flows over time. The 
numbers fell in the early- to mid-1980s and then rose 
dramatically from the mid-1980s as the armed struggle 
against apartheid intensified and political repression 
increased. The outflow stabilized in the late 1980s and then 
began to increase again in the run-up to the country’s first 
democratic elections in 1994. The peak year of emigration 
to Canada was 1994, after which the numbers stabilized at 
1,500 to 2,000 people per year.  The number of migrations 
fell again after 2000, then stabilized after 2005 at 1,000 to 
1,500 per year. Although the survey methodology targeted 
all South Africans irrespective of when they moved to 
Canada, a disproportionate number of the respondents 
were post-1994 immigrants (Figure 5.2).
figuRE 5.1: SoutH AfRiCAn iMMigRAtion to CAnADA, 1980–2009
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Source: CIC.
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figuRE 5.2: yEAR of iMMigRAtion to CAnADA of RESPonDEntS, 1953–2009
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Although the survey respondents are from every Canadian 
province, the overwhelming majority live in Ontario (41 
percent), British Columbia (26 percent) and Alberta (18 
percent) (Table 5.1). The urban bias of the sample simply 
reflects the strong attraction of Canadian cities for South 
Africans. One-third of the sample live in cities with a 
population of more than one million, and 60 percent live in 
metropolitan areas with populations of more than 250,000 
people. Less than 25 percent live in rural areas with less 
than 1,000 residents.
Slightly more males (55 percent) than females (45 percent) 
responded to the survey. Racially, the sample is largely 
white (88 percent of respondents) (Table 5.2), which is 
consistent with the past pattern of migration from South 
Africa. The respondents are mainly of working age, with 
more than 80 percent under the age of 53. The majority are 
married (78 percent).
tABlE 5.1: gEogRAPHiCAl loCAtion  
of RESPonDEntS
Number %
Province or Territory of Residence
Ontario 665 40.7
British Columbia 422 25.8
Alberta 299 18.3
Manitoba 109 6.7
Saskatchewan 51 3.1
Nova Scotia 32 2.0
Newfoundland and Labrador 23 1.4
Quebec 16 1.0
New Brunswick 13 0.8
Prince Edward Island 3 0.2
Northwest Territories, 
Nunavut, Yukon
2 0.1
Total 1,635 100.0
Population of City/Town of Residence
>1,000,000 536 33.9
500,000–1,000,000 340 21.5
250,000–500,000 43 2.7
100,000–250,000 133 8.4
50,000–100,000 151 9.6
10,000–50,000 194 12.3
1000–10,000 160 10.1
<1000 (rural) 23 1.5
Total 1,580 100.0
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tABlE 5.2: DEMogRAPHiC PRofilE of SoutH 
AfRiCAn RESPonDEntS
Number %
Gender
Male 889 55.1
Female 724 44.9
Total 1,613 100.0
Race (South African terminology)
White 1,438 88.5
Indian/Asian 87 5.4
Coloured 57 3.5
Black African 28 1.7
Other 14 0.9
Total 1,624 100.0
Age
17–30 298 18.6
31–39 346 21.6
40–46 340 21.2
47–52 315 19.7
53–90 303 18.9
Total 1,602 100.0
Marital Status
Married/common law 1,265 77.6
Never married 250 15.3
Divorced/separated 97 6.0
Widowed 18 1.1
Total 1,630 100.0
The South African diaspora in Canada is highly educated 
and dominated by skilled professionals. Before leaving 
South Africa, 54 percent of the respondents had obtained 
a university degree. South African immigrants are 
therefore far more qualified than the general Canadian 
population, 23 percent of whom possess a university 
degree (Statistics Canada, 2009). After leaving South 
Africa, 47 percent of respondents continued with their 
formal education, primarily in Canada. Technical or 
vocational qualifications were either obtained or in 
progress by 29 percent of respondents. Other qualifications 
include professional degrees, mainly in law, medicine 
and business administration (19 percent), while others 
pursued bachelor’s (16 percent) and post-graduate 
degrees (12 percent) (Table 5.3). As many as 25 percent of 
the respondents claimed that they were underemployed 
in jobs that did not make full use of their professional 
qualifications and experience.
Of the respondents’ occupations, 30 percent are health 
professionals, eight percent are employed in the 
education field, seven percent occupy management 
posts, six percent are employed in the sales and service 
industry, five percent occupy administrative or clerical 
positions and another five percent are employed in the 
finance, business and banking industry (Table 5.4). As 
noted above, the South African diaspora in Canada are 
high earners by Canadian standards. Nearly one-quarter 
of respondents earn more than CDN$200,000 per year and 
almost 40 percent earn more than CDN$100,000 per year 
(Table 5.5). Only 12 percent earn less than CDN$25,000 
per year.
tABlE 5.3: EDuCAtionAl PRofilE of  
SoutH AfRiCAn RESPonDEntS
Number %
Highest level of education in South Africa
Less than secondary school 132 8.2
Secondary school 222 13.8
Technical/vocational diploma or certificate 325 20.1
Bachelor’s/honour’s degree 307 19.0
Master’s degree 93 5.8
Professional degree (e.g., LL.B, M.B.A., M.D.) 443 27.4
Ph.D. 36 2.2
Other 56 3.5
Total 1,614 100.0
Qualifications achieved/in progress outside South Africa
Less than secondary school 4 0.5
Secondary school 28 3.8
Technical/vocational diploma or certificate 219 29.4
Bachelor’s/honour’s degree 121 16.2
Master’s degree 63 8.4
Professional degree 143 19.2
Ph.D. 32 4.3
Other 136 18.2
Total 746 100.0
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tABlE 5.4: CuRREnt JoB/oCCuPAtion in CAnADA
%
Management 6.9
Business owners 3.8
Finance, business, banking 5.0
Engineering and construction 2.6
Health 30.4
Legal 1.4
Sales and service 5.8
Information technology 3.7
Advertising, media, communications 3.0
Arts, sports and culture 3.4
Social services 1.6
Civil service 0.5
Technical and trades 4.4
Education 8.4
Student 1.4
Self-employed 2.4
Administrative and clerical 5.2
Other 1.6
Unemployed 8.5
Total 1,529
tABlE 5.5: inCoME PRofilE of  
SoutH AfRiCAn RESPonDEntS
Annual Income (CDN$) %
Less than 25,000 11.9
26,000–50,000 16.4
51,000–75,000 11.2
76,000–100,000 10.6
101,000–200,000 15.9
More than 201,000 22.8
Prefer not to answer 11.2
Total 100.0
REASonS foR lEAving SoutH AfRiCA
More than half of the respondents immigrated to Canada 
under the economic class of entry. A smaller number of 
respondents entered as temporary workers and later 
managed to secure permanent residence, especially in the 
health field:
When I initially came to Canada it was supposed 
to be for a 30-month work exchange (so purely for 
professional reasons, rather than socio-economic 
factors). However, we decided to apply for 
permanent residency and remain in Vancouver, 
predominantly because of the amazing lifestyle 
here, rather than the conditions in South Africa 
(which according to all accounts has deteriorated 
significantly since we left). The longer we stay in 
Vancouver, the more difficult it would be to give 
up the Vancouver lifestyle and return to South 
Africa. (Respondent No. 604)
I qualified as a family doctor in South Africa 
and came to Canada with the plan of staying 
for two years to save some money. After two 
years, I decided to stay for another year because 
financially, I was doing very well. I was about 
to go back to South Africa to specialize but then 
got offered a position as a resident in obstetrics 
and gynecology at the University of Alberta. 
(Respondent No. 39)
By contrast, only 10 percent of the respondents said that 
their primary reason for coming to Canada was economic 
in nature (Figure 5.3). Another eight percent said that 
professional reasons had brought them to Canada. The 
two most common reasons given for moving to Canada 
were safety and security (34 percent) and their children’s 
future (26 percent). These findings confirm previous 
studies that suggest that concerns about personal and 
family safety are a leading driver of migration from 
South Africa (Awases et al., 2004; Grant, 2006; Joudrey 
and Robson, 2010).
Many of the respondents provided vivid anecdotes of their 
personal experiences with crime and violence in South 
Africa:
I was personally attacked and assaulted eight 
times in one year. My eldest daughter was robbed 
and held at gunpoint three times in one year. My 
house was robbed twice in one year, whilst I was 
in the house. (Respondent No. 26)
Crime was a big factor in my decision to move 
away from South Africa. Myself and four other 
family members had been carjacked over the 
years. My immediate family and relatives had 
been victims of robbery and or burglary of some 
sort. It was just a matter of time before someone 
was murdered. (Respondent No. 107)
I realized that sleeping with a gun under my 
pillow was not normal practice. The statistics at 
the time were that one out of three women would 
be raped, and if you were raped, you would 
contract HIV/AIDS. That equals a death sentence 
for me. (Respondent No. 345)
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figuRE 5.3: MoSt iMPoRtAnt REASon foR CoMing to CAnADA
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I worked in a security armed response control 
room, and we would receive the distress calls 
from homes that we monitor. The things I heard as 
we would dispatch armed guards to try and help 
were unimaginable. There is no media out there, 
Canada included, that shows the true occurrences 
that take place in South Africa. I promised myself I 
would not have children in South Africa and took 
my entire family (mom, dad, brother, sister-in-law 
and wife) to Canada. I have never returned, nor 
will I ever. (Respondent No. 319)
I feel that I had no choice but to leave my beloved 
South Africa for reasons of safety. My children’s 
lives and future are more important than living 
the South African lifestyle and being with my own 
family and friends. I hate living in Canada, I loathe 
the weather and the lifestyle but my children are 
happy here and have established themselves. I 
could never leave without them and they aren’t 
going anywhere. I am stuck here! (Respondent 
No. 11)
Some argued that they were victims of affirmative action 
and that the future of white children in South Africa 
was threatened by the policies of the African National 
Congress government. None of the respondents showed 
any concern about either the future of black children or 
the fact that unemployment rates in South Africa are much 
higher among blacks than whites:
I was laid off at Telkom on management level, 
because I’m white. They had to “correct” the 
numbers by having less white managers. 
(Respondent No. 32)
My business was forced to employ Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) staff who did not fit into my 
practice or could not contribute in the improvement 
of our service to clients. The government’s policies 
forced our clients to discriminate against our firm 
and we could not afford the BEE changes forced 
upon us. (Respondent No. 423)
I struggled to find work mostly for not being black 
enough. The irony was that under apartheid, as an 
Indian I was not white enough. (Respondent No. 
228)
CoMPARing CAnADA AnD SoutH AfRiCA
The survey asked respondents to compare South Africa and 
Canada on 15 quality-of-life indicators (Table 5.6). Canada 
scored higher on every single indicator except social life, 
which was seen as better in South Africa. Predictably, both 
personal and family security were seen as significantly 
better (by 98 percent of respondents), as was the future of 
children (91 percent). Other indicators that were ranked 
significantly higher in Canada included the upkeep of 
public amenities (92 percent better in Canada), racial/
ethnic/cultural tolerance (85 percent better in Canada) and 
environmental protection (83 percent better in Canada). 
On nine indicators, less than 10 percent thought that South 
Africa was better. On no indicator (except social life) did 
more than one-third think South Africa was better.
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tABlE 5.6: PERCEivED quAlity of lifE in CAnADA vERSuS SoutH AfRiCA
Better in Canada 
%
Better in South Africa 
%
No Difference 
%
Don’t Know 
%
Personal/Family safety 98 0 1 1
Upkeep of public amenities 92 1 2 5
Future of my children 91 1 2 6
Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance 85 2 9 4
Environmental protection 83 4 6 7
Availability of a suitable job/job security 79 6 10 5
Attitudes to foreigners/treatment of refugees 77 4 10 9
Prospects for professional/job advancement 77 7 10 6
Honesty/integrity of politicians 74 1 17 8
Medical services/treatment 72 18 7 3
Level of income 69 11 10 10
Cost of living 54 28 11 7
Affordable housing 44 32 13 11
Social life 35 44 17 4
Level of taxation 30 27 23 20
Number of Respondents: 1,533
The preference for living in Canada was reflected in the 
fact that 61 percent had acquired Canadian citizenship. 
Another 26 percent, more recent arrivals, are permanent 
residents (landed immigrants) who can be expected to 
acquire citizenship in due course (Table 5.7).
tABlE 5.7: iMMigRAtion StAtuS of  
SoutH AfRiCAn RESPonDEntS
Number %
Canadian citizen 975 61.4
Permanent resident/Landed immigrant 411 25.9
Non-permanent resident (work permit) 158 9.9
Not specified 25 1.6
Non-permanent resident (student) 17 1.1
Asylum seeker/Refugee 3 0.2
Total 1,589 100.0
What are we to make of the fact that South Africa scores 
so poorly in comparison with Canada on quality-of-life 
tests and that so many South African immigrants in the 
survey have taken out Canadian citizenship? It certainly 
does not mean that South Africans in Canada no longer 
identify in any way with their country of origin. A large 
majority of respondents (88 percent) said that being 
from South Africa is an important part of how they view 
themselves. Furthermore, 80 percent said that they felt that 
they have strong ties with people from South Africa. The 
survey also asked about various cultural activities and 
preferences, which again indicated high levels of personal 
identification. The vast majority (91 percent) make or buy 
traditional foods from South Africa, want their children 
to know about South African culture (82 percent) and 
listen to South African music (80 percent) (Table 5.8). 
tABlE 5.8: intERESt in SoutH AfRiCAn  
CultuRE AnD PolitiCS
Do you: %
Make or buy traditional foods from South Africa? 91
Want your children to know about the culture of South 
Africa? 82
Listen to music from South Africa? 80
Read newspapers from South Africa in print or online? 73
Participate in a social networking site that is associated with 
South Africa? 58
Want your children to learn the language(s) of South Africa? 48
Find that most of your best friends in Canada are from South 
Africa? 37
Three-quarters of respondents regularly consult South 
African newspapers online, while 48 percent want their 
children to learn a South African language.
The majority of respondents are integrated into Canadian 
society, but still maintain a sense of themselves as South 
Africans rather than Canadians:
There’s also something about South African 
culture and the connection to the South African 
landscape that never truly leaves you. When I 
think of “home,” I don’t think of St. John’s (where 
I’ve lived for the past seven years) — I think of 
Table Mountain, I think of the Drakensberg, I 
think of Kirstenbosch, I think of the highveld, etc. 
I’m only just starting to identify with Canadian 
culture. I don’t think I’ll ever feel truly Canadian, 
though. Not even after I receive my citizenship. 
(Respondent No. 362)
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I came over to Canada to see if the grass is actually 
greener on this side. My personal opinion is that 
it is easier for the white English-speaking people 
to immigrate, adapt and fit in than the Afrikaans-
speaking people. South Africa is the only place in 
the world where the Afrikaners would ever feel 
at home. That would also be the main reason for 
returning home one day, and that is to be between 
my people, culture and to speak my own language. 
(Respondent No. 190)
South Africa is where I was born and spent intense 
years and my emotions run very deep there. I 
am very sentimentally attached to South Africa 
because I remember my parents and grandparents 
and all our shared memories and nostalgia. I miss 
the colour and vibrancy of the place, the nature 
and animals, especially the smell of dust and rain. 
So in a poetic way I am always linked to Africa 
and get excited to meet people from all over the 
continent. (Respondent No. 297)
A small minority claimed to have successfully shed their 
South African identity:
I feel very “North American” in many ways after 
studying and living in North America for my 
adult life. (Respondent No. 312)
Canada is the only home my children know. They 
are Canadian and can be the best they want to 
be if they apply hard work, respect and humility 
to their choices in life. My family is blessed in 
Canada. South Africa is one chapter in the book of 
our lives. We have many other chapters and many 
more to be written. (Respondent No. 87)
I only have a brother in my immediate family left 
in South Africa. He is all I personally care about in 
South Africa. The rest I do not care about really. I 
decided to distance myself from it. As the world 
doesn’t care, neither do I. I do not have any other 
interest in that country. (Respondent No. 617)
fAMily tiES
The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that 
they have close family members in South Africa. These 
include siblings (74 percent of respondents), parents 
(69 percent), grandparents (45 percent) and children (13 
percent). Most South African immigrants in Canada still 
maintain close contact with their family members in the 
country. The survey showed that they travel relatively 
frequently to South Africa. As many as 92 percent had 
visited South Africa at least once since immigrating to 
Canada, and 59 percent had done so in the previous three 
years. More than 30 percent visit South Africa every two to 
three years and 18 percent at least once a year. More than 
80 percent of the most recent visits were for family-related 
issues and events. Only six percent visited for tourism and 
four percent for business purposes.
The survey also ascertained what other links South 
Africans in Canada maintain with South Africa. About 40 
percent still maintain bank accounts in South Africa, while 
22 percent have investments, 14 percent own a house and 
nine percent own land in South Africa (Table 5.9). However, 
half of the respondents indicated that they do not own any 
of these assets in South Africa. The survey also showed 
that the longer a person has lived in Canada, the less likely 
they are to hold assets in South Africa (Table 5.10). In other 
words, over time, South Africans progressively disinvest 
and cut these links.
tABlE 5.9: ASSEt oWnERSHiP in SoutH AfRiCA
%
Bank account 41
Business 2
House 14
Investments 22
Property (land) 9
Savings 16
tABlE 5.10: ASSEt oWnERSHiP lEvElS in SoutH 
AfRiCA, By yEAR of MigRAtion to CAnADA
Period of Immigration
Before 
1980 
(%)
1980–
1984 
(%)
1985–
1989 
(%)
1990–
1994 
(%)
1995–
1999 
(%)
2000–
2004 
(%)
2005–
2009 
(%)
Bank 
account 8.9 10.3 14.3 20.5 19.5 26.1 35.3
Business 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 1.6 2.0
House 5.1 0.0 3.8 7.1 6.4 9.2 13.0
Investments 3.8 3.4 9.8 17.3 12.8 17.3 15.3
Property 5.1 3.4 4.5 3.2 5.4 5.7 7.4
Savings 3.8 0.0 3.8 6.4 7.7 11.4 14.2
REMitting BEHAviouR
Remittances are usually viewed as the most visible 
evidence of the material ties that migrants maintain with 
their countries of origin; however, nearly 45 percent of 
the South African respondents indicated that they have 
never sent remittances to South Africa. Only 12 percent 
can be considered regular remitters, sending money to 
South Africa at least once a month. Many of those who 
remit do so irregularly: 23 percent a few times a year and 
18 percent less than once a year. The amounts remitted in 
the previous year varied considerably: just over one-third 
of respondents had sent less than CDN$5,000, while only 
12 percent had remitted more than CDN$5,000 to South 
Africa (Figure 5.4).
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figuRE 5.4: voluME of REMittAnCES SEnt to SoutH AfRiCA
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The bulk of the remittances go to immediate and extended 
family members. In the previous year, more than half of 
the remitters (58 percent) had sent remittances to their 
immediate family members in South Africa, while 15 
percent sent the remittances to their extended family. 
Only 13 percent sent them to a personal banking account 
in South Africa. Remittance usage is consistent with the 
private intra-family nature of the transfers. Over one-third 
(38 percent) of the remitters identified household expenses 
in South Africa as the major use of the remittances, 
followed by paying medical expenses (33 percent), buying 
food (31 percent), covering costs of special events (31 
percent), buying clothes (21 percent) and education (16 
percent) (Table 5.11). Remittances are focussed on meeting 
the consumption needs of family members and very little 
is spent on investing or savings.
More than half of the respondents (54 percent) had not 
remitted any goods to South Africa since migrating 
to Canada. In the year prior to the survey, only 39 
percent had sent goods to that country. Just 24 percent 
reported sending goods to South Africa at least once a 
year. Very few (eight percent) sent goods valued at more 
than CDN$500. The average value of goods sent was 
CDN$415 for the whole sample and CDN$1,045 for the 
remitters. Books and other educational material (sent by 
40 percent of respondents) were the most common items 
sent to South Africa. Other goods sent include household 
goods and appliances (12 percent), food (nine percent) 
and equipment (six percent).
tABlE 5.11: uSE of REMittAnCES
% of Remitters
Meet day-to-day household expenses 38.3
Pay medical expenses 32.7
Buy food 31.2
For special events 31.1
Buy clothes 21.3
Pay educational/school fees 16.3
Build, maintain or renovate dwelling 14.4
Pay transportation costs 13.6
For savings/investment 9.1
Buy property 3.7
Start or run a business 2.8
For agricultural inputs/equipment 1.4
Purchase livestock 1.1
In sum, South Africans in Canada are not a remitting 
diaspora in the conventional sense or in comparison to 
other Southern Africans in the country (see Chapter 4). 
The majority have not remitted anything since moving to 
Canada. And of those that have, the remitting frequency 
is generally erratic and the amounts relatively small, 
especially in relation to their earnings in Canada. Those 
who do remit clearly do so to meet the needs of immediate 
family members in South Africa. There is little evidence 
that remittances are seen as developmental in nature (i.e., 
designed to promote economic and social development 
of the country). Levels of savings and investment of 
remittances are extremely low and there is little evidence 
of collective remitting for development projects.
Disengagement in Development
The survey asked the respondents to indicate their interest 
in contributing to development in South Africa and the 
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likelihood of their participating in development-related 
activities linked to South Africa. In sharp contrast to other 
Southern Africans, over 80 percent of the South African 
respondents said that they did not see themselves playing 
any role in the development of their country of origin. The 
survey revealed very low levels of interest in activities 
such as educational exchanges, volunteer work, making 
charitable donations, skills transfer, import and export of 
goods, fundraising for projects in South Africa, remitting 
for development projects and investment in South African 
businesses. More than 70 percent of the respondents did 
not see themselves participating in any of these activities; 
in some cases, the figure was over 90 percent. The lack of 
interest was consistent with the fact that over 80 percent 
of the respondents did not feel that they had an important 
role to play in development in South Africa. In justifying 
their position, some noted that they had already done 
so, while others were highly critical of the South African 
government and NGOs:
South Africa holds no allure for me any longer. I 
spent eight years of my professional life providing 
medical care to disadvantaged communities. I’ve 
paid any “debts” I may have had. (Respondent 
No. 32)
I have no role in South Africa’s development…I 
invested 30 years of my life in South Africa — 
that’s enough! (Respondent No. 216)
The money goes into a deep dark pit, and does 
not contribute to self-development. Any help sent 
there lands in the bottomless pit of corruption. 
(Respondent No. 16)
I do not contribute to charities and NGOs, as I do 
not believe the money actually gets to those who 
need it; rather, the money lines the pockets of 
“higher-ups.” This has been evident for numerous 
years and is often reported in the South African 
media. I do not believe it is the role of expats to aid 
in South African development; the change needs 
to come from within. (Respondent No. 33)
REtuRn MigRAtion
Return migration is seen as one of the ways by which 
migrant-sending countries can benefit from their 
professional diasporas overseas (Van Houte and Davids, 
2008). The survey found that the potential for return 
migration to South Africa is very low, with only 13 percent 
having considered it a “great deal” and 21 percent having 
given “some consideration” to returning (Figure 5.5). 
About 46 percent had never considered returning, while a 
further 19 percent had given it hardly any thought.
Even fewer respondents indicated that they are likely to 
return to South Africa in the near future. Only six percent 
said they were likely to return within the next two years, 
10 percent within the next five years and 20 percent at 
some time in the future. The absence of imminent plans 
to return to South Africa is confirmed by the fact that only 
two percent had applied for a job there in the previous 
year, although 10 percent said they had been offered 
employment. The evidence for “brain circulation” is also 
minimal, with only four percent having worked in South 
Africa in the previous year — and some of these were 
probably recent immigrants to Canada. Only one percent 
had been on an exchange program in South Africa in the 
past year, while two percent had volunteered there.
Consistent with the reasons stated for coming to Canada 
in the first place, the lack of safety and security was cited 
as the most significant obstacle to return. A reduction in 
crime levels in South Africa and the abolition of affirmative 
action were major preconditions for reconsidering a return 
to South Africa. Other reasons cited included an absence of 
family in South Africa, the respondent’s age and a feeling 
that they owed nothing to the country:
All my immediate family now live in Canada and 
my children (18 and 16) were born in Canada and 
for that reason I would not return there to live in 
South Africa. (Respondent No. 63)
Emigration makes one start all over. We emigrated 
at age 36. It took four years to become somebody. 
Now, at age 50, we don’t have motivation to try 
and start over again, in another country, not in 
Africa or anywhere else. (Respondent No. 554)
I have never returned, nor will I ever. I served in 
the military for four years, as did my brother and 
my father and his father before him. We have paid 
our dues to South Africa...I love the country, but 
my new home is Canada. Canada has provided 
our kids with opportunity and our family with 
safety. The only time I am South African is when 
it is Rugby World Cup time. (Respondent No. 319)
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figuRE 5.5: ConSiDERAtion givEn to REtuRning to SoutH AfRiCA
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figuRE 5.6: AnnuAl inCoME of EngAgED AnD DiSEngAgED SoutH AfRiCAnS
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tHE CoMMittED MinoRity
Differentiating Engaged South Africans
While the majority of South Africans in Canada are not 
involved in the range of activities typical of an engaged 
diaspora and do not see themselves playing any role in 
the future of South Africa, a small minority does. What 
differentiates these South Africans from the rest of their 
peers? Do they display a different demographic, social or 
economic profile? Do they have a more positive view of 
South Africa and its future than the majority? What kinds 
of development-related activities do they engage in? To 
answer these questions, we differentiated between those 
who agreed (the engaged) and disagreed (the disengaged) 
with the statement: “I have an important role to play in the 
future development of South Africa.”
The first task was to determine whether there were any 
differences in the demographic and socio-economic 
profiles of engaged and disengaged members of the 
South African diaspora in Canada. There were no 
significant differences between the two groups on a range 
of indicators, including where they lived in Canada (city 
and province), gender, race, education and training 
(both inside and outside South Africa), or whether or 
not they had family members still in South Africa. Other 
variables, however, did seem to differentiate the two 
groups. First, in some income brackets (i.e., CDN$75,000–
100,000 and over CDN$200,000 per year) the proportions 
of engagement are very similar (Figure 5.6). However, 
proportionally more members of the engaged diaspora 
are in the lower income brackets: 38 percent earn less 
than CDN$50,000, compared to only 22 percent of those 
who are disengaged.
Second, there is a marked difference between the 
two groups in terms of their main reason for coming 
to Canada. The disengaged diaspora was far more 
motivated by concerns about safety and security and 
their children’s future than the engaged diaspora. Two-
thirds of disengaged South Africans gave these as their 
main reasons for coming to Canada, compared with 46 
percent of engaged South Africans. In other words, these 
issues were important for both groups, but seem far more 
significant for those who see no role for themselves in the 
future of South Africa.
Third, engaged South Africans in Canada tend to visit 
South Africa more frequently than their disengaged 
counterparts (Table 5.13). Only 10 percent of the latter 
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group visit the country once or more a year; in contrast, 
over one-third (36 percent) of the engaged diaspora group 
visit South Africa this frequently. Or again, 30 percent 
of the disengaged group have either never been back to 
South Africa or visit less than once a decade, in contrast to 
only 13 percent of the engaged group.
tABlE 5.12: MAin REASon foR Moving to CAnADA
Engaged Disengaged
% %
Safety and security 24.5 37.6
Children’s future 21.8 28.9
Economic 13.9 8.8
Professional 8.5 5.6
Educational 6.8 1.3
Unite with relatives 5.4 5.4
Political 4.1 5.6
Religious 0.3 0.3
Other 14.6 6.6
Total 100.0 100.0
tABlE 5.13: fREquEnCy of viSitS to SoutH AfRiCA
Engaged Disengaged
% %
More than once a year 8.2 1.2
Once a year 27.9 9.1
Every 2 to 3 years 32.0 30.2
At least once every 5 years 11.9 18.0
At least once every 10 years 7.1 11.4
Less than once every 10 years 1.4 11.4
Never 11.6 18.7
Total 100.0 100.0
iDEntifiCAtion WitH SoutH AfRiCA
In theory, members of the engaged South African 
diaspora should exhibit more positive feelings toward, 
and identification with, South Africa. The vast majority 
of South Africans in Canada do exhibit a strong South 
African identity; however, the strength of that identity 
is even stronger among the subgroup who constitute the 
engaged diaspora. For example, 84 percent of the engaged 
group strongly agreed that being from South Africa is an 
important part of how they view themselves (Table 5.14). 
The equivalent figure for the disengaged group was only 
48 percent. Or again, 79 percent of the engaged group 
strongly agreed that they felt strong ties with other South 
Africans, compared to just 33 percent of the disengaged 
group. In addition, they are more likely to continue with 
cultural practices that remind them of South Africa. On 
every measure used in the survey, engaged South Africans 
exhibit a stronger identification with South African culture. 
In other words, self-identification as South African, feeling 
a strong affinity with other South Africans and with South 
African culture is strongly correlated with the degree of 
personal commitment to South African development.
tABlE 5.14: SoutH AfRiCAn iDEntity of EngAgED 
AnD DiSEngAgED DiASPoRA
Engaged Disengaged
% %
Being from South Africa is an important part of how I see myself.
Strongly agree 84.4 48.3
Agree 12.7 31.5
Neither agree nor disagree 1.8 10.6
Disagree 1.1 5.9
Strongly disagree 0.0 3.7
I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.
Strongly agree 79.3 33.1
Agree 17.5 33.6
Neither agree nor disagree 2.9 19.5
Disagree 0.4 9.2
Strongly disagree 0.0 4.5
The other question is whether engaged South Africans 
rate South Africa more highly than they do Canada. In 
fact, Canada is rated more positively by both the engaged 
and the disengaged groups on almost all quality-of-life 
indicators. The proportion that rates South Africa better, 
however, is consistently higher among the engaged group 
(Table 5.15). This holds true across all indicators, with 
the exception of personal income, although there is no 
difference in perceptions about the honesty and integrity 
of politicians and personal and family safety.
linKS WitH SoutH AfRiCA
How strong are the links of engaged South Africans with 
their country of origin? The first and most obvious area 
is remittances. While engaged South Africans tend to be 
lower wage earners than disengaged South Africans, they 
remit more and do so more regularly. For example, while 53 
percent of disengaged South Africans have never remitted, 
the figure for engaged South Africans is only 32 percent. 
The average annual remittance of the engaged group is 
more than twice as much as the disengaged group. One-
half of engaged South Africans remit at least once a year, 
compared to only 29 percent of disengaged South Africans 
(Table 5.16).
A second important indicator of diaspora engagement 
is the extent to which members of the diaspora associate 
themselves with, and are involved in the activities of, 
diaspora organizations and associations. In the case of the 
South African diaspora in Canada, rates of participation in 
such organizations are generally low in both the engaged 
and disengaged groups; however, there is a relatively 
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consistent pattern of greater involvement by the engaged 
group (see Chapter 6).
tABlE 5.15: PERCEivED quAlity of lifE in CAnADA 
vERSuS SoutH AfRiCA
Engaged Disengaged Difference
(% Better 
in South 
Africa)
(% Better 
in South 
Africa)
%
Social life 61 38 +23
Affordable housing 41 32 +9
Cost of living 35 26 +9
Level of taxation 31 26 +5
Medical services/
treatment 23 16 +7
Prospects for 
professional/job 
advancement
13 6 +7
Availability of a suitable 
job/job security 12 5 +7
My level of income 11 12 -1
Attitudes to foreigners/
immigration/treatment 
of refugees
10 4 +6
Environmental 
protection 7 3 +4
Racial/ethnic/cultural 
tolerance 7 1 +6
Future of my children 3 0 +3
Upkeep of public 
amenities 2 1 +1
Honesty/integrity of 
politicians 1 1 0
My personal/my 
family’s safety 0 0 0
tABlE 5.16: fREquEnCy of REMittAnCES
Engaged Disengaged
% %
More than once a month 2.4 0.6
Once a month 12.9 10.5
A few times a year 28.8 12.2
Once a year 5.8 5.8
Occasionally (<once a year) 16.6 16.3
Never 32.5 53.0
Don’t know 1.0 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Third, there is a consistent pattern of greater involvement 
by the engaged group than the disengaged group on 
every measure used, ranging from buying property, to 
investments, importing South African goods for sale 
and, especially, to charitable donations (Table 5.17). The 
intention to engage in the future was also significantly 
higher among the engaged group. For example, 28 percent 
of the respondents from the engaged group said they 
were likely to work in South Africa in the next two years 
(compared to only three percent of the disengaged group) 
(Table 5.18). Forty percent of the engaged said they would 
fundraise for projects in South Africa, compared to only 
six percent of the disengaged. Other major differences 
included sending funds for development projects in 
South Africa (39 percent versus four percent) and making 
charitable donations that benefit South Africa (55 percent 
versus 16 percent).
tABlE 5.17: DiASPoRA EngAgEMEnt ACtivitiES  
(in tHE PREviouS yEAR)
Engaged Disengaged
% %
Bought a house or property in 
South Africa 4.1 1.0
Carried out research with people in 
South Africa 12.2 1.5
Exported goods to South Africa 
from Canada 2.7 1.2
Invested in a business in South 
Africa 2.7 0.7
Purchased goods from South Africa 
to sell in Canada 3.7 1.0
Made a donation to a Canadian 
NGO/charity operating in South 
Africa
17.3 7.1
Made a donation to an NGO/
charity in South Africa 14.2 5.9
Made a donation to a religious 
organization in South Africa 13.2 5.6
tABlE 5.18: liKEly DiASPoRA EngAgEMEnt 
ACtivitiES (in tHE nExt tWo yEARS)
Engaged Disengaged
% %
Invest in business in South Africa 22.1 1.7
Work in South Africa 27.6 3.0
Participate in exchanges 31.2 3.7
Fundraise for projects in South Africa 39.7 5.9
Send money for development projects 
in South Africa 38.7 4.4
Make charitable donations that benefit 
South Africa 54.6 15.7
Volunteer work in Canada to benefit 
South Africa 40.7 5.6
Finally, the survey provides insight into the kinds of 
activities that the engaged South African diaspora are 
interested in participating in (Table 5.19). Skills transfer 
was rated as the most important contribution either 
through training programs in South Africa (55 percent 
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of respondents) or working in South Africa (53 percent). 
Forty-four percent were interested in undertaking 
educational exchanges. Another area of preferred 
activity was philanthropy, with 54 percent willing 
to fundraise in Canada for projects in South Africa, 
49 percent volunteering in South Africa, 42 percent 
participating in development projects in South Africa 
and 34 percent making charitable donations to South 
Africa. Less significant, but by no means unimportant, 
were entrepreneurial activities, such as investing in 
South African businesses (34 percent), importing goods 
from South Africa (27 percent) and investing in South 
African infrastructural development (18 percent). While 
the majority of engaged Canadian South Africans 
remit money to family in South Africa, only 23 percent 
see themselves remitting specifically for development 
projects.
tABlE 5.19: PREfERRED DiASPoRA  
EngAgEMEnt ACtivitiES
%
Transfer skills through training people in South Africa 54.7
Fundraising for projects in South Africa 54.3
Transfer skills through working in South Africa 52.5
Volunteer work in South Africa 48.6
Educational exchanges 43.8
Participate in development projects in South Africa 42.0
Making charitable donations 34.4
Invest in business in South Africa 34.0
Importing goods from South Africa 27.5
Sending remittances 23.2
Investment in infrastructure 17.7
Exporting goods to South Africa 13.4
Additional insights into the thinking of the engaged South 
African diaspora group came from their verbatim comments:
I think a program where people could take their 
annual vacations in South Africa, including a week 
of volunteering paired with a week of holidays, 
would get lots of votes of popularity from South 
African transplants looking to contribute to 
change without putting their family, their lives 
and their economic futures at great personal risk. 
(Respondent No. 402)
I support two South African NGOs that focus 
on female empowerment and support, and I do 
a lot of fundraising and raising awareness for 
these issues. Last Christmas, I took a group of 
volunteers to KwaZulu-Natal and next year will 
be moving to Cape Town for the summer to work 
with the organizations I support. I think I have a 
crucial role to play in African development. I also 
work with an NGO that sets up education and 
support systems in Uganda and Kenya, because 
I am a South African who has been blessed with 
opportunities and it is up to me to use those to 
empower the people living there. I am passionate 
about volunteer work and international 
development, especially in Southern Africa. 
(Respondent No. 454)
I am still passionate about South Africa. Six years 
ago, I started a home-based travel agency. My core 
business is selling South Africa. Annually, I book 
many expats to South Africa for vacation and 
send Canadians on tours or safaris. For me, this 
is a unique way of contributing to South Africa 
and to focus on the positive. South Africa is an 
amazing country and has lots to offer to travellers. 
(Respondent No. 200)
We support an African school feeding program. 
This is an interest as my niece, who lives in the 
United Kingdom, is a director and fundraiser for 
the charity. For four years, I imported products 
from three self-help groups in South Africa to sell 
for them at fairs and through stores in Canada. 
(Respondent No. 285)
REtuRn MigRAtion
Given that the engaged diaspora is more favourably 
disposed towards South Africa on most measures, it is 
interesting to see if this translates into an intention to 
return. As noted above, 46 percent of South Africans in 
Canada have given no consideration to returning, and only 
13 percent say they have given it a great deal of thought; 
however, the engaged and disengaged groups think about 
this question very differently. For example, 64 percent of the 
disengaged group have given it no consideration, compared 
to only 17 percent of the engaged group. Similarly, only four 
percent of the disengaged group have given it a great deal 
of consideration, compared with one-third (34 percent) of 
the engaged group. The differences are also marked on 
the question of likelihood of return (Table 5.20). Nearly 20 
percent of the engaged group said it was likely they would 
return within two years, compared to only two percent of 
the disengaged group. At the five-year mark, the figures 
were 30 percent and three percent, respectively. As many as 
65 percent of the engaged group thought it likely that they 
would return at some point, compared to only seven percent 
of the disengaged group. In other words, the likelihood of 
engaged South Africans returning to South Africa increases 
over time, while the likelihood of disengaged South Africans 
returning is low and static.
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tABlE 5.20: liKEliHooD of REtuRning  
to SoutH AfRiCA
Engaged Disengaged
% Likely % Likely
Within next two years 18.9 2.3
Within next five years 30.5 3.1
At some point in the future 65.3 7.4
What motivates people to consider thinking of return? 
Clearly it is not nostalgia or homesickness or the Canadian 
weather; rather, it is because potential returnees see a 
development-related role for themselves, as the following 
comments demonstrate:
I am thinking of moving back to Cape Town since 
I have received a job offer there. I feel like I have 
to take the skills I have gained abroad back to 
my home, I have a responsibility to improve the 
country at this critical time for all South Africans. 
(Respondent No. 137)
I have been considering moving back to South 
Africa for a year now and have finally made the 
decision. Despite an excellent income and good 
quality of life, I prefer to be home. I preferred to 
share an uncertain future with family, friends and 
people who share the same background as me. 
Despite making great friends and acquaintances 
and making progress in my field I still feel like 
an immigrant to Canada. And I don’t blame any 
of its citizens for not making me feel at home…
But because I was always interested in politics I 
couldn’t help seeing a dark future. I realized that 
with my emigration to Canada I have also forsaken 
South Africa. I have realized in the last three years 
that the answers and solutions to South Africa’s 
problems are far more likely to be found amongst 
the skilled and possibly therefore emigrants. 
(Respondent No. 176)
Personally, I would like to go back to South Africa 
to hopefully play a role in its politics for the better 
— meaning making everything equal in that 
country, even though it seems like a goal that will 
never be reached. This is why I want to go back, 
because this situation needs to change in order 
for my kids and my family to one day go back to 
South Africa, their rightful home and live their 
lives in prosperity and safety. I do not want the 
situation that apartheid presented to ever happen 
again, so I hope something good happens in the 
future where I can actually play a role and make a 
difference. (Respondent No. 415)
I love South Africa, and it will always be home. 
Even if nothing changes back there, I will still move 
back at some point. I believe everyone has to make 
it work for himself. I have all my relatives back 
there, and they are all very happy and successful 
and will never move. (Respondent No. 562)
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ChapTer 6: diaspora 
organizaTions in 
developmenT
EngAging CollECtivEly
Migrants are well known for forming diaspora associations 
and organizations with those who come from the same 
country. These associations allow for a range of social, 
cultural and economic interactions within the diaspora 
(Mercer, Page and Evans, 2008). Besides demonstrating an 
affinity with the country of origin, diaspora associations 
provide an avenue for the diaspora to make meaningful 
contributions to those countries. This chapter examines 
the development-related activities of Southern African 
diaspora organizations in Canada, focussing primarily 
on those associations actively engaging in development 
initiatives or those with the potential for engaging in 
such development work.1 The activities discussed here 
include initiatives by individuals who rely on their 
diaspora networks, as well as initiatives by groups that, as 
a collective, raise funds and material resources in Canada 
to support projects or institutions in their countries or 
communities of origin.
The chapter demonstrates that diaspora organizations 
engage in a wide variety of formal and informal 
development initiatives in Africa. Most tend to be 
directed at the grassroots level and generally avoid 
engagement with national governments. Despite their 
strong developmental focus and impact, very few 
associations and projects receive financial or material 
support from either the federal or provincial governments 
in Canada. Their main source of support and fundraising 
is the diaspora itself. There is significant overlap in the 
sectors and kinds of activities of diaspora associations, 
but the majority of them tend to support initiatives in the 
education and health fields.
The survey found that 52 percent of individuals from the 
Southern African diaspora outside of South Africa are 
involved in at least one of the different types of diaspora 
association (Table 6.1). The proportion of engaged South 
Africans is also relatively high, at 48 percent; however, 
as might be expected, disengaged South Africans do not 
participate in these organizations to the same degree (only 
31 percent). When the general pattern of involvement 
is disaggregated by type of organization, none of the 
organizations has more than 20 percent involvement by 
the disengaged diaspora. Only one type of organization 
(alumni associations of African universities) has more than 
10 percent involved. By contrast, more than 10 percent of 
both the other Southern African and the engaged South 
1  A number of diaspora associations or networks limit their activities 
to Canada and are given less attention in this chapter.
African diaspora are involved in at least five of the eight 
types of organization listed.
What is of interest is the patterns of membership 
between the two types of engaged diaspora. Southern 
Africans from outside South Africa are much bigger 
supporters of African diaspora associations (16 percent 
versus less than one percent of South Africans), ethnic, 
cultural or HTAs (18 percent versus eight percent), and 
religious organizations (18 percent versus 11 percent). 
Engaged South Africans are more likely to be members 
of alumni associations (17 percent versus seven percent 
of other Southern Africans), professional associations 
(17 percent versus five percent) and Canadian charitable 
organizations with African links (18 percent versus 13 
percent). Both are equally involved with NGOs with 
links to Africa. While these numbers are not large and 
the differences are not very significant, they do suggest 
different potential channels for engagement by the two 
groups. The engaged South African group tends to be 
associated with more formal organizations that are 
exogenous to the diaspora itself while the other Southern 
African group tends to be more involved in self-organized 
institutions.
tyPology of oRgAniZAtionS AnD 
ASSoCiAtionS
The various Southern African diaspora organizations 
in Canada can be classified using a modified typology 
suggested by the IOM (Ionescu, 2006). The classification 
is certainly not comprehensive and further research 
may help clarify the diversity of current and emerging 
initiatives; some overlap may also exist between these 
broad categories.
national/Ethno-national Associations
These associations are the most common form of diaspora 
organization in countries of settlement and numerous 
groups exist in Canada. For example, the Tanzanian 
Canadian Association (TCA) represents people of 
Tanzanian origin in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA); 
other ethno-national organizations for the Tanzanian 
diaspora community in Canada are the Montreal 
Tanzanian Association (MTA) and the Tanzanian 
Community Association of Northern Alberta (TANA) 
(MTA, 2013; TANA, 2013). Amongst Zimbabweans, 
associations include the Zimbabwe Community 
Assistance Association (ZCAA) for recent Zimbabwean 
migrants based in Hamilton, Ontario (ZCAA, 2013). 
Many associations are organized groups with their own 
websites and formal organizational structures, such 
as formal membership with dues, an elected board of 
directors, bylaws and constitutions. Other smaller, more 
informal, groups perform a similar function within 
migrant/diaspora communities.
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tABlE 6.1: PARtiCiPAtion in ACtivitiES of DiASPoRA oRgAniZAtionS
Southern African 
Diaspora
Engaged South African 
Diaspora
Disengaged South 
African Diaspora
% % %
African diaspora association 15.6 0.7 1.3
African students’ association in Canada 7.4 2.2 0.1
Alumni association of African university 6.8 16.6 11.3
Canadian charitable organization with links to Africa 12.7 18.4 9.7
Ethnic, cultural or hometown association in Canada 17.8 8.1 4.4
NGO in Canada with links to Africa 10.6 10.0 2.5
Professional association in Africa 5.4 17.3 5.5
Religious organization with links to Africa 18.3 11.4 8.8
None of the above 48.0 52.0 69.0
Number of Respondents 735 271 636
These associations play a meaningful role within the 
diaspora. Perhaps the most important role is community 
building. By organizing regular social events like picnics, 
dinners and celebrations of milestones in the countries 
of origin (such as Independence Day) and emphasizing 
cultural preservation, they help immigrants and their 
children to maintain symbolic and cultural ties with 
their countries of origin. They provide a vital platform 
for second-generation diasporans, contributing to the 
formation and development of diaspora identity and 
collectivity.
Ethnic/Religious Associations
Most members of these associations belong to a common 
ethnic, cultural and/or religious group. Examples include 
SAJAC and the Canadian Chinese Association (South 
Africa). The Tanzanite Association represents the largely 
Christian Goan community from Tanzania, who trace their 
roots to the western Indian state of Goa.
This category includes groups whose organization and 
activities are based on religious principles: there is an 
affiliation with a religious body and the group’s mission 
statement derives from faith-based values. In some cases, 
the groups obtain financial support from religious sources. 
Examples include the Canadian Friends of the South 
African Chevrah Kadisha (CAFSACK) and the Ismaili 
Youth Soccer (IYS) group, founded by Tanzanian-born 
Amyn Bhulji to encourage Ismaili youth in Vancouver to 
play soccer (CAFSACK, 2013; IYS, 2013). A substantial 
percentage of the Ismaili community in Canada migrated 
from Tanzania and Zanzibar and other East African 
countries during the 1960s and 1970s (“Ismailis,” 2012).
Although the research identified the existence of many 
ethno-national diaspora associations, it also showed 
generally weak involvement in development work in 
SADC countries, though further research may well 
find more connections. Many of the groups focus on 
the diaspora/immigrant community in Canada by 
providing social support to members, often helping 
diaspora members to adjust and integrate into receiving 
societies. Nevertheless, their potential to contribute to 
development in SADC countries is considerable. Several 
groups indicated that there was strong interest among 
members in supporting worthwhile projects “back home” 
and discussions had begun regarding participation in 
selected projects.
HtAs
HTAs are formal or informal associations established by 
diaspora members from the same town or region in the 
country of origin (Orozco and Rouse, 2007; Somerville, 
Durana and Terrazas, 2008; Mercer, Page and Evans, 2009). 
Our preliminary inventory of diaspora groups located very 
few of these associations, which may be linked to lower 
migrant numbers, diverse political histories of Southern 
African countries and disparate motivations for migration 
to Canada among diaspora members. Examples include 
ZANCANA, a community organization for people from 
the Tanzanian region of Zanzibar, and Outreach Zanzibar 
(ZANCANA, 2013; Outreach Zanzibar, 2013).
Alumni networks and Associations
This diaspora group consists of alumni members from 
schools and universities in Southern Africa. Formal and 
informal alumni associations help to keep their members 
connected to their educational institutions, each other and 
to their diaspora communities. Examples in this category 
include alumni groups from South Africa’s Rhodes 
University and UCT (Rhodes University, 2013).
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Professional networks
Examples of professional networks include the 
Organisation des Professionnels Congolais du Canada 
(OPCC). Formed in 1997, this organization’s mission is 
to create a network of professional leaders, students and 
entrepreneurs in Canada and the DRC and to increase 
their influence through the activities and credibility of 
this network. It also seeks to promote cooperation and 
foster new partnerships between Canadian and Congolese 
organizations such as companies, universities and research 
institutions (OPCC, 2013).
Business networks
Business networks link entrepreneurs and companies in 
Canada and elsewhere with business opportunities in 
Southern African countries. They play an important role 
in deepening foreign investment in the country of origin. 
For example, the Zambia Diaspora Business Group Inc., 
launched in Calgary in 2010, allows the Zambian diaspora 
to invest in business opportunities in that country (Zambia 
Diaspora Business Group, Inc., 2013). The group describes 
itself as “an investment vehicle with the objective of 
channeling investment funds into promising business 
opportunities in Zambia” and is based on the premise 
that the Zambian diaspora are “best positioned” to “direct 
and optimize investment opportunities that will benefit 
Zambia’s development efforts” (ibid.).
Chambers of Commerce
Chambers of commerce are similar to business networks, 
in that they provide their members with opportunities 
for trade and investment in countries of origin. They also 
maintain strong links with businesses and governments in 
both countries of origin and settlement, and play a key role 
in trade missions between the two countries. An example 
is the Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business, which 
organizes regular events like the Mining Breakfast, Indaba 
dinner and seminars to achieve these objectives (Canada-
Southern Africa Chamber of Business, 2013).
Collaborative networks
Collaborative networks bring together a variety of diaspora 
and non-diaspora groups and institutions for specific 
projects on issues such as health care. The Ottawa-based 
North-South Institute’s (NSI’s) Diaspora Giving Back 
project, for instance, attempts to provide opportunities 
to Southern African diaspora health-care professionals 
based in Canada to contribute, on a short-term basis, to 
the national health systems of their country of origin (NSI, 
2013). The NSI designed this project in collaboration with 
the South African-based Southern African Network of 
Nurses and Midwives and the Somerset West Community 
Health Centre, based in Ottawa.
Knowledge networks
These transnational networks, established by members 
of the Southern African diaspora in Canada, aim to 
build linkages between research institutions — within 
and outside universities — in Canada and Africa. They 
build up knowledge systems about Southern African 
countries, provide research opportunities to scholars in 
these countries and build capacity by training researchers 
from SADC countries. Research institute and university 
exchange programs provide new opportunities for 
educators, students and academics in both Canada and 
Southern Africa. They help to increase scholarly and 
research expertise in developing countries and promote 
knowledge transfer. In 2004, South African diaspora 
members in Canada played a major role in facilitating 
an exchange agreement between Queen’s University and 
UCT. In 2009, the Canada-based UCT Foundation helped 
facilitate a comprehensive exchange and collaborative 
agreement between UCT and York University in Toronto 
(UCT Foundation, 2009). A number of universities in 
Southern Africa are part of research and development 
partnerships with Canadian universities (Table 6.2). These 
are not diaspora initiatives per se, although diaspora 
academics are often centrally involved.
Significant diaspora-led knowledge networks include the 
Canadian International Development Agency-funded 
African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) that 
links six Canadian universities with university partners 
in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
(AFSUN, 2013).
Community initiatives
Community initiatives support local development and 
community-based projects in countries of origin, and 
include non-profit and charitable foundations engaged in 
development work.
Social-Philanthropic networks
The Canadian Southern African Network (CSAN) is 
a representative example of this category. Established 
in September 2009, this Toronto-based non-profit 
organization has formed a social and philanthropic 
collective of Southern African diaspora members and other 
Canadians interested in their objectives. Another example 
is the Stephen Leacock Foundation for Children, which 
raises funds for education-based programs affecting more 
than 2,000 children in Toronto and South African schools 
(Waldie, 2011).
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tABlE 6.2: RESEARCH AnD tRAining PARtnERSHiPS BEtWEEn CAnADiAn AnD SADC univERSitiES
African Country Canadian Partner African Partner
Angola Ryerson University Agostino Neto University
DRC Laurentian University Université de Kinshasa
Madagascar
Laurentian University Université d’Antananarivo
Université de Montréal Université d’Antananarivo
Malawi
Memorial University Bunda College, University of Malawi
Queen’s University Chancellor College, University of Malawi
Mozambique
University of Victoria Eduardo Mondlane University
Queen’s University Eduardo Mondlane University
Namibia Queen’s University University of Namibia
South Africa
University of British Columbia UCT, Stellenbosch University
McMaster University University of KwaZulu-Natal
Concordia University University of the North
University of Alberta University of Fort Hare
Queen’s University UCT, Wits University, University of KwaZulu-
Natal
York University UCT
Swaziland Queen’s University University of Swaziland
Zambia Queen’s University University of Zambia
umbrella organizations
Umbrella organizations are national and international 
platforms for individuals in diaspora communities and 
diaspora-based associations whose objectives focus on 
diaspora involvement and development-based issues 
in their countries of origin. Examples include Zambia 
Diaspora Connect (ZDC) and the newly constituted 
Zambian Canadian Friendship Association. Efforts 
have been made recently to develop a similar structure 
for Tanzanian associations in Canada. Other umbrella 
groups have been created to forge a more integrated 
diaspora community identity. The Canadian Council 
for South Africans (CANCOSA) was established in 
1995 as the umbrella organization representing South 
African groups in the GTA (CANCOSA, 2013a). The 
amalgamation of the South African Nationals in Ottawa 
and the Protea Club led to the formation of the South 
African Rainbow Association of Canada — Ottawa, 
which, since 2005, has been instrumental in the formation 
of the African Diaspora Association of Canada (ADAC), 
an umbrella organization for all African diaspora 
communities in Canada (ADAC, 2013).
ngos in Canada
This category includes NGOs in Canada that are either 
founded by diaspora members or in which diaspora 
members play a prominent supporting or management 
role. Examples include:
• Tanga Education Support Association (TESA), which 
is supported by the diaspora alumni group of the 
Usagara School in Tanga, Tanzania (Sembony, 2010);
• Reachout to Africa, a Christian humanitarian 
organization operating out of North Vancouver 
(Reachout, 2013);
• Zanele Poverty Relief Effort, founded in 2007 focussed 
on poverty relief in rural Zimbabwe (Zanele Poverty 
Relief Effort, 2013);
• Rural Action International (RAI), dedicated to gender 
equality and women’s empowerment in Zambia 
(RAI, 2013);
• Kuwasha Project, which aims to provide sustainable 
and cheap solar power in Tanzania;
• Vancouver-based Education Without Borders (EWB), 
which seeks to develop educational facilities in 
disadvantaged communities in South Africa;
• My Arms Wide Open (MAWO) Foundation, a 
Canadian charitable foundation created in 2009 to 
support comprehensive community-based projects in 
South Africa (MAWO, 2013);
• Outreach Zanzibar, which aims to provide 
development assistance to Zanzibar in partnership 
with Zanzibar Help Foundation (Outreach Zanzibar, 
2013);
• South African Women for Women (2013), which runs 
a scholarship program for South African-born female 
students from poor backgrounds; and
• Zenzele (2013), a charitable organization based in 
Toronto that provides skills training, entrepreneurial 
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development and business support to women in 
Southern Africa.
Diaspora members also make donations to registered 
charities in Canada to support work either in their home 
country or in Southern Africa generally, depending 
on the focus of the charity. For example, the Toronto-
based Nirvana Cultural Society has raised funds to 
support the activities of the Stephen Lewis Foundation 
and the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund (Canada). 
The Stephen Lewis Foundation works with grassroots 
organizations in developing countries, strengthening 
and implementing HIV and AIDS initiatives in most of 
the countries included in this study. Similarly, the Nelson 
Mandela Children’s Fund (Canada) was founded in 1998 
to “give disadvantaged children and youth in South 
Africa a hand up to overcome the continuing effects of 
the previous apartheid government, disability, HIV and 
AIDS, homelessness and poverty” (Nelson Mandela 
Children’s Fund, 2013).
Student Associations
These networks are made up of international students from 
SADC countries and youth from Southern African diaspora 
communities enrolled in Canadian universities. Like 
ethno-national associations, these networks emphasize 
social and cultural events, reinforcing connections with 
countries of origin. In some cases, these formal and 
informal associations may lead to the formation of ethno-
national organizations. A case in point is the TCA, which 
emerged out of the Tanzanian Students’ Association, 
formed by diaspora members studying at colleges and 
universities in the GTA during the 1970s (TCA, 2013).
virtual Diaspora Associations
The Southern African diaspora in Canada has taken in 
large numbers thanks to the networking potential of 
social media platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn. 
Almost 100 diaspora groups with Canadian-based 
administrators were identified on Facebook, with a total 
of 9,652 members in early 2011. Only two SADC countries 
(Lesotho and Seychelles) had no identifiable groups. The 
greatest number related to South Africa (36), followed by 
Mauritius (15) and Zimbabwe (11) (Table 6.3). The number 
of LinkedIn groups is much smaller, but includes groups 
such as the CSAN (with over 300 professionals as members 
from throughout Canada), SA Canada (over 150 members), 
Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business (around 
80 members), Tanzanians in Canada (30 members) and 
Zimbabweans in Canada. The vast majority of social media 
groups aim to reach out and attract fellow individuals 
from the same country. All of the South African groups 
include a variation of the words “for South Africans living 
in Canada.” This intention is also expressed in the title of 
the virtual diaspora associations, with names like “South 
Africans Living in Toronto,” “South Africans Living in 
Vancouver,” “South Africans in the GTA,” “South Africans 
in Ottawa,” “Young South Africans in Vancouver,” and 
“South Africans in Canada” (at least six groups with this 
name).
Most virtual diaspora associations are established to 
facilitate contact between diaspora members from the same 
country of origin. A common theme in the descriptions 
of the virtual diaspora associations is facilitating social 
connections between persons from the same country. In 
some instances, associations extend invitations to others. 
For example, the South Africans in Ontario Business 
Group on Facebook invites other Canadians to join the 
group, describing itself as a “non-invasive” space to 
share ideas about small business or new business ideas. 
Another group, Canadian Friends of South Africa, has a 
membership that clearly consists of a mix of South African 
and other Canadians.
tABlE 6.3: onlinE DiASPoRA gRouPS
Country Number of Groups Number of Members
South Africa 36 5,371
Zimbabwe 11 477
Madagascar 7 663
Zambia 6 366
DRC 5 130
Tanzania 4 201
Namibia 3 68
Angola 3 34
Botswana 3 54
Swaziland 2 506
Malawi 1 26
Mozambique 1 27
The research identified at least two cases where the 
associations have clearly stated political objectives. Both 
the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) in Canada and 
the Zimbabweans Living in Canada Association describe 
the purpose of their associations as raising awareness 
about the political situation in their countries. The SSN, 
a virtual association on Google groups and Wikispaces, 
provides a collection of articles and documents that focus 
on political, social and economic issues in Swaziland. “As 
Canadians,” they note, “we are hoping to increase public 
awareness of the oppressive government of King Mswati 
III and to demand that our government actively supports 
democracy in this corrupt kingdom” (SSN, 2013).
DEvEloPMEnt initiAtivES
All of the 70 or so groups identified during the research 
play a role in building, maintaining or strengthening 
the transnational engagement of the SADC diaspora. 
Given their diversity and function, their actual roles and 
contributions to development-related activities are wide-
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ranging and varied. To begin with, it is clear that while 
the real and potential contributions of the SADC diaspora 
in Canada to their countries of origin has only recently 
been acknowledged, their involvement is not a recent 
occurrence. The historical dimension, however, is even 
more poorly studied and documented than the current 
patterns. The Forum Club, for example, now a dormant 
entity, was formed in 1976 by members of the South 
African diaspora in Ontario after the Soweto uprising. 
Its purpose was to aid victims of the “cruel and unjust 
policy of apartheid” and, until 1994, it contributed to 
various projects, including the Bishop Tutu Fund to help 
families of political prisoners, school feeding programs 
and homes for the aged (CANCOSA, 2013b). A principal 
project supported by this club for 15 years was the African 
National Congress-run school for children of exiles in 
Tanzania (ibid.).
As far as contemporary patterns of engagement are 
concerned, a number of groups have been directly involved 
in projects from their inception to completion. This is 
most clearly the case for community-based initiatives 
established by diaspora-led charitable or non-profit 
organizations in Canada. Several of these foundations 
have been, or are involved in, implementing projects in 
a number of countries at the same time. We identified 23 
such groups, with the largest number involving South 
Africa and Zambia (six organizations each) followed 
by Zimbabwe, Tanzania and the DRC (four each). Other 
diaspora organizations have played a supporting role to 
organizations or projects already set up in Africa. Still 
others have provided support to Canadian organizations 
with development projects in SADC countries. In some 
cases, a collective of diaspora and non-diaspora actors 
have worked jointly to build up existing systems in SADC 
countries in areas such as education and health.
Diaspora-led charitable organizations have contributed 
to a variety of sectors, including education (high school 
and college/university), humanitarian assistance, gender 
and development, poverty reduction, environment and 
development, food security, basic amenities development 
and health (Table 6.4). The number and strength of 
diaspora-led charitable and non-profit organizations is not 
necessarily related to the size of a country’s diaspora in 
Canada. Smaller diaspora communities, such as Zambians 
in Canada, have established similar or larger numbers of 
development-centred organizations compared with larger, 
more established communities such as the South African 
and Tanzanian diaspora communities.
Many diaspora associations have contributed to several of 
these activities rather than only one (Table 6.5). Education 
is clearly the most important area for diaspora engagement, 
with many groups contributing in various ways in an effort 
to improve existing facilities and access to education for 
vulnerable communities in Southern Africa. This decision 
to invest in education draws on the groups’ beliefs that 
existing facilities are inadequate and that governments 
have failed to meet educational needs, particularly of rural 
and marginal communities. It is also motivated by the view 
that “young people are the country’s future” (Mulenga, 
2011). One respondent explained the decision this way:
Education is the best way to break the cycle of 
poverty. Education provides the fundamental 
foundation otherwise you are wasting. There are 
people who say we should be giving money to 
AIDS, this, that or the other, but I think education 
is positive. It is enthusiastic and when you see the 
results of these kids and you talk to these kids and 
you see how smart they are and then you think if 
they hadn’t gone to the Get Ahead, how miserable 
their lives would have been or how wasted that 
potential would be. (Anonymous respondent)
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tABlE 6.4: DEvEloPMEnt ACtivitiES of DiASPoRA oRgAniZAtionS
Thematic Focus Activities
Education 
(school-level support)
• build/improve infrastructure (classrooms, buildings)
• improve or expand existing facilities (desks, books and computers)
• special programs to enhance learning and improve standards of education
• curriculum development in partnership with Canadian teachers and educators
• additional teaching guidance and programs to address shortage of teachers
• provide scholarships to outstanding students
• pay school fees for children from marginalized communities to reduce rates of attrition
Higher education • improve resources, such as books and journals for university libraries
• financial support for research and community-based projects at universities
• collaborative projects
• contribute to scholarships and bursaries or create new scholarships and bursaries for students (based 
on merit and need)
• build knowledge systems about SADC countries
• enhance research potential
• capacity building through participation of SADC university faculty and students
Health • improve or expand existing facilities
• train health professionals
• provide specialized services (like physiotherapy, occupational therapy)
• HIV and AIDS prevention and sexual health projects
• donate medical supplies and equipment
• collaborative projects involving diaspora participation
Humanitarian assistance • donations of food, money and supplies for accidents or disasters
• projects for internally displaced populations
• donate used clothing and supplies to impoverished communities
Poverty alleviation • create short-/long-term employment for participating communities
Food security • feeding programs for vulnerable households, especially female-headed households and orphans
• food garden program
• diversified uses of existing foods
Basic amenities • improve or increase access to amenities (clean drinking water, housing and electricity)
Youth and development • programs that focus on at-risk youth from marginal communities
Gender and development • programs targeting women
• programs that support or enhance women’s empowerment in communities
• scholarships for female students in schools/universities
Capacity building and skills transfer • provide new opportunities for research and participation
• train local participants in projects
Institutional development • creating formal mechanisms for diaspora engagement with governments in countries of origin
• developing and enhancing diaspora engagement with state structures in countries of origin
Environment and development • introduction of eco-friendly technology, such as solar power
• tree-planting schemes
Fundraising • organize events to raise funds for projects and organizations
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Diaspora networking groups can indirectly contribute to 
development processes by reinforcing the work carried 
out by other organizations based in Canada and Southern 
Africa. CSAN has organized several fundraising events, 
the proceeds of which have supported the expansion of 
educational opportunities for disadvantaged children 
in Southern Africa and Canada. Two past recipients are 
the Stephen Leacock Foundation and Make a Difference 
(MAD) Foundation. The South Africa-based MAD 
Foundation organizes financial support, especially for 
schooling, to youth from poor backgrounds and has a 
mentoring program pairing MAD members and volunteers 
with beneficiaries. So far, the Foundation has supported 79 
students through scholarships (determined on the basis 
of merit and need) and more than 500 children from their 
educational programs in the Western Cape, Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. In 2012, 
CSAN’s fundraising event supported ZimArt-in-Trust’s 
Maori Primary School Project outside Harare (ZimArt, 
2013). The Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business 
has similarly donated funds through special events to 
the African Preschools Society, a Canadian-registered 
charitable organization that develops primary schools 
and has built schools in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal 
provinces in South Africa (African Preschools Society, 
2013). In 2002, the South African Women for Women 
helped to raise money for the Phelophepa Train Project, 
whose objective is to improve health services in remote 
South African rural communities through a mobile medical 
unit providing primary medical care, including optometry, 
pharmaceutical and dental care.
Although diaspora alumni groups have raised funds 
for their alma mater institutions in South Africa, other 
diaspora-based organizations have also contributed 
financial resources to support educational institutions. The 
No Future Without Forgiveness gala event, inspired by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s book of the same name, was 
held in Toronto in 2002. It was organized by South African 
Women for Women, in collaboration with the Law Society 
of Upper Canada, raising more than half a million South 
African rands to support the Faculty of Women’s Studies 
and Faculty of Law at the University of the Western Cape. 
The Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business has 
instituted a postgraduate bursary award at UCT (UCT, 
2011).
Group initiatives, including the formation of organizations 
and foundations, have often emerged out of individual 
diaspora philanthropic efforts. Examples include the 
Enanae Foundation, Global Light Projects, Rural Action 
International, Qamer Foundation and ZDC. South 
African-born doctor Michael Hayden used his 2008 award 
from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to fund 
the establishment of the Ripples of Hope trainee awards, 
including the annual Global Health Award, for recipients 
from African countries. These awards allow trainees 
to come to Canada to study various aspects of health at 
the University of British Columbia (Centre for Molecular 
Medicine and Therapeutics, 2011). He also helped to create 
and implement the Masiphumelele Youth Project (MYP) 
near Cape Town (MYP, 2010).
Philanthropic activities and development initiatives by the 
Southern African diaspora in countries of origin are often 
concomitant with similar activities in Canada. Several 
diaspora groups have contributed to development-
oriented or social projects in Canada, such as the Stephen 
Leacock Foundation-sponsored Triangle of Hope Program, 
which provides support to children from poorer families 
in two Toronto schools.
Diaspora groups in Canada raise funds for their projects 
through membership donations, corporate sponsorship 
and special events. Examples of activities supporting the 
sponsorship and member donations are:
• Qamer Foundation’s Change for Change Campaign, 
which urges people to gather loose change or coins 
in old water bottles for their clean drinking water 
project;
• Outreach Zanzibar and MAWO’s collected donations 
through a partnership with Tides Canada;
• MAWO’s partnership program with You Change, 
which allows US and Canadian residents to recycle 
electronic items, whose equivalent monetary value is 
subsequently donated to the projects;
• from 2008–2010, Malamulele Onward received 
funding from the Social Justice Fund of the Canadian 
Auto Workers;
• the Simon Poultney Foundation has created 
supporting charitable organizations in Zambia and 
the United Kingdom; and
• the Zambian Canadian Foundation and TCA have 
changed their status to charitable organizations 
to enable them to issue tax receipts to donors and 
raise larger sums for their activities in Canada and 
countries of origin.
Although financial resources are largely raised and 
collected in Canada, in some instances international 
diaspora groups like TESA and ZDC, and projects such as 
the MYP have received funding from diaspora members 
outside Canada.
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tABlE 6.5: DEvEloPMEnt EngAgEMEnt of SADC DiASPoRA
Country Diaspora Association Activity
Education
DRC Africa-Japan Chamber of Commerce • raised funds for a school in Kinshasa
DRC Nyantende Foundation • improved primary and secondary school enrollment for children in Nyantende
South Africa EWB • expanded educational facilities in two schools in the Western Cape province
South Africa CAFSACK • donated funds are used for existing social programs for the Jewish community in 
South Africa, like burial expenses support, senior citizens and youth welfare, and 
employment support
South Africa Stephen Leacock Foundation • the Get Ahead Project provides special education programs for disadvantaged 
youth
Tanzania TESA • runs an independent learning centre (with a library and computers) and program 
at the Usagara School in Tanga
Tanzania TESA • runs an after-school meal program for students at the Usagara School
Tanzania TESA • recruited retired Canadian teachers contribute to learning programs by revising, 
updating the curriculum and providing training to current teachers
Tanzania TESA • raised funds to renovate school building
Tanzania Qamer Foundation • donated school supplies for children from a marginal community
Tanzania IYS • in partnership with the Aga Khan Educational Society (Tanzania), raised funds to 
renovate the soccer field at the Aga Khan Primary School, Dar-es-Salaam
Tanzania Zanzibar Canada Association 
(ZANCANA)
• donated computers to two schools in Zanzibar
Tanzania IYS • raised funds in 2010 to revamp the soccer fields at the Aga Khan Primary School, 
Dar-es-Salaam
Zanzibar, 
Tanzania
Outreach Zanzibar • raised funds and helped to renovate the Unguja Ukuu Primary School in Zanzibar
Zambia RAI • helped to construct a new school building
Zambia Simon Poultney Foundation • built a new staff house at Sungula School in Chibwelelo in central Zambia
DRC Fondation Lazare • donated computers to the University of Kinshasa
Zimbabwe Hutano • organized a fundraising event to purchase textbooks and journals for the 
University of Zimbabwe medical library
Zimbabwe Runyararo Zimbabwe Children’s 
Charity
• provided scholarships (covering school fees and educational supplies) for children 
in three schools
Southern Africa SAMP/AFSUN • provides new avenues for collaborative research between diaspora and non-
diaspora faculty at Queen’s University and institutions in Southern African 
countries
South Africa Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of 
Business
• created a postgraduate business bursary award at UCT
South Africa UCT Foundation/UCT alumni group • helped to establish the research and student exchange program between UCT and 
York University
South Africa UCT Foundation/UCT alumni group • provided funds for scholarships, bursaries and various university-based projects
Zambia Masomo Foundation • provides university-level scholarships each year to a select number of students in 
Canada and Zambia
Health
DRC Fondation Lazare • donated medical supplies and equipment to the Kalembelembe Children’s 
Hospital in Kinshasa
Lesotho and 
South Africa
Malamulele Onward • provides specialized therapy such as physiotherapy, occupational therapy and 
speech therapy along with equipment and caregiver training in poor rural 
communities
Zanzibar Outreach Zanzibar • opened a low-cost dental clinic with volunteer staff
Tanzania Qamer Foundation • provided clean drinking water through construction of new wells
Humanitarian Relief
DRC Shiloh Place • provided housing and living needs for vulnerable groups, such as orphans and 
widows
Tanzania ZANCANA • collected funds and supplies of families of victims of a ferry accident
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Country Diaspora Association Activity
Zambia Mulenga Michael Sikombe/Enanae 
Foundation
• collected gently used items (including clothing, shoes and bedding) in partnership 
with Zambians in America group to donate in Zambia
Zimbabwe Moonraiser Entertainment • donated clothes and other supplies to two orphanages
Poverty Reduction
South Africa MAWO • implemented One Brick at a Time employment program for local communities in 
Berknok, Limpopo
Zimbabwe Canada Rural Folk of Africa 
Foundation
• donated poultry to small farmers in Rusape, Manicaland Province
Food Security
DRC Fondation Lazare • provided 40 acres of land for community farming and food production in the 
Mbakana rural community
South Africa EWB • established a food garden program
Zambia RAI • established an education program to make diverse foods using local crops like 
cassava
Environment and Development
South Africa MAWO • established a tree-planting program
Tanzania Carbon X Energy • implemented a solar energy program
Zambia Global Light Projects • implemented a solar energy program
Diaspora engagement is also evident in the willingness 
of diaspora faculty at Canadian universities to leverage 
and establish institutional partnerships for international 
research collaboration and education capacity building 
in SADC countries. A 2008 symposium organized by 
the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada 
(AUCC) with the World University Service of Canada and 
the IDRC recorded the specific advantages of diaspora 
faculty to set up such collaborative ventures and the large 
numbers of diaspora faculty who were leading projects 
in their country or region of origin (AUCC, 2009). The 
increasing numbers of SADC diaspora faculty appointed 
in Canadian universities reinforces this aspect (ibid.).
Prosperous migrants, such as many South Africans in 
Canada, are well positioned to generate sizable sums for 
development causes. There is already evidence of this 
in the work of groups like CSAN. Faith-based groups, 
many of which have ties to Tanzania, are another diaspora 
group with solid prospects for transnational development 
engagement. Ismaili communities in different parts 
of Canada possess a strong record of community and 
humanitarian work. They also have a very high profile 
within Canada for raising funds for development work 
in Canada and developing countries, including Tanzania, 
through the Aga Khan Foundation. The annual World 
Partnership Walk, organized by the Aga Khan Foundation 
Canada, has raised more than CDN$70 million. In 2011, 
alone, some 40,000 participants raised more than CDN$7 
million for projects in Africa and Asia (World Partnership 
Walk, 2013).
PRoMoting AnD iMPEDing EngAgEMEnt
While the range of projects and involvement is impressive, 
the depth and scale of engagement varies by group and 
country. Like individual engagement, diaspora group 
involvement is strongly influenced by conditions that 
enable or limit engagement in activities with development 
outcomes (Table 6.6).
The philanthropic efforts and development engagement 
of the Southern African diaspora communities clearly 
enhance the emotional, cultural and personal ties that 
they maintain with their countries of origin. A Zambian 
diaspora member living in Ontario who is involved 
with several diaspora-based groups, wrote recently that 
despite “living away from home for many years, they 
[the Zambian diaspora] have not forgotten their land of 
birth” (Sichilima, 2009). “I wanted to give back to my 
motherland” was how another respondent explained his 
engagement with Zambia.
These engagements reveal the multiple attachments 
of diverse Southern African diaspora communities 
to different geographic locations. For certain groups, 
especially those who can trace their origins to places 
outside Southern Africa, these emotional and cultural 
ties extend to several countries rather than one country of 
origin. A participant from the Tanzanian Goan diaspora 
explained the decision to support projects in different 
places: “I wanted to give back to Tanzania, India and 
Canada because all these three places have moulded who 
I am as a person.” Funds raised at the Tanzanite group’s 
annual event in 2010 were donated to projects in Goa, 
Tanzania and Canada. The Nirvana Cultural Society’s 
annual dinner event has raised funds for victims of the 
Bhopal gas disaster in central India and contributed to 
initiatives in South Africa through the Stephen Lewis 
Foundation and Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund.
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tABlE 6.6: fACtoRS AffECting DiASPoRA EngAgEMEnt
Enabling Constraining
• emotional and cultural ties with Africa and/or countries of origin
• appreciation and ties to alumni institutions in Africa
• role of gratitude and privilege
• supporting diaspora and non-diaspora networks in Canada
• support from family and friends in Africa
• social and economic integration in Canada
• diaspora skills and expertise
• familiarity and knowledge of countries of origin
• importance of volunteerism and philanthropy for faith-based 
diasporas
• Internet and social media
• Canada’s international engagement and humanitarian role
• synergies of existing groups
• weak mechanisms of diaspora engagement by African and 
Canadian governments
• limited funding for diaspora-led initiatives
• corruption and bureaucratic red tape
• skepticism of government agendas
• double burden on diasporas in sending and receiving contexts
• weakening engagement over different diaspora generations
• small, isolated diaspora associations
• divided communities and politics within
• political histories of African countries
• excessive reliance on volunteers
• varying skill sets of volunteers
• longevity of involvement
Attachment to places of birth and places where they spent 
their formative years is a key factor in the selection of 
project locations by diaspora members:
I think that with our knowledge of Zanzibar, the 
fact that we speak the language, the fact that we 
were born there and raised there and understand 
the nuances of the people, we can make the most 
impact on a lot of people, [more] than other people 
who try to help. (Anonymous respondent)
Unsurprisingly, many projects have been carried out in 
the home villages or towns of key members of diaspora 
organizations. The inaugural school lighting initiative of 
Global Light Projects was implemented in Chona village, 
the native village of one of the organization’s founders. 
Another project is being planned in Mwanangonze village, 
the ancestral home of another Zambian-Canadian, based 
in Peterborough, who has raised funds for Global Light 
Projects.
To foster engagement, members of diaspora organizations 
have relied on their personal networks in Canada and 
Southern African in a variety of ways. To identify suitable 
projects and where these should be carried out, diaspora 
members have relied on their own knowledge, familiarity 
with the area and the advice of family and friends in 
Southern African countries. The education project of 
Outreach Zanzibar has focussed on the Unguja Ukuu 
School, where one of the organization’s founders worked 
as a teacher in his youth. The founder of the Runyayaro 
Charity asked her sisters in Zimbabwe to identify 
schools where the scholarship program would be best 
implemented. Besides identifying worthy initiatives, 
target locations and project beneficiaries, family members, 
relatives and friends have been asked to join the executive 
committee of organizations in Canada. They have 
participated in similar committees or sister organizations 
in the countries of origin, overseeing the progress of 
projects and disbursement of project funds. The Qamer 
Foundation, Simon Poultney Foundation and MAWO are 
among the groups where family members are executive 
members and play an active role in organizational 
activities.
Diaspora members’ networks have also proven beneficial 
in generating funds for development initiatives. Three 
examples of networks that extend beyond Canada 
and SADC countries are the Zimbabwe Gecko Society, 
which used its church-based contacts in Vancouver and 
Burnaby to sell wire ornaments to raise funds for its 
programs; Global Light Projects, which reached out to 
the congregation at the Royal View Church in London 
to collect funds for its school lighting projects in Zambia; 
and diaspora members who used the email list of Umoja 
Tanzanian Canadian Community Organization to raise 
funds for victims of a bomb blast in Tanzania.
With its large immigrant population, progressive outlook 
towards refugees and immigrants, and long-standing 
humanitarian engagement, Canada is well positioned 
to play a strategic role in facilitating and strengthening 
global diaspora linkages. Many reunions of diaspora 
communities in North America, Europe, Australia and 
elsewhere have been held in Canada. More than 350 
former residents of Arusha, Tanzania now residing in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and 
Canada attended the first global reunion in Toronto in mid-
2010. That same year, Toronto hosted a similar reunion of 
diaspora Zanzibaris, and in mid-2012, the city also played 
host to Ismaili diasporans originally from Tanga, Tanzania.
The synergies of diaspora organizations, especially those 
working in similar geographical locations, can strengthen 
existing projects and initiatives. Global Light Projects and 
RAI plan to provide solar power to a rural community 
in northern Zambia in a joint project that will not only 
deliver electricity to the local school, but will also allow the 
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community to dry cassava using solar heating technology, 
buttressing RAI’s existing education and food security 
projects in the area. The success of small-scale projects can 
act as a stimulus for new projects. For example, the Chona 
village school lighting project and its immediate benefits 
for the community motivated one of its Canadian donors 
to establish a solar energy-based project in Zambia, using 
the solar water disinfection method to disinfect drinking 
water and reduce water-borne diseases.
By virtue of their dual association, diaspora organizations 
can function as bridges between countries of origin and 
Canada. In addition to raising funds, they can contribute to 
development work in other ways, including strengthening 
Canadian non-diaspora philanthropic efforts by providing 
volunteers for projects. Many groups have drawn on the 
large pool of Canadians interested in volunteering in these 
countries to participate in existing diaspora development 
projects. For example, Outreach Zanzibar engaged the 
voluntary services of two retired British schoolteachers to 
revise the English language curriculum at the Unguja Ukuu 
School. TESA organized and funded accommodation for 
volunteer Canadian teachers at the Usagara School.
The funds raised by diaspora groups vary considerably, 
from a few hundred dollars to much larger sums for 
worthy projects. The MYP solicited close to CDN$400,000 
globally; the Stephen Leacock Foundation for Children has 
collected more than CDN$8 million in Canada for school-
based programs in South Africa; Canadian UCT alumni 
donated close to CDN$100,000 in 2009 and 2010 to support 
bursaries and other programs; and TESA has collected 
more than CDN$50,000 for school improvement projects.
A striking feature of contemporary diaspora development 
engagement is the increasing role and innovative use 
of information and communication technologies in 
developing transnational networks and strengthening 
linkages with countries of origin. The ZDC conducted their 
second e-conference using the Zambia Blog Talk Radio, 
while the Yahoo groups messaging system was used 
to conduct the first conference. The ZDC has regularly 
informed the Zambian diaspora about its activities and 
mandate through Zambia Blog Talk Radio. The MYP 
involved UCT medical school alumni members living in 
countries including Israel, United States and Canada.
Notwithstanding these enabling factors, there are serious 
limitations and barriers to diaspora engagement. Because of 
the difficult histories of several countries tied to colonialism 
and apartheid, combined with the variable reasons that 
diasporas left these areas, these relationships are not as 
straightforward as might be imagined. They can be much 
more complicated and ambivalent, raising questions about 
who and how many in the diaspora community are willing 
to participate in organized development activities.
It certainly cannot be assumed that all members of the 
Southern African diaspora in Canada have the ability or 
are ready to contribute to their countries of origin. One 
recent immigrant from South Africa who was opposed to 
fundraising for projects said, “I have just left that place. Why 
would I want to give back?” When diaspora communities 
are divided economically, racially or politically, the task 
of bringing them together under a common banner to 
work cooperatively can be challenging. Conflicts between 
members in an organization can disrupt its functioning 
as well as project continuity. These differences may be 
magnified when umbrella organizations are created for 
development engagement.
The question of attachment becomes even more important 
for successive generations. While several participants felt 
that their children’s attachment to their country of origin 
was equally strong and would remain so over several 
generations, others were not as optimistic:
My relationship with Zanzibar is very strong. But 
I am not sure about my children’s attachment to it. 
They are born here and are much more interested 
in the Canadian culture. They know that their 
roots are there — in Zanzibar and Tanzania — but 
they may not feel the same as I do. When someone 
asks me where I am from, I always say Tanzania, 
but my children [when asked the same question] 
say Canada. (Anonymous respondent)
Diaspora-based initiatives and organizations often rely 
on the time and skills of volunteers, which may limit the 
scope and impact of projects. Some diaspora organizations 
have very limited funding, which may restrict their ability 
to contribute to and run projects.
Concerns about corruption and the lack of financial 
transparency can be a barrier to diaspora involvement 
in development projects in their countries of origin. One 
respondent said that there was “corruption at all levels” 
in Canada and African countries and that “money raised 
for such work did not always go where it was supposed 
to.” An anonymous respondent gave the example of a 
wealthy South African relative living in Ontario who had 
given a substantial amount of money to an orphanage 
in South Africa, only to discover that the money had 
been misappropriated. The relative then had to spend 
additional funds to employ another manager to oversee 
the operations of the orphanage.
Weak state structures to engage the diaspora and the 
absence of dual citizenship provisions were deemed other 
hurdles to engagement. While many respondents indicated 
their keenness to work with local authorities to run their 
projects, others expressed equally strong concerns about 
excessive regulation, having to deal with corrupt officials 
and the indifference of state authorities. Organizers of a 
school-based project complained that, despite having 
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followed the proper procedures for securing work visas, 
they were forced to bribe immigration officials to end the 
constant harassment over the immigration documents of 
their Canadian volunteers. A diaspora member suggested 
that African countries establish structures such as a 
diaspora ombudsman, with authority over government 
departments, to liaise with diaspora communities. Another 
respondent bemoaned the lack of support from local 
officials for a project in a government-run school: “We are 
working in a vacuum. There is no recognition from the 
government or ministry of education. If the government 
gives us support, we can work much better.”
Divergent perceptions about diaspora initiatives are 
obstacles to engagement. One respondent said that 
diasporas were sometimes seen in their countries of 
origin as “money-making machines, which we are not. 
We are often using our personal resources to do the 
work.” Diasporas are sometimes perceived as a threat and 
competition to citizens living in these countries: “People 
think that we want to be masters of [countries of origin]. 
But we don’t, we only want to achieve our goals,” was one 
interviewee’s explanation. Another respondent wrote that 
“rather than seeing the diaspora as a miser doubly bent 
on benefitting from the Zambian resources, the Zambian 
government should see the diaspora as an integral part of 
its development strategy.”
The high cost of sending goods, steep custom duties and 
shipping delays were identified as other barriers. One 
respondent indicated that the diaspora community in 
Toronto had been discouraged by the experience of similar 
groups in the United States. The respondent explained 
that an organization in Dallas, Texas, had raised money 
to send medical equipment to Tanzania, but the beds and 
equipment were held up at customs for over a year and the 
organization was unable to raise additional funds to get the 
consignment released. A different participant recounted a 
similar experience for Zimbabwe: “I know of a friend of 
an aunt of mine living in Michigan who had organized a 
book drive to send used books to Zimbabwe. Now all of 
the books are sitting in her basement because she has not 
found a way to be able to ship the books to Zimbabwe.”
Some diaspora groups revealed that they were 
overwhelmed by the many needs of marginal communities 
in Southern Africa. “The biggest room in Zambia,” 
remarked an interviewee, “is the room for improvement. 
When I reached the school, it was disappointing. There 
were no desks or chairs in the classroom. We had brought 
the technology [to electrify the school] but there were no 
desks or chairs for the children.” Despite the great need, 
organizations may not always be able to implement 
programs in the most deprived communities in Southern 
Africa.
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ChapTer 7: ConClusion
Since 1990, over five million people have immigrated 
to Canada, an average of 250,000 people a year. Of the 
three million who entered after 2000, 60 percent arrived 
as economic immigrants, 26 percent were in the family 
class of entry and 11 percent were given refugee status. 
Under Canadian immigration law, all three groups 
become permanent residents of Canada. Recent estimates 
suggest that the foreign-born population of Canada and 
their Canadian-born children (so-called second-generation 
immigrants) make up 20 percent of the total Canadian 
population. In other words, one in five Canadians can be 
considered a member of a diaspora.
While the number of immigrants to Canada has been 
relatively constant, the volume of temporary migration 
has grown rapidly over the past decade. The two main 
categories of temporary residents are workers and 
international students. Between 2000 and 2011, the number 
of temporary migrant workers in Canada increased from 
90,000 to 300,000, and the number of students increased 
from 115,000 to 239,000. Neither group can really be 
considered members of a diaspora, however, unless they 
change their status and remain in Canada.
Advocates of temporary migration to countries like 
Canada argue that the temporary foreign worker program 
is a good example of migration and co-development, or a 
“triple win” for all the participants: Canada, the country 
of origin and the migrants themselves (Newland, 2009; 
Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmerman, 2012; Zapata-
Barrero, García and Sánchez-Montijano, 2012). While 
temporary work programs around the globe are notorious 
for the exploitation of migrants, there are clear economic 
benefits to source countries as well as migrants themselves 
from well-run, rights-based programs.
In contrast, permanent immigration has conventionally 
been seen only as a “double win,” benefitting Canada, 
which gains skilled workers without spending on training, 
and the immigrants themselves, who are upwardly mobile 
and tend to earn more than they did in their countries of 
origin.
From the perspective of source countries, the movement 
of skilled and educated migrants from South to North 
has been seen as a negative and damaging phenomenon, 
encapsulated in the oft-used pejoratives “poaching” and 
“brain drain.” By redefining immigrants as diasporas, 
researchers and governments are now trying to develop a 
more nuanced position on the global impacts of migration. 
The growing use of this term, including by many migrants 
themselves, is meant to draw attention to the emotional 
and material ties that those who relocate maintain with 
their countries of origin, and even pass on to their children.
Immigration to Canada has been increasingly dominated 
by countries in the South over the past two decades. 
Between 2000 and 2011, for example, 1.45 million people 
emigrated from Asia to Canada (50 percent of the total). 
In addition, 612,000 people (21 percent) emigrated from 
Africa and the Middle East and 283,000 (10 percent) from 
Central and South America. In other words, just over 80 
percent of Canada’s immigrants come from developing 
countries. Conventional “brain drain” wisdom might 
suggest that Canada is guilty of “poaching” the brightest 
and the best from the South and negatively impacting the 
development of these countries and regions. Redefining 
immigrants from developing countries as diasporas 
raises the interesting possibility that there might be 
real development benefits for those countries, and 
that immigration, not just temporary migration, might 
constitute a “triple win” as well. This study set out to test 
this proposition with a subset of African immigrants in 
Canada — those from the southern part of the continent.
Various methodological difficulties made it impossible 
to collect a representative survey sample from all 15 
countries of the SADC. In two cases (South Africa and 
Zimbabwe), there were sufficient responses to undertake 
an independent analysis of the diaspora (Chikanda, Crush 
and Maswikwa, 2012; Crush, 2012). In the South African 
case, the sample was large enough to undertake a separate 
analysis of health professional immigrants in Canada 
(Crush, Chikanda and Pendleton, 2012). This report 
focusses on the contrast between South African immigrants 
in Canada and immigrants from other countries in the 
Southern African region. The latter were aggregated into 
a single group for purposes of analysis in order to create a 
large enough sample. Further research would be needed to 
see how far the diasporas from individual countries fit the 
aggregate picture.
The primary reason for separating out the South Africans 
in this analysis is that it soon became clear that there 
were considerable attitudinal and behavioural differences 
between this group and other immigrants from Southern 
Africa. When it comes to the maintenance of links with 
countries of origin, attitudes towards those countries and 
engagement in development, the differences are so stark 
that the term “divided diasporas” was coined to describe 
them. The South African diaspora in Canada — for all 
its wealth, privilege and skills — displays an attitudinal 
and behavioural profile that leads us to the conclusion 
that it is largely disengaged in development. The majority 
used their skills and training acquired in South Africa to 
emigrate to Canada; however, they generally do not feel 
that they owe their country of origin anything.  For some, 
life under a black majority African National Congress 
government was unpalatable after the benefits of apartheid 
for whites. Others left over fears of crime and personal 
lack of security. We could find no evidence of sympathy 
towards the black population of South Africa, however, 
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who are far more vulnerable to crime than most whites. 
The majority of South African whites in Canada hold 
negative views about their country of origin, are divesting 
themselves of their resources there and show little desire to 
be involved in its development. Their contacts with South 
Africa primarily involve visiting family there; very few 
are interested in return migration. The majority of South 
Africans in Canada appear to be “lost” to South Africa.
At the same time, the South African diaspora in Canada 
is itself divided, with a minority showing a very different 
attitudinal profile. This minority, around 20 percent of 
those interviewed, are far more typical of an engaged 
diaspora, demonstrating a genuine desire to be involved 
in the development of South Africa. Their views and 
activities are far more similar to immigrants from other 
Southern African countries in Canada than they are to 
their fellow South Africans.
Immigrants from the Southern African region outside of 
South Africa are characterized by the findings of this report 
as an engaged diaspora. The majority are comparatively 
recent immigrants to Canada and maintain close personal 
cultural and economic ties with their countries of origin. 
The clearest indication of this is their remitting behaviour. 
They are not particularly high earners in Canada and 
individually, they do not remit large sums, but they 
do remit cash (and goods) extremely regularly, mostly 
through formal channels. While most remit to help meet 
the living expenses of relatives, remittances clearly have 
positive development implications at the household and 
community levels, including contributing to improved 
food security and nutrition, medical expenses and the 
education of children. Only a small minority use their 
remittances in a broader development-related manner 
through investment in community projects, productive 
activity, entrepreneurship and so on. A significant minority 
do engage in other activities that have development-
related implications: for example, a quarter have exported 
goods from Canada for sale in their countries of origin, 
and 10 percent have imported goods for sale in Canada. 
The same proportion have invested in business, generated 
employment and engaged in research partnerships. These 
numbers could grow rapidly with the return of political 
and economic stability and opportunity in countries such 
as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe.
The basis for this conclusion is the openness of the 
engaged South African diaspora and other Southern 
African diaspora participating in a variety of development 
activities in the future. Two out of every three survey 
respondents agreed that they have an important role to 
play in the development of their countries of origin. The 
most-cited activities of interest included skills transfer 
(mentioned by 58 percent), investing in businesses (55 
percent), participating in developmental projects (52 
percent), educational exchanges (52 percent), volunteer 
work (47 percent), fundraising for development projects 
(46 percent), philanthropy (42 percent), export and import 
of goods (39 percent), infrastructural investment (39 
percent) and providing long-distance learning (37 percent). 
One-third of respondents would also like to contribute to 
development by sending remittances, suggesting a desire 
to see the development potential of remittances reaching 
beyond their own families.
How can the gap between what members of the diaspora 
are actually doing and what they are interested in doing 
be bridged? The questionnaire did not ask what would 
help individuals or associations to bridge the gap, but 
some tentative answers can be advanced. The first 
challenge is an attitudinal one. Disapora individuals 
or groups are unlikely to put words into action if it 
means supporting a government or political system 
that they consider unacceptable or unrepresentative. 
Most diasporic Zimbabweans, for example, want to see 
major changes in the country’s political dispensation 
before they will commit to supporting any development 
projects or programs involving the government. 
However, even if the members of a diaspora will not 
work with government, this does not mean that they 
will do nothing until the political situation is more to 
their liking. Chapter 6 of this report demonstrates that 
highly motivated individuals and groups in Canada have 
already established a significant and impressive array of 
community-oriented projects throughout the Southern 
African region, particularly in education and health, with 
their own resources and through fundraising within and 
outside the diaspora. An evaluation of many of these 
initiatives would help to identify best practices and 
new ideas which could be scaled up, with appropriate 
financial backing, to have a broader impact.
Another challenge is that there is only so much that 
individuals can do unless they are independently wealthy 
or have major financial backing. Here, there is a critical 
enabling role for various types of diaspora organizations 
that potentially provide the structure, ideas and resources 
to harness individual energy and enthusiasm. Such 
organizations rely heavily on volunteer and pro bono 
work, and private donations, which affects their ability 
to develop serious and systematic long-term projects 
and planning. The Canadian government, in particular, 
could reframe the diaspora as development partners in 
new ways and creatively support their work and projects 
with dedicated funding and support. By identifying the 
kinds of activities that members of the diaspora are, or 
would like to be, engaged in, this report makes a valuable 
contribution to this process.
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Canada amonG natIons 2013: 
Canada-afrICa relatIons
edited by Rohinton Medhora and yiagadeesen Samy
the 27th volume of this influential series analyzes the ebb and flow 
of Canada’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through different 
lenses, highlighting the opportunities and difficulties that exist 
for Canada and Sub-Saharan Africa. it is clear that a new Africa is 
emerging, and Canada must be prepared to change the nature of its 
relationship with the continent.
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the mIllennIum develoPment 
Goals and Post-2015:  
squarInG the CIrCle
barry Carin and nicole bates-eamer
based on a series of reports and discussions on the post-2015 
development agenda, this paper reviews the history of the 
Millennium Development Goals, describes the current context 
and lists the premises and starting points. it concludes with some 
observations on each of the 10 recommended goals. 
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between north and south: the 
eu-aCP mIGratIon relatIonshIP
Jonathan Crush
in the space of a decade, international migration has shifted 
from being an issue that was of marginal interest on the 
international development agenda to one that is increasingly at 
its centre. this paper provides a context for understanding the 
nature of cooperation between the eu and ACp Group of States 
on international migration governance.
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are short sellers PosItIve 
feedbaCk traders? evIdenCe 
from the Global fInanCIal CrIsIs
Martin t. bohl, Arne C. klein and pierre l. Siklos
During the recent global financial crisis, regulatory authorities in 
a number of countries imposed short-sale constraints aimed at 
preventing excessive stock market declines. the findings in this 
paper, however, suggest that short-selling bans do not contribute to 
enhancing financial stability.
Policy Brief
East asian statEs,  
thE arctic council and 
intErnational rElations 
in thE arctic
James manicom and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
introduction
The significant changes taking place in the Arctic are attracting worldwide 
attention, often to the discomfort of Arctic states and peoples. This is no better 
demonstrated than by the East Asian states’ growing interest in Arctic issues. All 
three major East Asian states — China, Japan and South Korea — bid for Arctic 
Council membership in 2009 and all have active polar research programs. This 
interest has met with concern in several quarters, not least because of China’s 
perceived belligerence in its own claimed maritime areas and because of the 
widely held misperception that it claims some portion of the Arctic Ocean. 
KEy Points
• East Asian states do not perceive Arctic issues through an “Arctic” lens; rather, 
they are deemed “maritime” or “polar” issues. This preference reflects a global, 
rather than a regional, perspective on the Arctic. East Asian Arctic interests can 
thus be pursued in a range of international fora; they do not need Arctic Council 
membership to pursue their Arctic interests.
• The Arctic Council’s member states should welcome East Asian states as observers 
to enmesh them into “Arctic” ways of thinking; otherwise, these states may pursue 
their Arctic interests via other means, which would undermine the Arctic Council’s 
place as the primary authority on Arctic issues.
• The most important element of this integration will be to foster dialogue between 
East Asian states and the Arctic Council’s six permanent participants (PPs) that 
represent northern indigenous peoples.
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east asIan states, the arCtIC 
CounCIl and InternatIonal 
relatIons In the arCtIC
James Manicom and p. Whitney lackenbauer
All three major east Asian states — China, Japan and South korea 
— have bid for Artic Council membership and have active polar 
research programs, but their interest has met with concern in several 
quarters. this policy brief suggests that the Arctic Council’s member 
states should welcome east Asian states as observers to enmesh 
them into “Arctic” ways of thinking.
ConferenCe report
false dIChotomIes: eConomICs 
and the ChallenGes of our tIme
kevin english
this report, from the CiGi and inet conference, focusses on how 
economists should work with other areas of study, such as history, 
law, psychology and political economy, to enrich research and 
provide more well-rounded answers to the questions facing the 
economic community today.
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EffECtivE
Skylar BrookS, Warren Clarke, MiChael CoCkBurn, 
DuStyn lanz anD BeSSMa MoMani
introduCtion
The global financial crisis has shown the need for stronger surveillance and 
better foresight in financial governance. In 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20) 
sought to bolster these by initiating the semi-annual EWE. Two international 
institutions — the IMF and the FSB — were tasked with conducting the EWE. 
Although the EWE is a critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and 
vulnerabilities, several problems constrain its effectiveness. The exercises 
suffer from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation, 
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures. 
KEy Points
• The Early Warning Exercise (EWE) was designed as a joint program between the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to identify 
low-probability systemic financial risks. Although cooperation between the IMF and 
FSB is central to the exercise, this needs to be significantly improved and strengthened 
to effectively alert and warn of potential crises.
• The EWE suffers from unclear goals, a lack of coordination, geographical separation, 
insufficient organizational capacity and ad hoc procedures.
• The EWE requires specific changes to address these shortcomings and would also 
benefit from a regular publication to boost its visibility and impact. 
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CoordInatIon CrItICal to 
ensurInG the early warnInG 
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bessma Momani et al.
the need for stronger surveillance and better foresight in financial 
governance was made clear during the global financial crisis. the 
Group of twenty initiated the early warning exercise, which is a 
critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and vulnerabilities; 
however, several problems constrain its effectiveness.
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CIGI G20 PaPers | No. 7, february 2013
barry Carin and David shorr
the G20 as a lever for ProGress
barry Carin and David Shorr
the failure of many observers to recognize the varied scale of the 
G20’s efforts has made it harder for the G20 to gain credit for the 
valuable role it can play. this paper offers five recommendations for 
the G20 to present a clearer understanding of how it functions and 
what it has to offer.
CiGi publications are available online at www.cigionline.org.
